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Perhaps most interesting within autism research is the focus on emotion processing and facial 
emotion recognition (FER) specifically because difficulties in recognising and responding appropriately 
to others emotions are part of the diagnostic criteria of autism outlined in the DSM-V (American 
Psychiatric Association 2013). The research surrounding emotion processing abilities in autism has 
shown conflicting results (Harms, Martin & Wallace 2010). The thesis presented here aims to explore 
emotion processing in autism with the use of new stimuli that better reflects the demands of everyday life 
by simultaneously incorporating tasks that require a greater understanding of socially appropriate 
information. 
 
Chapter 1 introduces autism in more detail and covers the theories that attempt to explain its 
aetiology, before briefly introducing emotion processing. Chapter 2 expands into the research area of the 
thesis covering theories of emotion and emotion processing research in much greater detail, both 
generally and within autism including a review of current methodologies used to explore FER in autism.  
 
Chapters 3 and 4 report the development and validation of the new stimuli set. The completed 
stimulus set contains 133 posed expressions and a matching 133 spontaneous expressions captured from 
19 individuals in response to seven social prompts. Analysis o f expression formation through FACS data 
with principle component analyses showed consistent display patterns were more frequent across 
spontaneous expressions than posed. In chapter 4 results showed significantly better recognition of 
spontaneous expressions than posed, participants could identify the correct answer significantly more than 
alternate options for six of the seven expressions. Participants also gave systematic emotion state 
attributions to those responses significantly more than chance would predict.  
 
Chapter 5 reports the results of displaying a subset of expressions with better recognition rates to 
typically developing children, and recording their visual attention patterns with an infra -red eye tracker. 
As was the case in chapter 4 differences in spontaneous and posed expressions extended to viewing 
styles; significantly more fixations were made to posed expressions and significantly more time was spent 
fixated to posed expressions  but this didn’t appear to influence recognition rates where  no differences 
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were present between posed and spontaneous expressions . The viewing styles in combination with 
performance on a retrodictive mindreading task significantly predicted autism traits.  
 
In chapter 6 differences between an ASC sample and typically developing control sample on a 
retrodictive mindreading task were investigated. No group differences on overall task performance were 
shown; this was true for both the retrodictive mindreading task and the reading the mind in the eyes task. 
The previous effect in chapter 4, of spontaneous expressions recognised significantly better than posed 
was repeated, both groups also made significantly more consistent emotion to retrodiction attributions 
than a chance model would predict. Investigation of the role  of Alexithymia showed no effect of 
Alexithymia severity on retrodictive mind reading ability. Investigating the role of alexithymia within the 
ASC sample showed no association between alexithymia sores and retrodictive mindreading ability.  
 
The results are discussed in respect of three themes in the thesis. Firstly the impact of posed and 
spontaneous expressions are considered in expression production (chapter 3), viewing styles (chapter 5) 
and recognition (chapters 4 and 6); suggesting that spontaneous expressions elicited during a real life 
social interchange under the methods outlined in this thesis are quantitatively different to posed 
expressions, are viewed differently, and have different recognition rates. Secondly the impact of 
Alexithymia on expression production and recognition was also considered. As an emerging theory that 
attempts to explain the emotion and social difficulties in ASC, Alexithymia’s comorbidity was an 
important finding throughout this thesis, its role is discussed specifically it s influence over retrodictive 
mindreading performance but not eyes task performance. Finally the results are discussed in respect of 
FER in autism. The lack of a significant difference between groups could have implications for the topic; 
many of the inconsistent results rely on different methods some of which are more artificial and lack 
validity of emotion processing in a real world sense. The discussion continues considering the limitations 
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Chapter 1: Autism and Associated Difficulties 
This thesis will investigate the often conflicting results of emotion processing in autism. The aims of 
the thesis are to better understand any difficulties associated with emotion processing by addressing the 
manner in which this ability is assessed. This is to be achieved by evaluating current methods and 
conducting an experiment where individuals on the spectrum complete an emotion proces sing task that 
uses a more valid assessment of emotion processing and understanding as would be required in truly 
social situations. The rest of this chapter will introduce the research surrounding autism, what it is, and 
any difficulties associated with autism. Theories that attempt to explain autism traits are discussed and the 
chapter will conclude with a brief introduction of emotion processing difficulties in autism.  
1.1 What is Autism? 
Autism is characterised by stereotyped behaviour, diminished social s kills and reduced 
communication abilities (APA 2013). The social detachment and lack of reciprocity was highlighted in 
Kanner’s (1943) early studies on the subject, and led to the description of autism as difficulties of 
“affective contact” based on observations of 11 children with high intelligence who displayed a 
preference for social isolation and rigid adherence to ‘sameness’. Similar observations made by Asperger 
of individuals with social difficulties, empathy issues and clumsiness formed his conditio n “autistic 
psychopathy” (Asperger & Frith 1991) which later garnered more attention termed “Asperger syndrome” 
(AS) (Wing 1981). Research investigating the prevalence of autism according to Kanner’s (1943) 
definition outlined the ‘triad of impairments’ common between those traits Kanner identified and those 
Asperger identified (Wing & Gould 1979). The major distinction being that those with AS tend to be of 
average or above average intelligence, not showing obvious difficulties in communication until complex 
social situations become more common. This is typically after the observation and diagnosis period of 







As more research has been carried out the understanding of autism has increased, changing from 
the outdated label of ‘childhood schizophrenia’ in the DSM -I (APA 1952) where the symptoms of autism 
were not outlined in a distinct diagnostic category. This was not changed until the DSM -III (APA 1980) 
and DSM-III-R (APA 1987), it was the latter revised version which outlined clearly observable criteria 
and that behaviours must reflect level of development which aided in diagnosis. In the next edition 
(DSM-IV 1994) several subtypes (Autistic disorder, Asperger Disorder, Rett’s Disorders, Childhood 
Disintegrative Disorder, Pervasive Developmental Disorder- Not Otherwise Specified) were added under 
the umbrella term ‘Pervasive Developmental Disorders’, in addition the possible markers had expanded to 
16 but requiring only 6 (in specific categories) to meet a diagnosis. These changes reflected the broad 
spectrum of manifestation in autism which allowed diagnosis with an understanding that individuals will 
differ in their behaviours, and difficulties.  
Currently autism is more commonly referred to as Autistic Spectrum Disorders (ASD) as an all-
encompassing term for individuals on the spectrum (Zwaigenbaum 2012). This is partly due to the current 
DSM-V (APA 2013) diagnostic criteria for ASD which proposes to collapse the autism subtypes e.g. 
High-functioning autism (HFA) and AS into the singular ASD term to encourage greater specificity of the 
diagnoses of difficulties faced on a case by case basis (Zwaigenbaum 2012). The introduction of a new 
disorder, ‘Social pragmatic communication disorder’, was introduced for those individuals who display 
Figure 1.1: A visual representation of the ‘triad of impairments’  
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social communication difficulties but not stereotyped behaviour or restrict ed interests associated with 
ASD (APA 2013), the redefined diagnostic criteria are displayed below in figure 1.2.  
Other notable changes in the DSM-V classification is the inclusion of sensory sensitivities within 
the restricted and repetitive behaviour umbrella, an aspect previously overlooked in autism 
symptomatology. Similarly there are changes to the period of onset for diagnosis which is now open with 
symptoms ‘being present in early developmental period but may not become manifest until social 
demands exceed limited capacities’ a change presumed to introduce more flexibility to reflect the abilities 
of those with HFA and AS within the new collapsed framework. Finally the DSM-V requires that any 
observed traits bring about ‘clinically significant impairments in social, occupational or other important 
areas of current functioning.’ Such a change is in effort to limit the diagnosis of ASD to cases where 
individuals require a level of support. This was justified because the application of the existing sub types 
was inconsistent; however, at a time when there is a strong drive to recognise the strengths of autism as 
well as the difficulties, restricting diagnosis only to cases where it brings about significant issues in daily 
functioning or wellbeing undermines this effort. On a similar point, more recently the trend in research is 
to use the term Autistic Spectrum Conditions (ASC) as this more accurately reflects the strengths, as well 
as the difficulties displayed by individuals with ASC (Happé & Vital 2009). ASC will also be the term 




Figure 1.2: A visual representation of the newly defined DSM-V diagnostic criteria for autistic spectrum conditions 
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The prevalence of ASC is estimated to be around 1-2% with 157 cases per 10,000 in the population 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2009). Research implicates a biological basis to the condition, with greater 
probability of ASC incidence in siblings (Jorde et al., 1991) and evidence of a higher concordance rate 
between monozygotic twins than dizygotic (Bailey et al., 1995). There are also claims of higher foetal 
testosterone and autistic traits (Auyeung, Taylor, Hackett & Baron-Cohen 2010; Auyeung et al., 2009) 
such as reduced eye contact (Lutchmaya, Baron-Cohen & Raggatt 2002), social skills and restricted 
interests (Knickmeyer, Baron-Cohen, Raggatt & Taylor 2005). Alongside the evidence of social 
difficulties and emotion processing issues there is research demonstrating links between ASC and various 
quality of life measures such as depression (Stewart, Barnard, Pearson, Hasan & O’Brien, 2006), anxiety 
(White & Robinson-Nay 2009) and support networks (Renty & Roeyers 2006). Not surprisingly with 
evidence of lower quality of life in ASC samples there is  emerging research suggesting the rate of suicidal 
thoughts and attempts are more prevalent for individuals on the spectrum (Cassidy, Ropar, Mitchell & 
Chapman, 2014). These results highlight the importance of a better understanding of the issues associated 
with ASC as these appear to not only have direct implications for the individuals but also implications for 
future wellbeing 
1.2 The Broader Autism Phenotype 
The traits associated with autism are often present in relatives of those on the spectrum but to a lesser 
degree, this is referred to as the broader autism phenotype (BAP) (Piven et al., 1994). This term 
encapsulates those that express autistic traits but at a sub-clinical level. There is strong evidence for 
heritability in autistic traits (Hoekstra, Bartels, Verweij & Boomsma, 2007; Constantino & Todd 2005; 
2003), these autistic traits in relatives manifest in specific areas like language (Folstein et al., 1999’ 
Piven, Palmer, Jacobi, Childress & Arndt, 1997a) and executive function (Hughes, Plumet & Leboyer 
1999; Hughes, Leboyer & Bouvard 1997). Outside of observing direct abilities that are relevant to autism, 
it is proposed the subclinical traits of ASC could manifest more broadly as personality traits (Austin 
2005). Research that has compared relatives of those with autism to those not related to a family member 
with autism show personality traits such as rigidness (Los h, Childress, Lam & Piven, 2008; Piven et al., 
1997b), impulsivity (Murphy et al., 2000), tactlessness (Losh et al., 2008; Piven et al., 1994) and anxiety 
(Losh et al., 2008; Murphy et al., 2000; Piven et al., 1997b). The personality characteristics listed above 
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communication 
Examples: 
- Difficulty interpreting facial 
expressions 
- Difficulty understanding 
gestures and voice tone 




approximate some of the traits associated with autism such as over adherence to routine (rigidness), 
appearing cold or rude/ lacking social etiquette (tactless), sensitive to change (anxiety). 
Investigation of Autism Quotient (AQ) scores (a questionnaire designed to differentiate between 
autistic and non-autistic individuals) between parents of autistic and non-autistic children significantly 
differentiated the two groups, the parents of autistic children scoring significantly higher on the AQ and 
males also scoring higher than females (Wheelwright, Auyeung, Allison & Baton-Cohen, 2010). This 
increased prevalence of autistic traits in relatives of those with autism typifies the BAP. The prevalence of 















Figure 1.3: Mothers and fathers of children with ASC distributed according to AQ scores taken 
from Wheelwright et al., (2010) 
Figure 1.4: Mothers and fathers of children without ASC distributed according to AQ scores taken 
from Wheelwright et al., (2010) 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
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As figures 1.3 and 1.4 show, there is a longer tail of higher scores on the AQ in the parents of 
children with ASC. Scores between 23 and 28 on the AQ fall within the ‘BAP’ (calculated as scores 
between 1 and 2 SD above the control sample mean). Scores between 29 and 34 are considered within the 
range of medium autism phenotype (between 2 and 3 SD above the control mean) and scores greater than 
35 are considered within the range of the narrow autism phenotype (scores further than 3 SD from the 
control mean). The longer tail on the distribution of scores from parents of children with autism suggest a 
higher percentage of this sample would fall within the broad, medium and narrow autism phenotypes than 
control parents would. Interestingly the sex distribution seems to show males more frequently fall within 
the broad and medium autism phenotype but an equal distribution of the sexes in the upper extremities of 
the narrow autism phenotype. 
Further evidence for the BAP comes in the finding that males and those in STEM professions 
(such as science, engineering, mathematics or computer science) typically presen t more ‘systemiser’ 
traits. Systemiser traits include a stronger grasp of, and reliance on, rule-based systems with predictable 
outputs based on inputs and knowledge of variables (Baron-Cohen, Richler, Bisarya, Gurunathan & 
Wheelwright, 2003). Those with higher systemiser traits (males and STEM professionals) also score 
higher on the AQ than females, or those in professions less aligned with systemiser thinking (Baron-
Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & Clubley, 2001b). This finding would suggest systemiser thinking 
is associated with autistic traits at a subclinical level in the BAP; this can be present in individuals with a 
relative with ASC or without as evidenced in the research discussed. 
1.2.1 Difficulties associated with the BAP  
The emotion processing difficulties that are present within ASC also appear in the BAP, for 
example, there is evidence of distinct processing patterns in the siblings (Oerlemans  et al., 2013) and 
parents (Adolphs, Spezio, Parlier & Piven, 2008) of children with autism. Difficulties in the recognition 
of expressions were also noted, particularly neutral expressions (Kadak, Demirel, Yavus & Demir 2014) 
and facial identity recognition (Wilson, Freeman, Brock, Burton & Palermo, 2010). Interestingly the 
emerging research linking Alexithymia (a condition where individuals struggle to understand, identify 
and label their emotions) and ASC has also evidenced a greater degree of alexithymic traits in parents of 
children with ASC (Szatmari et al., 2008). Specifically the ASC children of fathers with higher 
Alexithymia traits showed more repetitive behaviour traits than those with fathers that had low 
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Alexithymia traits. The results mentioned above suggest elements of social cognition may be heritable 
and highlight specific endophenotypes that attribute to the difficulties in ASC. The association of A SC 
and Alexithymia is present within the BAP, further strengthening the position of researchers highlighting 
Alexithymia’s role in social cognition within ASC. 
1.2.2 Summary of the BAP 
The BAP shows that differential functioning is present between those high and low in autistic 
traits, this is present in language (Folstein et al., 1999; Piven et al., 1997a), executive function (Plumet & 
Leboyer 1999; Hughes, Leboyer & Bouvard 1997) and facial emotion recognition (FER) (Harms et al., 
2010). Analysis of relatives of those with autism show personality traits that could be considered 
associated with autism such as tactlessness, rigidity, anxiety and impulsivity (Losh et al., 2008; Piven et 
al., 1997b; 1994; Murphy et al., 2000). Relatives of those with autism were also more likely to work in 
STEM fields, such as engineering or the natural sciences (Baron-Cohen 2012) showing support for a 
systemising superiority in those with relatives or autis m. There is also evidence of altered processing 
styles (Oerlemans et al., 2013; Adolphs et al., 2008) and performance in relatives of those with ASC 
(Kadak, Demirel, Yavus & Demir 2014) and links to Alexithymia (Szatmari et al., 2008). 
1.3 Theories of Autism 
The theories outlined below all attempt to explain autism or specific aspects of autism in some 
capacity. It is worth noting that of the theories discussed the extreme male brain theory may be the only 
theory that attempts to explain autism more globally; all subsequent theories address constituent parts of 
autism, namely social skills or emotion processing. This is most evident with Theory of Mind and the 
alexithymia hypothesis which specifically relate to the ability to mentalise and assume anothe r 
perspective or understand and define the affective experience of emotion respectively. Occupying a 
middle ground is the central coherence theory and amygdala theory, with the central coherence theory 
still showing a heavy tendency to focus on social skills being impacted by a reduced ability to incorporate 
masses of information into a coherent whole, while also claiming to explain savant like abilities. Similarly 
the amygdala theory, while showing a heavy influence on explaining emotion processing and social skills 
does play a role in threat perception and some evidence suggests hyperactivity is present in ASC which 
could explain anxiety commonly reported in ASC. 
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Going forward although titled ‘theories of autism’ as these theories are often described, it might 
be more appropriate to view the extreme male brain theory as the closest approximation to a theory of 
autism, subsequent theories explain sub-components of autism. As such, the most discussion will be 
dedicated to theory of mind and the alexithymia hypothesis which present the most compelling 
explanations of emotion difficulties in autism, the focus of this thesis.  
1.3.1 Extreme male brain theory 
The empathizing-systemizing theory later developed into the extreme male brain (EMB) theory 
(Baron-Cohen 2002; 2010) suggests people with autism are poor empathisers. Broadly, empathy is the 
ability to understand and share the feelings of another; this can be in multiple domains such as emotional 
empathy in understanding another’s emotional state, motor empathy in mimicking another’s motor 
movement and facial expressions, or in cognitive empathy, imagining another perspective e.g. theory of 
mind tasks. As the EMB theory predicts reduced empathizing traits in ASC individuals, it also predicts 
increased systemizing abilities (e.g. embedded figures tasks (EFT)). It is proposed generally females are 
better empathisers whilst males are better systemisers; this lends itself to a spectrum of empathising and 
systemising, this may present like the concept of androgyny where one  can score highly on both 
characteristics. However, the EMB theory suggests that autism traits manifest more frequently with 
increasing ‘maleness’, this is supported by research linking both foetal testosterone (the male androgen) 
and age of onset of first menstrual period in girls to autistic traits (Auyeung et al., 2009; 2010; 
Whitehouse, Mayberry, Hickey & Sloboda, 2011). The concept of EMB is underlined by the BAP, the 
very nature of the EMB relies on an extreme version of the typical sex distribution of empathising and 
systemising. With systemizing and empathizing falling on continuums as opposed to a dichotomy, and 
individuals in STEM fields scoring higher on the AQ (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001b; Baron-Cohen, 2012), it 
would be expected the prevalence of systemisers would increase within the BAP and subsequent medium 
autism phenotype and narrow autism phenotype. 
The EMB theory with the proposed lower empathising in ASC provides some explanations for 
the reported social difficulties and emotion processing difficulties in ASC. However the EMB theory fails 
to account adequately for other reported behaviours in ASC such as narrow interests, sensorimotor 
difficulties and rigidity to routines. The core of the theory is supported by the higher prevalence of ASC 
within males, however the presentation of female ASC is still misunderstood (Howe et al., 2015) with 
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evidence suggesting female ASC is often missed in diagnostic criteria if it is not presenting with 
intellectual disability (Fombonne, 2003; Scott, Baron-Cohen, Bolton & Brayne, 2002). It has been 
proposed that females with ASC and higher cognitive abilities display ASC traits more subtly or 
altogether differently (Howe et al., 2015); a stance supported by research showing that ASC children with 
equal levels of symptoms results in girls less likely to meet the diagnostic criteria (Dworzynski, Ronald, 
Bolton & Happé, 2012). 
Investigation of behavioural patterns of those diagnosed with ASC showed sex differences in 
multiple domains, females self-reported increased sensory issues, a new aspect of the DSM-V which may 
now see Female ASC diagnoses rise. There were also less obvious social functioning issues in females 
that only became apparent through self-report, which lead to the authors suggesting more advanced 
coping mechanisms in female ASC (Lai et al., 2011). Although in the aforementioned study no significant 
differences were present between males and females on the empathis ing quotient or systemizing quotient, 
which would support the EMB theory of ‘maleness’ in autistic brains, there is still research needed to 
better understand female ASC which may yet shed new light on ASC globally. As such the EMB theory 
is based on the current understanding of autism which is primarily based on research in males and 
extrapolated to females, a greater body of evidence is required before the theory can be substantiated for 
autism generally rather than autism in males. One strength of the EMB theory is the ability to explain 
some savant traits in ASC, due to the proposed systemiser superiority. Some example savant traits include 
hypercalculia (Pring & Hermelin, 2002) or advanced memories, which can result in extremely accurate 
memory recollection to a specific date (Kennedy & Squire 2007). 
1.3.2 Amygdala hypo and hyper-arousal 
The next theory to be discussed points to a neurobiological basis at the root of ASC, with 
atypical amygdala function purported to drive altered face processing in these individuals (Wallace, 
Coleman & Bailey 2008; Bachevalier & Loveland 2006; Grelotti et al., 2005). Whilst the amygdala 
theory is reported as a theory of autism, the amygdala is concerned with the ‘social brain’ and so the 
amygdala’s role in autism is more specifically concerned with the social difficulties often associated with 
autism. This is true for much of the theories attempting to ‘explain’ autism that they focus on social 
difficulties and so are more accurately defined as theories of emotion in autism. This applies to the 
amygdala theory as well with the amygdala believed to be linked with the allocation of attention to salient 
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stimuli; specifically the amygdala rapidly responds to stimuli to determine which areas are the most 
salient and as such need attention. There is also evidence that links the fusiform face area and superior 
temporal sulcus in this process (Schultz, 2005). Adolphs (2002) isolated key neuronal systems relevant in 
the processing of emotions and highlighted the amygdala as a key contributor during  FER, this appears to 
be particularly relevant for negative emotions such as fear, d isgust and anger (Breiter et al., 1996). This 
would align with previous research that reports poor recognition of emotions of negative affect  in ASC 
where altered amygdala activity is reported (Harms  et al., 2010; Bal et al., 2010; Ashwin, Chapman, Colle 
& Baron-Cohen, 2006; Wallace et al., 2008; Howard et al., 2000) 
The importance of the amygdala is also highlighted in studies on emotion recognition tasks in 
individuals with amygdala damage. Such research shows significant difficulties when processing fearful 
stimuli and complex tasks such as attributing trustworthiness ratings to individuals based on facial stimuli 
(Adolphs, Sears & Piven 2001; Adolphs, Russell & Tranel 1999). Subsequent comparisons were drawn 
between ASC individuals and individuals with amygdala damage. Similarities were evident in ratings of 
trustworthiness, for example, both groups rated individuals more trustworthy than controls did (Adolphs, 
Russell & Tranel 1999). This further implicates the amygdala’s role in recognition of emotions, 
particularly threatening ones likely to play a key role in threat perception and self-preservation of the 
individual (Adolphs, Russell & Tranel 1999). Of note in the research on emotion recognition competency 
in amygdala damaged individuals was the intact recognition of happiness, suggesting the difficulty is 
more localised to negative expressions. In application, these findings could explain some of the 
difficulties in social skills exhibited by individuals with ASC, potentially acco unting for social 
difficulties. 
The amygdala is partly responsible for recognising threats, as discussed this is partly why its 
function is associated with the recognition of negative emotions which could hold vital information. The 
amygdala is also responsible for directing attention, isolating the salient stimuli available and focussing 
attention towards it (Vuilleumier 2005). Evidence in support of the amygdala theory comes from research 
that has tested the manner in which ASC individuals attend to emotional stimuli. When  presented with 
emotion expressions, individuals appear to prioritise processing the eyes while findings suggest ASC 
individuals favour the mouth region (Klin, Jones, Schultz, Volkmar & Cohen, 2002). ASC individuals 
also exhibit atypical saccadic pathways and scan the environment more frequently than controls 
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(Rutherford & Towns 2008; Neumann, Spezio, Piven & Adolphs, 2006; Klin et al., 2002). However, 
research has yet to definitively explain why these differences exist. It is proposed that the abnormal vis ual 
perusal and regions of interest typical in ASC individuals are a symptom of abnormal amygdala function 
(Pujol et al., 2009; Schultz 2005). This alteration in development is expressed in such a manner that these 
regions are not sufficiently activated by typical eye driven stimuli (Grelotti et al., 2005). This lack of 
arousal causes the individual to seek alternative information from other sources, such as the mouth, verbal 
context and body language (Piggot et al., 2004; Teunisse & de Gelder 2001). 
Recent research is showing an opposite trend in ASC individuals rather than hypoarousal of the 
amygdala some research is reporting hyperarousal. Crucially research has shown neural habituation (the 
neural response decrease over time to repeated exposure to the s ame stimuli) (Thompson & Spencer 
1966) in individuals with ASC is lower, simply the rate at which the amygdala becomes less excited by 
the stimuli is slower. This was also associated with more severe social difficulties (Kleinhans et al., 
2010), suggesting the amygdala in ASC individuals does not habituate and reduce activation to social 
stimuli at the same rate recorded in TD individuals. Lack of neural habituation would keep the ASC 
individual aroused on the verge of a fight or flight response in social s ituations longer than would be the 
case for TD individuals. The interaction of co-morbid conditions in ASC shows that in individuals with 
high social anxiety the activation of the amygdala is aroused more than in matched controls (Kleinhans et 
al., 2010, Schumann, Barnes, Lord & Courchesne, 2009) further showing hyperarousal specific to 
individuals with social anxiety. 
Further research has shown some similar results with the amygdala and fusiform gyrus 
displaying activation upon gaze fixation with eyes (Dalton, Nacewicz, Alexander & Davidson, 2007). 
This may be related to social anxiety or anxiety surrounding eye contact often reported in the literature. 
Amygdalae volume was found to be smaller in ASC children (changes in volume are referred to as 
amygdalae dysmorphia) compared to control; children with the smallest amygdalae were slower to 
distinguish between neutral and emotional stimuli and displayed the least fixation to the eyes (Nacewicz 
et al., 2006). This pattern of reduced emotion recognition competency coupled with amygdalae 
dysmorphia and reduced fixation to the eyes is indicative of an aversion response to social stimuli. This 
may explain the conflicting results regarding amygdalae arousal; given that individuals with ASC are 
showing a tendency to avoid the regions of the face that typically result in amygdalae arousal. When 
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attention is paid to these locations, ASC individuals display a slower neural habituation rate suggesting 
the stimuli is continually arousing the ASC individuals into a fight or flight state. This could potentially 
explain the aversive scan paths documented 
The amygdala theory presents some strong evidence that can account for emotion processing 
difficulties in ASC with reduced amygdalae volume (Nacewicz et al., 2006), activation (Wallace et al., 
2008; Bachevalier & Loveland 2006; Grelotti et al., 2005) and performance patterns in ASC similar to 
those patients with amygdala damage/lesions (Adolphs et al., 2001; 1999). By extension, the emotion 
processing difficulties could also contribute to the social traits such as monotone, awkward social prose, 
and difficulty maintaining social relationships. Abnormal amygdala function does not directly explain the 
social difficulties reported in ASC but can address these as a knock on effect from emotion processing 
difficulties. However the Amygdala theory does not address repetitive and stereotyped behaviours in ASC 
with only potentially contributing to anxiety in shifts from routine where the amygdala may be hyper 
aroused. 
1.3.3 Central Coherence theory 
An alternative theory of autism is termed the central coherence (CC) theory. Frith (1989) 
considered this in terms of a preference for details in ASC individuals due to the use of local as opposed 
to global processing, resulting in weak central coherence (WCC). It is this tendency in individuals with 
ASC to focus on details first rather than the stimuli in a holistic manner that can lead to complications in 
FER (Hill, Varela, Kamps & Niditch, 2014; Deruelle, Rondan, Gepner & Tardif, 2004). This altered 
method of processing can often result in misinterpretation of emotional stimuli (Kennedy & Adolphs 
2012a; Deruelle et al., 2004) and may be one of the root contributors to lower social skills frequently 
found in ASC individuals (Hill et al., 2014; Pujol et al., 2009). CC theory is typically explored by 
focusing on a differential preference of attention between ASC individuals and typically developing 
individuals (TD). Where TD individuals show a tendency to process images in a global manner (Navon 
1977), commonly considered as viewing an image or scene in its entirety, the same trend is not present in 
individuals with ASC which suggests attention is focussed on the local details of an image, this is then 




Examples of some of the tasks used to explore WCC in ASC include compatible and 
incompatible stimuli presented across the global and local levels in a variation on the Navon task (1977). 
In this experiment two paradigms were investigated, a divided attention task where the children had to 
identify the target in either the global or local level on a trial by trial basis; a second task of selective 
attention instructed children to focus only on the target at global or local level. With no explicit priming, 
meaning children relied on whatever processing style was dominant, typically developing children made 
most errors at the local level whilst ASC children made more in the global level. However, in the 
selective attention task both groups were faster in identifying the global target. These results suggested 
the account of WCC in terms of global processing difficulties was  not limited by ability to process 
information globally but rather a preference in processing style towards the local level, potentially due to 
lack of inhibitory mechanisms around local processing. 
Another well-known task used is the embedded figures task (EFT) with target stimuli embedded 
within them which participants must find. ASD individuals seem to excel at EFT’s (Jarrold, Gilchrist & 
Bender 2005) because their processing style focuses on information in constituent parts rather than part of 
a whole, supporting the CC theory. Shah and Frith termed this strength for detecting constituent parts and 
noticing obscure patterns an ‘islet of ability’ (1983) Examples of the type of tasks  used can be seen in 





Figure 1.6: Example images from a) the embedded figures 
test and b) The childrens embedded figures task (Witkin, 
Oltman, Raskin & Karp 1971) 
Figure 1.5: Examples of stimuli compatible at local 
and global level (1 & 2) incompatible/global (3 & 4) 
and incompatible/local (5 & 6) (Plaisted, Swettenham 
& Rees 1999) 
Some materials have been removed 
due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in 
Lancester Library - Coventry 
University.
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3rd party copyright. The unabridged 




In relation to ASC individuals it is suggested some of the emotional difficulties displayed are 
due to underdeveloped configural face processing a development alongside global processing. 
Investigating the contribution of contextual information in a configural sense research has demonstrated 
that ASC individuals are less susceptible to visual illusions (Happé 1996). However further research has 
failed to demonstrate a robust effect (Mitchell & Ropar 2004). Attempting to investigate configural 
processing in social contexts, Rosset et al., (2008) tested the recognition rate of ASC children when 
viewing human faces and cartoon faces. While initially ASC participants were shown to match TD 
controls on recognition ability, it was later found that the processing technique used differed on the 
stimuli presented. ASC participants opted to use a local processing strategy for real faces, while they 
selected a global processing for cartoon faces. Rosset and colleagues (2008) attempt to explain this by 
addressing the often simplified appearance of cartoons, suggesting that the implementation of a configural 
processing method was triggered by the exaggerated features of the cartoon stimuli. 
Contrary to predictions, Rosset and Colleague’s findings showed that both ASC and TD controls 
performed worse on cartoon faces than human. It may be that cartoon faces prime for a local processing 
system much like inverted faces do, due to having fewer and more exaggerated features;  these features 
are too locale based to integrate into a coherent whole. If this is the case, that ASC participants opt in to a 
global processing style with cartoons but not real faces, it would suggest cartoons elicit a reaction in ASC 
children that they do not in TD children. More importantly, it shows global processing is present and 
functional in ASC individuals, but possibly underutilised or incorrectly selected and engaged.  
This suggestion is addressed in some literature attempting to explore the relationship with ASC 
individuals employing both global and local processing (Plaisted, Swettenham & Rees 1999). In this 
research, the condition under which each processing style is employed appears to be dependent upon task 
demands. Here, ASC individuals tend to opt for a local processing style in tasks dictating a division of 
attention, yet they opt for a global processing style for tasks that utilise selective attention. To further 
evidence this relationship, it is found that stimuli presented at the global level, in a forced divided 
attention task resulted in the worst performance from ASC children. Even in this trend however, ASC 
children did seem advantaged by attempts to utilise global processing or hindered by its use in a task 
better suited to local processing (Plaisted et al., 1999). This therefore further supports the evidence of an 
intact global processing system in ASC individuals, regardless of underutilisation, and supports the weak 
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central coherence theory that global perception is lessened in ASC. The ability of ASC children to 
perform globally when prompted to do so indicates the difficulty in implementation of global processing 
may stem from an inability to attend correctly to appropriate facial regions. This difficulty is less 
pronounced however when those facial regions are externally p rovided or highlighted (Mottron, Burack, 
Stauder & Robaey, 1999; Mottron, Burack, Iarocci, Belleville & Enns, 2003; Koldewyn, Jiang, Weigelt & 
Kanwisher, 2013).  
Others suggest that the tendency in ASC individuals to use locally focused processing over 
global is because this may be the preferred method. Some research stipulates that through the use of local 
processing, ASC individuals partake in a processing style that is more specialised and efficient (Plaisted, 
Saksida, Alcántara & Weisblatt, 2003). Here, the ability and potential for global processing is present, but 
ASC individuals perform better when using a local style of information processing (Plaisted et al., 2003). 
The specialised local processing is a consistent finding (Hill et al., 2014; Deruelle et al., 2004), and the 
ability to process globally is found to be regularly demonstrated if it is explicitly designed into a task or 
instructions prime the individual to do so (Mottron et al., 1999; 2003; Koldewyn et al., 2013). Naturally 
though, there appears to be a bias towards local process ing in ASC, possibly suggesting the perception of 
features of an image present themselves as more salient to an individual with ASC than would the global 
context of the entire face. The evidence would point towards an altered salience hierarchy in ASC, whe re 
features of an image overpower the global context which would provide a clearer holistic image.  
The evidence for weak central coherence in ASC is not undisputed however, with numerous 
studies citing intact holistic processing or difficulties milder than previously believed (Nishimura, 
Rutherford & Maurer, 2008; Mottron et al., 1999; 2003; Koldewyn et al., 2013). Rather than an inability 
to process information globally and configurally analyse faces , it now appears that WCC is more 
accurately recognised as a biased processing hierarchy than a lack of ability. There is the possibility that 
these differences are likely due to other aspects not directly addressed within the work, such as 
differences in clinical subtypes of ASC or substantial variation in task design and difficulty. Therefore, 
suggestions arise that CC is deficient, or possibly underutilised in ASC populations ; this is particularly 
expressed in tasks where an image is comprised of constituent parts which are singularly salient 
(Rinehart, Bradshaw, Moss, Brereton & Tonge, 2000; Mottron et al., 1999). Because difficulties are still 
present in global processing but this appears to be less pronounced than for objects or figures with clear 
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constituent parts, WCC can still account for emotion processing and recognition difficulties in ASC. 
Much like it can account for certain difficulties due to the attention to detail that WCC would predict it 
could also provide an explanation for savant like memory and artistic abilities (Treffert 2009). It does not 
explain particular social difficulties such as the intricacies of turn taking or emotive pitch in conversation, 
and these cannot be adequately explained by the lack of social context from inaccurate emotion 
processing. To adequately understand turn taking and further general maintenance of relationships an 
element of understanding of others internal states would be required which WCC does not address. 
Similarly, alongside the intricacies of social difficulties, WCC does not account for stereotyped repetitive 
behaviours, narrow interests or limited imagination. 
1.3.4 Theory of mind 
Theory of Mind (ToM) (Baron-Cohen, Leslie & Frith, 1985) concerns the ability to attribute 
mental states to others and use this ability to predict behaviour (Premack & Woodruff 1978). This is the 
ability of the individual to think or place themselves in such a scenario that they could reasonably assume 
what another individual’s wishes, desires, beliefs and thoughts are. However the process of how this 
attribution of mental states and causal behaviour to others comes about is at the centre of theoretical 
disagreements within ToM. Two main approaches dominate; that of Theory-theory and Simulation 
theory. 
1.3.4.1 Theory-theory 
Theory-theorists align with the view that a naïve theory of psychology ‘folk psychology’ is core 
to understanding and predicting others’ behaviour. This naïve theory is continually revised through 
observation of the world where the child can begin to better p redict and apply causal rules to the 
behaviour of others (Gopnik & Meltzoff 1997). There is debate if this folk psychology is innate (and 
develops at a set pace) or is learned, Carruthers and smith (1996) argue it is more probable the 
development of a folk psychology theory is innate given that certain developmental milestone are reached 
at typically the same age of four (Gopnik & Astington 1988; Perner, Leekam & Wimmer, 1987; 
Callaghan et al., 2005). This typical developmental milestone would be supportive of the notion that an 
internal theory develops at a set pace gathering information and revising its model until such a point 




In support of theory-theory Gopnik and Wellman (1992) highlight three distinct theories or 
views that appear at different stages of development, they begin with that of a 2-year-old. They begin by 
describing 2-year-olds as mentalists that their psychological knowledge is  structured in two states, desire 
and perception. Gopnik and Wellman liken desire and perception to two theoretical constructs ‘world -to-
mind’ and ‘mind-to-world’ (Searle 1983). These two constructs require an understanding that what’s in 
the mind can influence the world, such as a desire causing a response in the world to fulfil that desire. 
Further there is an understanding that what is in the world can influence the mind in such a way that the 
perceptions of the world influence the mind. This early theory builds the foundations that connect the self 
(the mind) to the world and that these two things can influence each other. This allows the first real 
opportunity of causal predictive inference.  
By the age of three children begin to demonstrate a development to more cognitive mental terms 
in language such as think, know, remember and make-believe (Shatz, Wellman & Silber 1983). This 
demonstrates an awareness of mental states with thoughts that are distinct from the world, remembering is 
the precursor to assuming another mental state (in time) and make-believe has obvious implications for 
false-beliefs. This developmental stage highlights a transitional period where evidence is accumulating 
that representations of reality exist, but understanding, or the pred ictive causal links children are willing 
to attribute to reality are still grounded in a desire and perception theory. This is evidenced by children’s  
willingness to acknowledge a false-belief but not to attribute causal actions to that false-belief (Moses & 
Flavell 1990). 
By age five in typical development the child has undergone a theoretical transition; at this point 
they are able to hold mental representations of the world meaning they can hold an understanding of 
different views of the world than their own. This paves the way to understanding people have a different 
view to the world than their own and different knowledge of the world than their own. This is best 
exemplified in the false-belief tasks (Perner, Leekam & Wimmer 1987). These tasks assess an 
individual’s ability to hold mental states different from their own or a previous mental state different from 
their current one. Example tasks include unexpected contents tasks where the individual is challenged by 
stating what their original belief was in light of new information about a given scenario. One such 
example is where a child is shown a smarties container and asked what they believe is inside, the child 
will usually respond ‘smarties’ they will then be shown inside the tube is crayons. Once the  tube is closed 
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again the child is asked what they originally believed was in the tube, a failure on the task is the child 
responding crayons; children typically pass this test at 4-5 years of age (Gopnik & Astington 1988).  
Another example of a false-belief task is the commonly known Sally-Ann task. In this task the 
child is told a scenario where Sally has a marble and places it in a basket, Sally then leaves the room Ann 
moves the marble from the basket to a box, upon Sally re-entering the room the child is asked where Sally 
will look for her marble. The correct answer is in the basket where she originally left it and believes it to 
be, however the child with a weak theory of mind will have trouble mentalizing Sally’s view of the world 
and will attribute their beliefs to Sally expecting her to look in the box. Children with representational 
minds can hold a mental state other than theirs and crucially use this to predict behaviour, there is an 
understanding that other’s behaviour can be directed and governed by knowledge of the world that is not 
the same as the child’s.  
It is argued the change from a desire and perception based theory in younger children to the later 
belief-representation based theory is supported by the use of natural language where children will 
attribute behaviours to desires when younger, for example ‘Jane is looking for her cat under the bed 
because she wants the cat’. This transitions to belief with development ‘Jane is looking for the cat under 
the bed because she thinks it is under the bed’ demonstrating a theoretical shift accommodating the 
occurrences of behaviours that are not always motivated by desires or perceptions (Bartsch & Welman 
1989, Wellman & Banerjee 1991).  
1.3.4.2 Simulation theory 
Differing from Theory-theory, Simulation theory does not presume there to be theoretical 
constructs that explain and govern predictive ability, instead it relies on the ability to simulate the current 
situation or proposed situation in the mind and predict  the behaviour of others based on what the self 
would do (Gordon 1986). This approach relies on the child’s interpretation of any given (simulated) event 
and applying this to others, because of this the theory is egocentric, any simulations made will be an  
approximation of how the self would behave not how another person would behave. Indeed research has 
shown the egocentric bias of attributing the states of the self to others (Birch & Bloom 2003; Keysar, Lin 
& Barr 2003). An egocentric bias does not inherently discredit simulation theory, it may underline certain 
instances when simulation fails, but through the attribution of the mental state of the self onto others it 
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supports the theory in its claim that to better understand others the state of the self is projected onto 
others. 
The presence of such a bias or failure in simulation may be due to two reasons, a lack of 
information on the target to make accurate simulations from, or the developmental stage of the simulator 
where at a young age children are unable to differentiate the knowledge they have which can be 
objectively true from subjective knowledge others have. The latter is evidenced in the errors children 
make in false-belief tasks. On such tasks children routinely confuse and over-rely on what they know to 
be objectively true (for example in the Sally-Ann task the marble is not where sally left it, sally will look 
where it is now), rather than use the subjective information of the world (that the marble has been moved, 
sally does not know this and will look where she left it). Simulation theory proposes that until children 
can compartmentalize knowledge (oftentimes contradictory) they will continue to fail false -belief tasks 
(Cruz & Gordon 2003). As discussed previously theory-theorists attribute the eventual passing of this task 
to a theoretical shift allowing mental representations of other perspectives, Simulation theorists believe 
the ability to pass false-belief tasks lies in the improvements in executive function in development 
allowing greater compartmentalization of objective and subjective knowledge. 
Another distinguishing feature between theory theorists and simulation theorists is the core 
knowledge that thoughts, desires and beliefs are linked actions by a set of laws or principles in fo lk 
psychology. Simulation theorists argue this is redundant when the capability exists to use our own 
reasoning (and subsequent intentions) to model those of other reasoning beings like ourselves. In this 
sense understanding the self and having knowledge of our own causal behaviours, we can relate this to 
many other beings and negate the need for set rules or laws. Simulation theorists argue this approach is 
more parsimonious and better grounded in evidence (Cruz & Gordon 2003), but are not entirely opposed  
to generalised rules of thumb developing as a component of simulation. 
Some of the evidence provided in support of simulation theory comes from the presence of 
mirror neurons (Gallese, Fadiga, Fogassi & Rizzolatti 1996; Rizzolatti, Fadiga, Gallese & Fogas i 1996; 
Rizzolatti, & Craighero 2004). Mirror neurons are a collection of neurons that activate upon seeing an 
action as well as performing the action, there presence has been noted in humans (Fadiga, Fogassi, Pavesi 
& Rizzolatti 1995). These mirror neurons or ‘mirror systems’ have been noted in emotion systems 
(Wicker et al., 2003) and tactile sensory systems (Singer et al., 2004). Such claims of a simulation based 
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model with mirror neuron input are bolstered by research showing impaired recognition of emo tional 
states in those with brain damage (Calder, Keane, Manes, Antoun & Young 2000) or brain legions 
(Adolphs, Tranel & Damasio 2002). 
There is also evidence to support simulation in prospection (future prediction) in that the 
richness of accounts in the distant past and far future are less than those of accounts in the immediate past 
and close future (D’Argembaeu & Van Der Linden 2004). Several studies linking episodic memory and 
prospection to specific brain regions and imagination (see Okuda et al., 2003; Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann 
& Maguire 2007)_have led researchers to suggest a core network of neural structures that underlines 
simulation of different time periods  (Buckner & Carroll, 2007; Schacter, Addis & Buckner, 2008). There 
are some that claim this core network also plays a role in mindreading, most notably the core network 
regions were activated when individuals were asked to consider a reality where someone’s belief differed 
from the current reality, but not when asked to consider the image (viewpoint) of an inanimate object 
(camera) (Saxe & Kanwisher 2003). This suggests that ToM or mindreading requires some element of 
imagination likely in simulating a different perspective; such results would support a heavier reliance on 
simulation rather than theory. It is possible that the activation of core network regions is attributable to 
retrieving memories to activate theories but this appears to more readily explain a simulation theory 
account of ToM. 
Though the foundation of how ToM is achieved is markedly different between theory-theorists 
and simulation theorists there is some endorsement of hybrid theories (Shanton & Goldman 2010). These 
encapsulate the parsimonious and pragmatic nature of simulation theory in using the mind of the self as a 
working model for others in favour of rules or laws which must be learned at some stage through an 
ineffectual trial and error process. Similarly the inclusion of some theoretical structure that can 
incorporate generalizations seems plausible given that simulating the most trivial of responses repeatedly 
would be wasteful. 
1.3.4.3 Theory of mind and autism 
It is proposed that many of the social communicative difficulties in ASC stem from a flaw in 
ToM or ‘mentalizing’ (Frith 2001). In research, monitoring the ability of traits deemed to be important for 
ToM such as; following another’s gaze, pointing or showing objects of interest and understanding make -
believe play are all among demonstrated difficulties in ASC individuals. So stron g is the evidence for the 
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importance of theory of mind that a difficulty in these traits at 18 months reflects a high co -occurrence 
with autism at 3 years of age (Baron-Cohen et al., 1996). Difficulties in these three traits are such a 
reliable predictor of autism, that they are included as an early indicator for autism in a multitude of tests 
(Auyeung, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & Allison, 2008; Baird et al., 2001; 2000).  
The false-belief task reported an 80% failure rate in autistic children (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985), this has 
led to ToM attracting criticism as a theory of autism difficulties. The finding that 80% of autistic children 
fail the false belief task whilst at first this seems high it does allow for a 20% pass rate within autism and 
so the reliability of such a task to detect autism is not robust. Further it opens the discussion that a weak 
ToM is not preclusive to autism. To this end ToM is now viewed more as a continuum rather than 
functioning or not functioning, higher difficulty second order tasks were designed to test this and help 
propose the idea that autism is more indicative of a delay in ToM development (Baron -Cohen 1989). 
There was evidence to support a developmental delay in ToM development with verbal mental age 
associated with false belief task success (Happé 1995) although the reported success rate of 73% on 
second-order false belief tasks in individuals with AS (Bowler 1992) led to developments in assessments 
shifting away from ToM specifically no longer believing weak ToM was universal in autism. 
With the universality of ToM difficulties in ASC under dispute, assessments developed towards 
advanced tests of ToM such as the reading the mind in the eyes task (Baron‐Cohen, Wheelwright, Hill, 
Raste & Plumb 2001a) with an inherent socio-emotional aspect in their assessment. The inclusion of 
social information in assessments was later developed with the enactive mind hypothesis (Klin, Jones, 
Schultz & Volkmar 2003) which suggests neurotypicals attribute social information to all aspects of the 
world which can be entirely inanimate. The social attribution task (Klin 2000) demonstrated this with the 
narrative provided by neurotypicals taking on character roles such as a ‘bully’ and the geometric shapes 
displaying mental states such as ‘scared’ or character traits like ‘shy’ whilst autistic individuals provide a 
narrative based on purely physical properties and relations. The assessment of ToM had shifted from 
tasks of false belief to inferring emotional states and attributing emotion to unsocial scenes. This change 
in assessment reflected the gradual shift from a specifically ToM account of autism, to a more socially 





1.3.4.4 Theory of mind and empathy 
The work of Blair (2005) posits that ‘empathy’ is a blanket term and can be divided into three 
subcategories of cognitive empathy or interchangeably ToM, motor empathy and emotional empathy. 
When exploring motor empathy, research has shown that ASC individuals also demonstrate diminished  
ability to perform tasks such as facial mirroring (Hatfield, Cacioppo & Rapson 1994). Blair (2005) states 
this difficulty is consistently characteristic of ASC individuals, and may be a fundamental aspect in 
understanding their struggle in FER and social skills generally.  
There is some evidence for difficulties in motor empathy within ASC (Williams, Senior, David, 
Loughland & Gordon, 2001; Nishitani, Avikainen & Hari, 2004), however the severity and the presence 
of these difficulties of imitation altogether are refuted (Press, Richardson & Bird, 2010) or the direction is 
reversed (Spengler, Bird & Brass 2010). Imitation concerns the natural tendency to copy another’s motor 
movements, typically this covers gross motor movements whilst mimicry concerns the copying of one’s 
facial expressions but the two terms are used interchangeably in the literature in some cases (Grecucci et 
al., 2013; McIntosh, Reichmann-Decker, Winkielman & Wilbarger, 2006). Grecucci and colleagues 
(2013) demonstrated that imitation abilities are intact but are not modulated by social context as is usually 
the case in typically developing individuals. While individuals with ASC do not spontaneously respond to 
emotion presentation in an automatic manner, they can be encouraged to engage in imitation, and perform 
well (Grecucci et al., 2013; McIntosh et al., 2006). An example of this is the work of McIntosh’s (2006) 
and Stel, van den Heuvel and Smeets  (2008) who investigated the effect of instructing participants to 
mimic and not mimic displayed emotions. As previously suggested the ASC participants were able to 
accurately mimic emotions when told to do so, whilst their unprompted mimicry was less frequent. This 
suggests motor empathy is present in autistic individuals, or at least the ability to accurately mimic is, the 
automaticity to do so is reduced however. 
In another interesting finding it was shown that control participants reported a correlative mood 
to that which they were mimicking, however no such effect was found with ASC individuals, suggesting 
a break in the semantic processing steps between perception, mimicry (motor empathy) and ToM function 
(cognitive empathy). There are other potential explanations for such a response such as highly co-morbid 
Alexithymia in ASC (Berthoz & Hill 2005; Hill, Berthoz & Frith 2004).  Alexithymia may mean ASC 
individuals are experiencing a change in affect but are unable to accurately recognise and label this.  
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These studies also demonstrated that ASC individuals showed intact voluntary attempts at 
imitation much similar to typically developing individuals  (Grecucci et al., 2013; McIntosh et al., 2006). 
This would suggest the basic levels of attenuation in response to social stimuli are present but automatic 
imitation occurs with a difficulty in individuals with ASC. It can then be considered without automatic 
imitation responses in social interactions, ASC individuals may have adapted to rely on voluntary 
imitation (McIntosh et al., 2006). Voluntary imitation in this context, addressed the conscious effort of the 
receiver to attempt to mirror the emotion, to better process and hopefully understand the display. It is 
further stipulated that the frequency rate at which voluntary mimicry is employed in ASC individuals 
could be occurring as a result of individual efforts to gradually understand social scenarios and etiquette 
over long periods of trial and error. This would stand to support the evidence that difficulties of emotion 
recognition and overall social skills are reduced in higher-functioning ASC individuals (Hill et al., 2014; 
Dyck, Piek, Hay, Smith & Hallmayer, 2006). This theory is supported by the presence of hyperimitation 
(e.g. echolalia repeating phrases and echopraxia copying actions) in high-functioning adults with ASC 
(Spengler et al., 2010). 
Much like motor empathy concerns the physical movement of the self in respect of another, 
Emotional empathy concerns the adaptation of the self in an emotional sense. This is specific to the 
display of emotions in response to another (Blair 2005). Emotional empathy is primarily in response to 
displays of emotion, however it can also be invoked by emotionally laden stimuli such as expressive 
vocabulary. Emotional empathy is then a hybrid of cognitive and motor empathy, this was referred to as 
‘emotional linkage’ in Preston and de Waal’s (2002) Perception -Action Model (PAM). In this model the 
process of empathy begins with perception where a stimulus is presented, this transitions to representation 
(imitation > emotional contagion > cognitive empathy) the cognitive aspect of empathy is situated 
towards the latter stages of this chain of events . The individual uses an interoceptive (internal analysis) 
awareness of the changes in the self from imitation and emotional contagion combined with an 
assumption of another’s mental state to construct a holistic understanding of that state (Preston & de Waal 
2002).  
As an explanation of ASC difficulties of ToM are more directly referred to as just th at, rather 
than difficulties in a prescribed area of empathy, which may be more applicable. As the literature 
introduced above showed, there are difficulties in motor empathy in both a hypoimitative (Williams et al., 
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2001; Nishitani et al., 2004) and hyperimitative capacity (Spengler et al., 2010). The perception-action 
model places these subcomponents of empathy in a collaborative model, but not always linearly in 
activation or execution. This model would suggest difficulties could be at any, or multiple s tages, of this 
entire empathy network, indeed there is a body of research showing altered perceptive styles in ASC 
(Klin et al., 2002; Rutherford & Towns 2008; Neumann et al., 2006; Nacewicz et al., 2006; Pelphrey 
2002; Kennedy & Adolphs 2012b; Smith, Montagne, Perrett, Gill & Gallagher,  2010). This might 
pinpoint perception as the origin of difficulties which impacts accurate imitation and emotion contagion. 
Similarly in the stages of motor empathy where imitation and contagion are activated, research sho ws 
altered physical movements in ASC which are then associated with severity of ASC (Hannant, Cassidy , 
Tavassoli & Mann 2016); this altered motor control in ASC is reflected in expressions that are less 
recognisable (Brewer et al., 2016).  
Finally the difficulties addressed above in ToM tasks highlight there are also prescribed 
difficulties in assuming the mental states of others along with any information that may be congruent to 
this. Tasks such as the unexpected contents and false belief (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Leslie & Frith 
1988; Gopnik & Astington 1988) do not involve or require emotional contagion or motor empathy and so 
show isolated difficulties in this domain. ToM difficulties might contribute to other aspects of empathy 
for example not being able to assume another perspective, would limit the understanding of said 
perspective and inhibit emotional empathy. However ToM stands alone in not being influenced by 
separate empathy domains, being unable to imitate should not interfere with assuming anot her perspective 
(in time). There is the potential that mental imitation of events in false-belief tasks, for example ‘I am 
sally, I put my doll here. I leave the room, I return. Where is my doll? ’ may influence ToM abilities; but 
the definition of such a process is opaque. Is this still ToM ability or imitation of behaviour? Or a 
hybridisation of the two? Ultimately there are clear difficulties in assuming others’ perspectives in ASC, 
as of now this would appear to be a stand-alone difficulty (depending on definition and ToM techniques) 
which may justify its’ focus in the literature but it should not overshadow that difficulties in each domain 
of empathy are just as prevalent in ASC. 
In respect of the above it might be better to evaluate the merits of the ToM explanation of ASC 
as a theory of empathy more globally, given that difficulties are identified in each domain rather than 
uniquely in ToM. Difficulties of empathy then adequately  explain social interaction and communication 
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issues in ASC, difficulties in assuming other perspectives will massively impact social skills and the 
abilities to appropriately respond to given social situations, this would appear to be more relevant to 
communication as empathy is particularly in response to a stimulus. Difficulties in empathy do not 
provide explanations for flexibility of thought or behaviour as this is almost entirely an internal drive and 
can be maintained in the absence of stimulus to be empathic towards. Only in a small capacity could ToM 
explain such inflexible behaviour because people often monitor their behaviour in respect of what others 
may think of them. The inability to assume another’s’ perspective and employ this self-evaluative step 
denies potential inhibition of inflexible behaviours, such perspective taking would allow awareness of 
behaviours seen to be problematic for others and presumably result in altered behaviour. Empathy 
difficulties provide no plausible explanation for sensory difficulties in ASC.   
1.3.5 The Alexithymia hypothesis 
As was discussed earlier The Alexithymia hypothesis proposes that the emotion processing 
difficulties reported in ASC are actually due to comorbid Alexithymia; because of this the Alexithymia 
hypothesis attempts to explain emotion processing in ASC, not ASC globally. The rest of this section will 
outline Alexithymia, its origins in the literature, what implications it has for ASC and the emerging 
research. 
Alexithymia first mentioned in 1972, literally meaning “lack of words for feeling” (Sifneos 
1996), is a condition where individuals struggle to understand, identify and describe emotions in the self. 
This can extend to the recognition of others’ expressions (Nemiah, Freyberger, Sifneos 1976; Parker, 
Taylor & Bagby 1993; McDonald & Prkachin 1990; Prkachin, Casey & Prkachin 2009), diminished 
empathic responses with evidence of lower empathic traits (Johnson, Filliter & Murphy 2009; Moriguchi 
et al., 2006) and reduced neural activity in the anterior insula; a brain region associated with emotional 
context of sensory input (Bird et al., 2010). Individuals with Alexithymia can be aware they are 
experiencing an emotion, but struggle to identify the emotion or specific change in affect. 
A growing amount of research is investigating Alexithymia as a potential contributing factor in 
emotion recognition difficulties (Pollatos & Gramann 2011; Pollatos, Schubö, Herbert, Matthias & 
Schandry, 2008; Cook, Brewer, Shah & Bird, 2013). One of the findings is the reported prevalence of 
Alexithymia comorbidity with ASC, which is currently estimated between 40% and 65% of autistic adults 
showing traits of Alexithymia (Berthoz & Hill 2005; Hill & Berthoz 2004). As Alexithymia is concerned 
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with the inability to understand, recognise or describe emotions in the self, it is curious that this should 
coincide with reduced FER abilities. This is noteworthy because Alexithymia is most commonly 
associated with internal emotional difficulties of recognition, labelling and understanding. It would 
suggest a shift in affect in the self (empathic response) is crucial to correctly recognising the emotional 
states of others (this may be present in individuals with Alexithymia but they cannot accurately label this 
shift in affect). Thus Alexithymia would appear to be an empathic disorder specific to emotional empathy, 
and research has supported this identifying that Alexithymia coincides with difficulties in emotional 
empathy but not cognitive empathy (Moskacheva, Kholmogorova & Garanyan 2015). The presence of 
difficulties specific to emotional empathy but not cognitive empathy would suggest Alexithymia is 
separate construct from ASC (although ASC does not universally present with cognitive empathy/ToM 
difficulties) despite their high co-morbidity. 
 The unique empathy specificity of Alexithymia to difficulties of emotional understanding, but 
not ToM, and the reported high co-morbidity with ASC has led to ‘the Alexithymia hypothesis’ of 
emotion difficulties in ASC. This hypothesis proposes  the emotional difficulties in ASC are attributable 
to the large amount of individuals with severe Alexithymia within ASC. Figure 1.7 below gives a visual 
example of the Alexithymia hypothesis within autism. Those in sample A would represent individuals 
with clear ASC traits and clear Alexithymia traits, this sample would demonstrate emotion recognition 
difficulties along with autistic traits. Sample C represents those with ASC traits but no co -occurring 
Alexithymia traits, it is hypothesized those individuals would not present emotion recognition difficulties 
and less empathy difficulties in a broader sense across multiple domains. The Alexithymia hypothesis 
centres on the heterogeneous assumption of Alexithymia traits within autism where a sample will 
comprise of some individuals with ASC with co-morbid alexithymic traits and some without (Sample B). 
This heterogeneous mix is proposed as the potential explanation of emotion difficulties in ASC, where 
difficulties emerge the sample has drawn upon more individuals with severe alexithymic traits; where no 













Currently it is difficult to appraise the Alexithymia hypothesis  in a critical sense, this is because 
research has neglected to control for Alexithymia severity in control samples and so comparisons are 
difficult. One such study has shown through matched controls that Alexithymia severity predicted 
emotional attribution accuracy whilst ASC did not (Cook et al., 2013). In a second experiment Cook and 
colleagues (2013) demonstrated that Alexithymia does not influence expression variation recognition, 
limiting the difficulties to emotional content rather than sensory identification. 
For Alexithymia to stand up to scrutiny as a potential contributor to emotion processing 
difficulties in ASC it should be able to shed light on the inconsistent scan paths in ASC. As Figure 1.7 
above suggests, these inconsistent findings within ASC could be due to the presence of Alexithymia in 
some ASC samples. If this is indeed the case, analysing Alexithymia severity should be associated with 
atypical scan paths to a larger extent than ASC trait severity. Research measuring both Alexithymia and 
ASC severity supported this, with ASC severity correlating negatively with attention to faces; however 
Alexithymia severity (but not ASC) predicted the degree of eye fixations (Bird, Press & Richardson 
2011). 
The Alexithymia hypothesis presents a compelling case for emotion difficulties in ASC, it is 
important to note that Alexithymia does not attempt to explain the triad of impairments in ASC only 
emotion difficulties. The highly co-morbid nature of Alexithymia presents a plausible explanation for the 
difficulties reported whilst also accounting for the lack of findings in ASC. The supposition that empathy 
difficulties are housed within Alexithymia, rather than ASC, re-introduces the PAM of empathy (Preston 
& de Waal 2002) that posits the emotional s tate of the self and others are governed by the same neural 
networks. The ‘emotional linkage’ referred to previously which pairs the state of the self and others to 
Figure 1.7: An illustration taken from Bird & cook (2013) visualising the overlap of 
Alexithymia traits and ASC traits 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. 




arrive at an accurate approximation might also be at the core of emotion recognition diffic ulties in 
Alexithymia. Ultimately as a theory explaining aspects of ASC, Alexithymia can only account for 
emotional and potentially social difficulties that manifest as a knock on effect from emotional 
understanding difficulties. 
1.3.6 Summary 
The theories discussed here are but a few a from a broad ranging group, often a consistent and 
pervasive flaw is that no single theory can account for all or even many of the symptoms associated with 
ASC. The inability of a single theory to adequately explain the entirety of ASC is evidenced by the 
breadth of theories currently proposed often citing relevant and compelling work. Rather than continue to 
propose theories attempting to explain the entirety of ASC, instead there is room for a proposal that the 
theories need not be all encompassing, or that certain difficulties are distinct but they may be comorbid 
under ASC. It may be that theories trying to cover all symptoms and difficulties of ASC are instead 
hindered by trying to accommodate elements into a theory that may not actually coexist in a manner 
where one difficulty is directly linked in a causal or mutually detrimental relationship with another. 
Indeed whilst it is important to consider that theories provide compelling evidence for certain difficulties 
within autism, it should be noted that these theories are also not required to be mutually exclusive. As 
such strengths from amygdala theory for example, shouldn’t by default discount evidence for a weakened 
ToM or altered processing style.  
Such thinking is beginning to gain traction in attempts at understanding ASC aetiology, Happé 
and Ronald (2009) reviewed evidence from multiple domains (behavioural, genetic, cognitive and neural) 
to propose the ‘fractionable autism triad’ the idea that the triad of impairment s are due to distinct genetic 
roots and not so tightly intertwined as previously believed. The face validity of such a proposal comes 
from the evidence of a triad of impairments; most measures are designed to assess across the triad and 
factor analytic research has demonstrated multiple factors exist in these assessments rather than a singular 
ASC factor with high explained variance (Mandy & Skuse 2008). This was further supported by genetic 
studies evidencing ASC heritability and a BAP, but crucially within the BAP symptoms would often 




Instead there should be a drive to focus on functionally distinct difficulties (and strengths) within 
ASC such as emotion recognition and consider the possibility that difficulties in multiple domains and 
stages of processing contribute to the difficulties measured. Within all of the theories discussed there is 
scope to explain emotion processing within ASC, thus highlighting the prevalence of the difficulty within 
ASC. The manner in which the difficulty is explained differs between the theories with some proposing 
perceptual differences (WCC, Amygdala theory), both in viewing style and emotion classification,  and 
others advocating a delay in mentalizing and empathy (ToM, EMB), or emotional understanding 
(Alexithymia). 
1.4 Autism and Atypical Emotion Processing 
Given that the theories discussed above all address emotion processing and understanding 
difficulties in some way, it is worth briefly considering the research on emotion processing in ASC. 
Currently the research surrounding FER in ASC is conflicted. Some research shows difficulties of FER 
exist in ASC individuals (Bal et al., 2010; Corden, Chilvers & Skuse, 2008; Ashwin et al., 2006; Howard 
et al., 2000; Kennedy & Adolphs 2012a;  Smith et al., 2010). FER difficulties in ASC appear to be 
particularly prevalent in recognition of fear (Humphreys, Minshew, Leonard & Behrmann, 2007; 
Pelphrey et al., 2002) or negative shifts of expression generally (Corden et al., 2008; Humphreys et al., 
2007; Ashwin et al., 2006). On the contrary there is a body of research showing no such difficulties 
(Tracy, Robins, Schriber & Solomon, 2011; Jones et al., 2011; Da Fonseca et al., 2009a; Lacroix, 
Guidette, Rogé & Reilly, 2009; Spezio, Adolphs, Hurley & Piven, 2007; Neumann et al., 2006; Piggot et 
al., 2004). The inconsistencies are hard to pinpoint with such a wide range of methodologies and 
individuals from different points of the autism spectrum included in the literature (Gaigg 2012; Harms  et 
al., 2010; Uljarevic & Hamilton 2013). What does appear to be emerging is the competency of ASC 
individuals with average, or above average intelligence, to perform competently on ‘simpler’ tasks of 
emotion recognition (Neumann et al., 2006; Rutherford & Towns 2008; Adolphs et al., 2001).  These 
‘simple’ tasks are defined as those utilising static, posed stimuli usually involving the basic emotions 
(Happiness, anger, surprise, fear, disgust and sadness) (Ekman & Keltner 1970; Ekman & Friesen 1971).  
Research similarly suggests when the task difficulty is increased  through the use of dynamic, 
and/or lower intensity stimuli, or the use of more complex emotions such as pride and guilt, the FER 
difficulties in ASC become more pronounced (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a; Philip et al., 2010; Kennedy & 
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Adolphs 2012a; Golan & Baron-Cohen 2006; Cassidy, Mitchell, Chapman & Ropar, 2015). Complex 
emotions which can be subject to display rules (Matsumoto, Olide & Willingham, 2009a; Matsumoto, 
Olide, Schug, Willingham & Callan, 2009b), such as conveying joy for politeness to hide true feelings, 
often result in more than one emotion being present in an expression. Considering the findings it is clear 
the presence of FER difficulties in ASC individuals appear ambiguous because of the variation in tasks 
employed, and individual differences of the populations tested. These methodological issues, and more, 
will be discussed in greater detail in chapter 2. 
1.5 Summary 
This chapter introduced autism and the multiple theories attempting to explain it. These were 
appraised both in cognitive and biological perspectives, the amygdala theory provides an explanation for 
poorer recognition of negatively valenced expressions that is not accounted for by other theories. The 
ToM was considered more broadly as a difficulty in a specific domain of empathy, th e other domains 
were also considered with compelling evidence for global empathy difficulties. The difficulties in 
emotional empathy overlap with the emerging new Alexithymia hypothesis which proposes the overlap of 
Alexithymia with ASC as a contributor to emotional processing difficulties. Finally the weak central 
coherence theory was discussed with evidence questioning the roots of the theory that global processing is 
reduced in frequency or ability. Multiple findings showed that global processing is intact but is not 
utilized in the same circumstances as TD samples would employ it. There is little evidence from the 
theories discussed that adequately explain other areas of difficulty in ASC such as ritualised behaviour, 
narrow interests or limited imagination. The chapter finished by briefly introducing the literature 
surrounding emotion processing and the inconsistent literature surrounding emotion processing 
difficulties in ASC. The next chapter will cover this topic more in depth introducing the function of 
displays of emotion more broadly, the development of emotion processing ability, expanding on the 





Chapter 2: Methods in Facial Emotion Recognition Research 
The previous chapter introduced autism defining what it is, the diagnostic criteria and any 
associated difficulties. This was followed with the introduction of several theories that attempt to explain 
autism which were appraised in their ability to adequately account for the difficulties routinely associated 
with autism. Also briefly introduced was the conflicting research surrounding emotion processing 
difficulties in ASC, which was a common theme among the theories discussed. This chapter will expand 
upon this theme of emotion processing in autism; first the theoretical basis of emotions will be 
considered, second the function of emotions will be discussed as this is key when adequately appraising 
any methods that attempt to measure the ability to recognis e and understand emotions. This will be 
followed by a summary of the development of emotion processing abilities and how this may play a role 
in recognition competencies. This will lead to a more thorough discussion of emotion processing in ASC 
and the key roles of recognition and attribution whilst simultaneously introducing the RM paradigm as a 
method that addresses this topic. The rest of the chapter will appraise the stimuli and methods that have 
been used previously; specifically the stimuli type, complexity, delivery method and task demands as 
contributing factors to FER competencies in ASC. The chapter will conclude by outlining the aims of the 
thesis and structure of the subsequent chapters.   
2.1 Theories of Emotion 
Much as there are theories of autism there are also theories that attempt to explain how emotions 
come to be. There have been many theories that attempt to explain the phenomenon that is emotion, one 
of the original theories termed the James -Lange theory proposed that emotions are preceded by 
physiological reactions which then inform the emotional response (James 1884; Lange 1922). 
Subsequently the Cannon-Bard theory (Cannon 1927) argued that the physiological sensations and 
emotional reaction occur simultaneously highlighting some key flaws with the James-Lange theory, most 
notably that removing the viscera (organs) leaves emotional reaction intact, they also noted that similar 
physiological changes in the viscera could result in different emotions, among other critiques. 
One of the central theoretical turning points in the theories attempting to explain emotion was 
the two-factor theory of emotion (Schachter & Singer 1962). The two-factor theory argues that emotions 
are categorised according to two factors, physiological arousal and cognit ive label or appraisal. It marked 
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a transition in acknowledging that similar physical states can bring rise to different emotion 
classifications due to the context that brought about the physiological changes . In a classic study Dutton 
and Aron (1974) demonstrated that physiological sensations can be misattributed to alternate contextual 
clues; they provided evidence of such an effect by way of an experiment were male participants had to 
cross either a highly arousing dangerous bridge over a ravine, or a much safer bridge. Upon crossing the 
bridge the male participants were approached by an attractive female experimenter and asked to give a 
description of an ambiguous picture and given the experimenters phone number to call in the case of any 
questions. The results demonstrated the participants in the highly arousing conditions (dangerous  bridge) 
made more sexual inferences in the description of the picture and were more likely to phon e the 
experimenter than the participants in the safer bridge condition. Dutton and Aron  (1974) suggested the 
highly aroused state of the participants in the arousing bridge condition processed their physiological 
sensation in the context of an attractive female and thus misattributed their heightened arousal (fear) as 
attraction due to the contextual clues. 
The explanation of emotions has theoretically fallen into two distinct categories, those that 
acknowledge emotions as distinct functional evolutionary devices and those that view emotions as 
psychological classifications of the self reacting to the environment. Major differentiations between these 
two stances is that those viewing emotions as distinct categories (typically credited with evolutionary 
roots) consider them natural kinds, hard wired and provided by nature, whereas those who believe 
emotions are part of a psychological construct to categorise the changes in the self, do not require 
conformation to distinct types with clear boundaries  (Barrett 2006). 
2.1.1 Darwin-Ekman theory 
The Darwin-Ekman theory is based on Darwin’s work focussing on emotions in attempt to 
support his theory of evolution. It was based upon three principles, the emotions as we know them today 
initially functioned more practically as physiological changes which had tangible benefits, he termed this 
the ‘principle of serviceable habits’ (Darwin 1872). Some examples of the baser functions of emotions 
having serviceable habits include evidence that the widening of the eyes typically associated with fear 
responses allows a wider visual field and faster eye movements (Susskind et al., 2008). A similar root 
function can be attributed to disgust which displays with a wrinkled nose and closed mouth, both of these 
46 
 
physiological changes assist in closing orifices and reducing harmful bacteria entering the body 
(Chapman, Kim, Susskind & Anderson 2009). 
Darwin’s second principle is that of antithesis, He proposed that some displays are not 
serviceable in functions; they are intended to be without function to display the exact opposite of 
commitment to any given state or confidence. The proposal of emotional antithesis would only fit in the 
later stages of Darwin’s proposal that emotions primitively initially served functionally adaptive purpos es 
these were then exaggerated and came to hold communicative meaning for others. Antithetical displays 
serve no function within the individual to prepare them for any given activity, they are entirely 
communicative in purpose and so do not hold the same underlying roots as the other emotions and 
displays. This is potentially problematic because the socially functional explanation of emotions is 
underpinned by the primitive physiological changes holding contextually communicative meaning for the 
situation that elicited them. Darwin states that these antithetical displays are originally voluntary displays 
and become repeated through habit eventually becoming involuntary and inherited which as Black (2002) 
noted is problematic due to its contradiction of the s elective pressures that underpin Darwin’s first 
principle. 
Darwin’s third and final principle is that nervous discharge from the nervous system gives rise to 
specific reactions, such as increased verbal responsiveness in animals when experiencing intense p ain, 
fear or excitement. This proposal reflects the theories discussed previously from James -Lange and 
Cannon-Bard in that physiological sensations give rise to emotions reactions. The specific functionality 
by which these nervous discharges come to be might only be applicable to very select instances of 
displays rather than the stereotypical emotion responses we know today. 
Darwin’s view of emotions is best supported by Ekman’s work on FER. Ekman among many 
other researchers, believes the display and recognition of emotions is universal across cultures and has 
conducted and presented much research in support of this (Ekman & Friesen 1971; Juslin & Laukka, 
2003; Elfenbein & Ambady, 2002; Russell, 1994 Kirouac & Doré, 1984; Izard 1971; Scherer, Banse & 
Wallbott 2001). Such a Vast amount of research was conducted investigating the universality of emotion 
recognition that Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) conducted a meta-analysis, concluding that emotions 
could be recognised across cultures to a significantly better degree than chance alone would expect, they 
reported an average recognition rate of 58%. In the same Meta-analysis Elfenbein and Ambady (2002) 
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investigated the prevalence of the in-group advantage, a phenomenon where individuals recognise 
expressions better when they are displayed by someone from their own ethnic or regional group. They 
found an overall significant effect of the in-group advantage across 16 studies equivalent to 30.2% 
improvement within an in-group. 
The presence of an in-group effect is problematic if emotions are to be universal across cultures, 
performing better at recognising emotions from individuals the same ethnicity as you suggest some 
cultural variation is present. The nature of how that variation exists is not compatible with a  natural kind 
explanation of emotion. However it is acceptable that being particularly attuned to faces of your own 
ethnicity would be advantageous to aid in recognition of faces one was more likely to encounter, but the 
means by which such subtle variation arises is not clear. 
Evaluating the natural kind theory proposed by Darwin and supported by Ekman ’s research has 
tried to correlate emotions with response patterns, such as self-report state, facial display, physiological 
response and behavioural change. There is strong evidence that correlates facial activity and subjective 
reporting of emotional states, this is true for anger and sadness (Bonanno & Keltner 2004), and happiness 
and sadness (Mauss, Levenson, McCarter, Wilhelm & Gross 2005). However there are criticisms that 
state the correlations of specific emotion categories to states pale in comparison to  the correlations 
between such measures and affective properties of arousal and valence (Lang, Greenwald, Bradley, & 
Hamm, 1993). 
Such criticisms have resulted in alternate attempts to explain the origin of emotions, perhaps 
most radical of these is the work of Russell and Barrett (1999) because it appears diametrically opposed 
to the Darwin-Ekman theory stance of emotions that evolution provided emotions in distinct categories to 
govern behaviour when appropriate. The Barrett-Russell approach considers emotions to be better 
explained by locations across two properties of activation and pleasure or arousal and valence. 
2.1.2 The theory of constructed emotion 
In a shift from the natural-kind stance that underpins the essentialist Darwin-Ekman theorists of 
emotion, ‘the theory of constructed emotion’ is predicated upon the belief of (in earlier works) a state of 
‘core affect’. Core affect is described as “the most elementary consciously accessible affective 
feelings…examples include a sense of pleasure or displeasure, tension or relaxation, and depression or 
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elation” (Russell & Barrett, 1999 p 806). The catalyst for a shift in paradigm was the lack of consensus in 
research to report correlate emotion subevents with resultant changes in areas such as self-report affective 
state, physiological response, emotional display etc. (Russell & Barrett 1999). This lack of evidence for a 
clearly defined natural-kind emotion structure can be seen in the high correlations between subjective 
reporting of negative emotions such as sadness, anger, fear, and disgust (Feldman, 1993; Watson & 
Tellegen, 1985; Watson & Clark, 1984).  
This lack of specificity between the emotions has led to some claiming the reports of negative 
emotions appearing related to one another is better represented as a circumplex structure (Russell & 
Barrett 1999). A circumplex relies on the objects (emotions) being varied and situated along basic 
properties. One such example of a circumplex is provided below in Figure 2.1, this particular example 
varies along two basic properties ‘valence’ ranging from pleasant to unpleasant and ‘arousal’ ranging 
from highly activating or highly deactivating. The labels inside the circle represent affective changes in 
approximate locations; the labels outside the circle represent the likely locations of the prototypical 















Figure 2.1 A circumplex of affect across two basic properties, valence (horizontal) and arousal (vertical) taken from 
Russell & Barrett’s work on core affect (1999). 
 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party 
copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in 
Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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It is worth noting the affective states in figure 2.1 such as ‘stressed’,’ nervous’, tense’ and 
‘fatigued’ (among others) hold some connotation for the physiological state of an individual. For example 
being stressed often has implications for one’s health such as blood pressure (Hassoun, Herrmann-Lingen, 
Hapke, Neuhauser, Scheidt-Nave & Meyer, 2015) much like being nervous or tense has an association 
with cardiac change and muscle tension. This idea that affective states appear alongside physiological 
changes has links to the idea of embodied cognition where the physiological changes in the body might 
influence the mind. The key premise in embodied cognition that the mind may be influenced by the body 
is at work in Barrett’s Conceptual act model (2006; 2014) of emotion. The conceptual act model (CAM) 
theorizes that emotions exist in the conceptualisation of incoming sensory input and prior experience 
(Barrett, 2014), that is the emotion is real in a constructed sense when prior knowledge and incoming 
sensory input categorize the event under an emotion term. 
Expanding on the CAM, Barrett (2017) proposed the theory of constructed emotion (CE) as an 
amended model where interoception (the sense of physical condition of the body) and allostasis (the 
delicate balancing act of ensuring adequate resources for functioning) were introduced.  The theory of CE 
once again has roots in embodied cognition, with even more reliance on changes in physiological states 
recognised through interoception impacting allostasis. It is the constant drive to achieve allos tasis that 
drives the CE theory. It is proposed an internal model of concepts (past experiences) is continually 
evaluating the world and predicting “what is about to happen in the sensory environment, what the best 
action is to deal with impending events, and their consequences for allostasis (the latter is made ava ilable 
to consciousness as affect).” (Barrett, 2017 page 12). These predictions are designed to minimise 
allostatic change, and when predictions are correct allostasis is maintained (or change is minimised), 
however when the predictions are wrong (prediction error) the allostatic change is high and the resulting 
affect experienced is greater. Once the prediction error is minimised it becomes an experience, the 
prediction then explains the cause of sensory events and directs action through categorizing the s ensory 
event (Barrett 2017) in this way the brain categorizes the concepts as emotions. 
Some of the evidence provided in support of the CE theory is in the form of decorticated cats 
(cerebral cortex surgically removed) which resulted in reflexive actions that lacked the affective 
component. Given that affect forms a core part of the predictive model in governing behaviour to manage 
allostatic change it was important to note that although the cats appeared to still react emotionally this did 
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not appear to be for survival purposes the allostatic purpose of the emotion was missing (Woodworth & 
Sherrington, 1904 in Barrett 2017). There are also many studies that show neuronal degeneracy, where 
structurally distinct brain regions perform similar functions or one function is mapped to numerous 
regions (Clark-Polner, Johnson & Barrett 2016; Herry & Johansen, 2014; Becker et al., 2012; Mihov et 
al., 2013) supporting the domain general approach outlined in the CE theory. 
2.1.2.1 Prediction and retrodiction 
Barrett (2017) also notes the brain functions in a predictive fashion rather than reactive, stating 
the brain runs simulations on incoming sensory input (Deneve 2008; Bastos  et al., 2012) to best match the 
current situation to any previously categorised (Gallivan, Logan, Wolpert & Flanagan 2016). Each 
prediction is a concept and when completed they are categorizations that govern physiological regulation, 
action, and perception (Barrett 2017); this is contradictory to standard appraisal models (Lazarus 1991; 
Scherer 2009). However this approach is not without issues, the evidence for prediction which Barrett 
uses to underpin the theory relies on a feedback loop (prediction error) built in to accommodate the 
inevitability of predictions being incorrect. But the model cannot sustain itself on prediction alone, no 
model can, it requires flexibility and re-evaluation to accommodate conflicting information. 
At this point there is the issue that the theory of CE appears to be built on the foundations of 
prediction that all predictions serve to govern the maintenance of allostasis. With these foundation s it is 
accepted that prediction would be portrayed as more important than retrodiction  (the explanation of past 
events through use of the event) but the model can only improve and so allostasis can only be achieved 
(with accuracy) through the continual process of retrodiction. Similarly the CE theory portrays emotions 
as the very last step, seemingly reduced to a conscious labelling exercise of the multitude of phys iological 
and affective information that arises  in prediction error. But if the categorization of that physiological and 
affective episode into an emotion allows effective implementation of that episode then the emotion 
governs future behaviour and retrodiction is the key that incorporates the information into the model. It 
would appear in the theory of CE the predictions are only as reliable as the retrodictions allow them to be.  
The importance of retrodiction is evident in research suggesting there is no inherent specialism 
on prediction that eclipses retrodiction ability (Jones & Pashler 2007). Similarly retrodiction has been 
shown to be a reliable method in the past of assessing emotional understanding (Cassidy  et al., 2014; 
Pillai, Sheppard, & Mitchell 2012; Pillai et al., 2014). The nature of the retrodictive tasks does not allow 
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prediction to factor into the causal event categorisation process , this is because the causal event has 
already happened only the result is observable and from this information  is deduced. Because of this 
prediction knowledge is always limited by what is known prior to the event and retrodiction includes the 
information of the event itself. 
Prediction and retrodiction work in tandem, particularly in social situations where one must 
adapt quickly to the complex nature of communication and display rules. To assume one prediction 
governs an entire social interaction is too simplistic and so retrodiction must bridge the gap between 
predictions within social interactions. The purpose here is not to argue that predictions are less valuable 
than retrodiction, after all no amount of information is useful if it serves no function to better understand 
and govern appropriate behaviour. What is the aim is to highlight predictions can only be as accurate as 
the sum of prior knowledge and retrodictions in explaining prediction error, prediction is of limited use 
without prior information on error to temper subsequent predictions  and retrodiction is no use without the 
ability to apply that information to future scenarios.  
2.1.3 Theoretical criticisms 
In summary the natural kind theory and the theory of constructed emotion each have limitations. 
The belief that emotions are natural kinds appears to lack research supporting correlate actions and causal 
evidence, there is also a resurgence in cross cultural universality research that questions the original 
findings (Gendron, Robertson, van der Vyver & Barrett 2014; Crivelli, Russell, Jarillo & Fernandez-Dols, 
2016; Nelson & Russell 2013). In much the same sense there have been claims that the phenomenological 
experience of an emotion and the subsequent action, such as facial displays or vocal response, is quite 
narrow and restricted to the most stereotyped of expressions (Russell, Bachorowski & Fernandez-Dols 
2003). 
There does also appear to be cultural in-group effects (Elfenbein & Ambady 2002) in 
recognition which should not be the case if emotions are truly universal, although  such an advantage 
could be attributed to familiarity to in-group facial morphology, although this is a tenuous explanation at 
best. The rigid adherence to emotions as natural kinds is essentialist as Barrett (2006) claims; such views 
quarantine emotion research to the basic expressions. Treating natural kind emotion as fundamental to all 
understanding only achieves shoehorning research into a corner, chasing the clear boundaries of specific 
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emotion types; instead research should acknowledge that emotions may be hardwired and may serve 
specific functions but to have these appear in mutual exclusivity is unrealistic and would be ev olutionarily 
counterproductive. 
The theory of CE however, relies on core affect quite heavily and though there is strong 
evidence for prototypical emotions falling along valence lines and inter-relatedness between these 
expressions, it is worth noting that in a functional sense the prototypical expressions that appear similar in 
a circumplex design all fall towards a negative valence requiring action (Russell & Barrett 1999). There is 
sense in phenomenological experiences that require action having some instances of cross -over, given 
that any highly activating negative stimulus is better responded to with one of many negative expressions 
than not at all; a much larger concern would be an overlap in the correlate measures of the 
phenomenological experience of happiness and fear, for example. Touched upon previously and another 
potential issue with the CE theory is that ‘emotions’ in the theory , appear relegated to a lesser role, 
marginalised to a category system at the tail end of an allostatic change (Barrett 2017). The reasoning  or 
justification for this appears only to serve the claim that emotions are real and do exist, but functionally 
do very little. This is further suggested in the claim that animals do not experience emotion but do 
experience a change in affect, but it is the change in affect that is  ultimately categorized in humans as an 
emotional episode (Barrett 2017).  
It is this lack of explanation as to what makes an emotion (or is required) that is absent, this 
leads to some questions: 1) how do animals maintain their allostasis without emotions to help categorise 
events and inform predictions? 2) If animals do this without emotions what is the purpose of emotions in 
humans? 3) What trait do humans have that allows us  emotions but not animals? Ultimately the theory of 
CE appears to undermine the very importance of emotions with its explanation of them, which is reduced 
to deviation from the allostatic norm. If such deviations require classification under emotion labels to 
better reduce allostatic change in the future, then this process (or ability) by Barrett’s own admission does 
not extend to animals which would suggest they have evolved an entirely separate system to govern their 






 There is merit in Barrett-Russell’s  theory of constructed emotion, the very basic assertion that 
emotions are not entirely distinct (as argued in this thesis) and range in intensity , supports the core 
components of the theory.  Believing that the distinct emotion categories exist, with evolutionary adaptive 
purposes, is also the stance in this work; it is such that emotional expressions without display, 
physiological, and behavioural changes would serve no purpose whatsoever. However, requiring 
expressions to be heterogeneous in their resulting correlate output behaviour and physiological 
manifestations requires independence in occurrence of expression, which is not the belief in this current 
work. It is instead believed the evidence for universality of expressions is supported in their widespread 
recognition, although see (Gendron et al., 2014; Crivelli et al., 2016; Nelson & Russell 2013) but this 
does not preclude or prohibit the stance that in actuality expressions are far more likely to be complex 
blends. Even when recognised as the basic six they are still likely to include some qualitative overlap of 
the boundaries. It is such that human perception of expressions (and self-report) of particularly high 
intensity will likely show adherence to basic prototypical kinds but presentation and measurement 
through various methodological approaches will show a rich blend of multiple emotions . 
2.2 Emotion Processing and the Function of Emotions 
When investigating the ability to correctly process and recognise emotions the focus should also 
be on the function of emotions, why is it important that we recognise them? If someone shows poor 
emotion recognition abilities what is this likely to mean for them in real terms? If there were no 
detrimental impacts on everyday life then there would be no need to investigate the ability. Unfortunately 
difficulties in recognising emotion are usually manifested in mental health conditions where there is 
evidence of difficulties in individuals with eating disorders (Bydlowski et al., 2005), schizophrenia (Gur 
et al., 2002; Hooker & Park 2002; Mueser et al., 1996), depression  (Bourke, Douglas & Porter 2010), 
attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (Yuill & Lyon 2007) and Alexithymia (Roedema & Simons 1999). 
There are also marked difficulties in individuals with Alzheimer’s disease (Cadieux & Greve 1997; Bucks 




The prevalence of emotion processing difficulties in many different areas from mental health 
issues that can be periodic, to diagnoses of Alzheimer’s or ASC that will stay with the individual 
indefinitely highlights the important association between emotion processing and mental wellbeing. The 
consistent presence of FER difficulties across the conditions listed above suggests that the ability to 
correctly recognise emotions is either: A) required for good health and typical development or B) the 
inability to do so is a negative side effect of atypical development as is the case in ASC; or health issues 
in the cases of Alzheimer’s or depression. The nature in which FER difficulties emerge in different 
conditions suggests there is not a single ‘poor performance’ style, but that this alters according to the 
issue experienced. For example in depression, sufferers have a tendency to overly recognise sadness and 
view neutral expressions as more negatively valenced (Bourke et al., 2010). Whereas individuals 
diagnosed with schizophrenia show a general difficulty in specificity often confusing emotions (with a 
slight improvement in happiness relative to other emotions) (Schneider et al., 2006), whilst those 
diagnosed with ADHD express reduced N170 (electrophysio logical markers of emotion processing) 
density in the fusiform gyrus; a brain region associated with face and emotion recognition (Ibáñez et al., 
2012). 
The differential presentation of emotion processing difficulties across various conditions or 
health issues underlines the communicative function of emotions. By displaying social information to 
others emotions can aid in social cohesion (Shariff & Tracy 2011), when that social information is not 
accurately recognised problems can emerge in social skills. For example the aforementioned emotion 
processing negative bias in depression patients, whether this pre-empts the origin of depression or is a 
symptom of depression, highlights the importance of correct recognition as this negative bias can 
reinforce the depressive state. Thus if there are functionally different communicative intents for each 
expression type, then difficulties in specific types of expressions can result in specific social difficulties. 
One such case is individuals with diagnoses of ASC. These individuals often have marked 
difficulties in recognising emotions of negative affect such as fear, anger or disgust (Harms  et al., 2010; 
Bal et al., 2010; Ashwin et al., 2006; Wallace et al., 2008; Howard et al., 2000). Considering this we can 
question what are the social difficulties likely to be faced in individuals who present specific difficulties 
in processing negative expressions? Well to answer this we need to consider the function of those 




Unanimously anger, fear and disgust would convey some need to alter behaviour; that things in 
the current environment are not okay. Anger is typically a threat, designed to convey that whatever you, 
or someone in the current environment are doing, is not well received (Averill 1982). Th e intent of the 
expression is dependent upon the intensity, mild anger communicates displeasure that you may have been 
rude, intense anger is approaching physical intervention or at the very least threat of such an intervention 
(Graham & Wells 2001). Disgust can be very similar in meaning something offensive has elicited this 
reaction but it specifically centres on revulsion and has evolutionary roots in behaviour adaptation 
(Wicker et al., 2003). Disgust can  be classified into three domains; Pathogen disgust intended to avoid 
infectious substances for example rotting food, Sexual disgust designed to govern mate choice in avoiding 
costly mates with potentially poor genes, the final domain is moral disgust which mediates social 
behaviour and helps to maintain social cohesion (Tybur, Lieberman & Griskevicius, 2009). Fear is fairly 
obvious in its communicative intent, it conveys immediate danger. Typically the social circles we keep 
are those we have a vested interest in; these could be family, immediate and distant, and friends. These 
people have a social alliance, sometimes with kinship investments and so signalling when immediate 
danger is near serves to help those who would also help us.  
Understanding the communicative function of negative affect expressions, we can now begin to 
hypothesize what personality characteristics would be present in individuals who show difficulties in 
recognising these emotions. Those who struggle to recognise d isgust might make social faux pas, as they 
misunderstand social etiquettes and violate certain subtle moral disgust taboos. They may also struggle to 
pick up on subtle anger that would be displayed to allow an opportunity to rectify previous social gaffes.  
Similarly difficulties in recognising fear might result in individuals who do not adequately recognise 
threats and appear overly trusting of others (Adolphs et al., 2001). Individuals diagnosed with ASC are 
often described as being socially awkward with lack of understanding of social rules such as personal 
space and reciprocal behaviour (Happé 1994; Baron-Cohen et al.,1999); they also present flat and 
inflexible speech (Muskett, Perkins, Clegg & Body 2009) although this may be a function of the 
flexibility provided by the individual they are interacting with. Characteristics such as those would be 
guided by the recognition of negative expressions such as anger or disgust which convey that the 
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communication behaviour is not to be expected. The inability to correctly recognise fear often presents in 
individuals with ASC (Caulfield, Ewing, Burton, Avard & Rhodes, 2014). 
Having outlined the communicative function of emotions, and what difficulties in recognition 
can mean, it is now worth considering the development of emotion processing throughout age; 
specifically how the communicative nature of emotions develops and is not fully formed at birth. 
Investigating this developmental trend will question how emotion processing should be assessed and if 
one task is appropriate for all age ranges, or if this inadvertently presents a bias to certain age 
demographics because of developmental stages. These issues are addressed in the next section. 
2.3 The Development of Emotion Processing from Childhood to Maturity  
The ability to correctly process emotions follows a developmental trajectory from birth through 
to adulthood. This trajectory is underpinned by several shifts in processing style and ability at certain 
developmental milestones. These milestones will be discuss ed in relation to how research typically 
assesses emotion processing and if the conclusions drawn can be considered valid in respect of the 
emotion processing ability at any given developmental time point. 
Orienting to face like stimuli appears innate at birth (Johnson & Morton 1991; Morton & 
Johnson 1991), with new research even demonstrating foetus’ preferentially orienting to face like stimuli 
in the womb (Reid et al., 2017). The presence of such abilities so early in development underlines the 
adaptive benefits of face orientation and emotion processing. These abilities develop in line with needs, 
for example orienting to faces post-natally appears to be less communicatively functional but more 
bonding focussed, this is because new-borns have very limited communicative ability. The extant of new-
born communicative ability is limited mostly to crying and some facial gestures, with premeditated 
gesturing not developing until around nine months (Iverson & Goldin -Meadow 2005). New-borns do 
show emotional mimicry (Meltzoff & Moore 1977; 1983) but this is likely an involuntary response to 
facilitate bonding with care-givers. The lack of ability to communicate needs in new-borns means they 
are entirely reliant upon care-givers to meet their survival needs, the best way to ensure this is achieved is 
to recognise a face when one is present and orient towards it. This ensures the caregiver can see the new-




Contextual understanding of expressions does not develop until approximately five years old, 
when children begin to understand emotions match certain situations (Philippot & Feldman, 1990; 
Boyatzis, Chazan & Ting, 1993). This is matched by an improvement in language ability within this age 
group demonstrating that as emotional understanding improves it matches the abilities and 
comprehension to use such abilities (Pons, Lawson, Harris & Rosnay, 2003). Of note is the improvement 
in recognition of emotions with negative affect such as fear and disgust (Herba & Phillips, 2004) this may 
be partly due to the increasing need to recognise emotions that pose a threat to the individual as 
development increases the ability to react to such expressions appropriately. New-borns would have no 
benefit in being able to recognise emotions such as fear and disgust because they are physically unable to 
act on the information conveyed. 
The improvement in ability after the age of five coincides with the improvement of configural 
processing styles, where children begin to show the ability to p lace an aspect of a face into the correct 
whole (known as the part-whole paradigm) (Tanaka, Kay, Grinnell, Stansfield & Szechter, 1998). This 
holistic processing is key to accurate emotion recognition where attention is directed to multiple areas of 
the face, most notably the eyes and nose. This attention is fluid transitioning between the eyes and mouth 
continually which requires the ability to interpret the information as a coherent whole. This could be 
linked with executive function development which als o controls working memory (Ozonoff, Pennington 
& Rogers 1991) possibly playing a part in holistic processing. Although holistic processing is developed 
at around age six, second-order relations (the distance between facial features) are still under developed 
(Bruce et al., 2000; Gilchrist & McKone 2010). Because second-order relation configural processing is 
not fully developed, there are implications for the type of task that can be used to assess emotion 
recognition abilities. Using static images that do not show any changes in facial structures during 
development lack these second-order relation components that would be present in natural real world 
expressions. This could result in research identifying performance above what would be representative in 
a real world situation. Using dynamic expressions is more likely to capture any difficulties as it reflects 
small changes in the face, such as the scrunching of the nose in disgust or unilateral slight upturn of the 
lip in contempt. Further still using spontaneous expressions can be even more subtle with shorter display 
periods and less intense presentations (Dibekglioğlu, Salah & Gevers, 2012; Dibeklioğlu , Valenti, Salah 
& Gevers, 2010). 
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Deviation from the typical viewing pattern outlined above is often associated with difficulties; 
one such example is in ASC. Evidence suggests individuals with ASC spend less viewing the eyes, and 
more time viewing the mouth and body regions than typically developing controls (Klin et al., 2002; 
Pelphrey et al., 2002). These viewing patterns also appear to translate to recognition of emotion 
categories and intensities (Kennedy & Adolphs 2012a; Smith et al., 2010). The importance of the eye 
region is further highlighted with evidence in ASC of a reduced ability to infer mental states of others 
from images of the eyes only (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 2001). These atypical patterns are also 
accompanied by a general difficulty in recognising negative shifts in affect (Humphreys et al., 2007; 
Pelphrey et al., 2002; Corden et al., 2008; Ashwin et al., 2006) likely due to atypical amygdalae function 
(Adolphs 2002; Adolphs, Baron-Cohen & Tranel, 2002; Breiter et al., 1996).  
However, these viewing patterns are not always the case and do not necessarily occur with 
differences in recognition between autistic individuals and typically developing individuals (Van Der 
Geest, Kemner, Verbaten & Van Engeland, 2002; Tracy et al., 2011; Jones et al., 2011; Da Fonseca et al., 
2009; Lacroix et al., 2009; Spezio et al., 2007; Neumann et al., 2006; Piggot et al., 2004). In some cases 
research has only highlighted differences between those with and without autism when the stimuli used 
was dynamic, more natural in presentation, and allowed social context (Speer, Cook, McMahon & Clark, 
2007). Another factor that influence the likelihood of group differences is using stimuli of a higher 
complexity (Cassidy et al., 2014), although this did not appear to be governed by visual search strategies. 
As emotion processing abilities develop the task that would be appropriate in assessing those 
abilities also needs to differ. A task used with adults should incorporate natural dynamic stimuli, to reflect 
the fact that typically developing adults should have a fully developed configural processing style tha t is 
able to differentiate between very subtle facial movements. A task in young children might want to 
consider still utilizing natural dynamic stimuli, but limiting the complexity of any expressions that may be 
mixed or blended (Hoque, Morency & Picard 2011; Hoque & Picard 2011) which could increase 
complexity beyond children’s recognition range and executive functioning. With the previous evidence 
introduced above, it questions whether such viewing patterns will still be present in those with ASC or 




2.4 Emotion Attribution and Recognition in ASC 
As is clear by now, successful recognition of others’ emotion expressions and appropriate 
responses to these are key to successful social interaction and relationships. One need only look at the 
difficulties faced by individuals on the autistic spectrum (Harms et al., 2010), to see how difficulties 
interpreting others emotional responses and responding appropriately can impact social and 
communication skills. Previous research has typically employed stimuli sets that are static in display and 
consist mainly of the six basic expressions; happiness, sadness, disgust, anger, fear and surprise 
(Tottenham et al., 2009; Martinez & Benavente 1998; Matsumoto & Ekman 1988; Ekman & Friesen 
1976). Research utilising such stimuli have presented conflicting results, with  some studies showing 
differences in emotion recognition ability between groups, such as men and women (Hall 1984, 1978; 
Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; McBain, Norton & Chen, 2009), and those with and without autism (Harms et 
al., 2010). Whilst other research shows no differences between these groups (Loveland et al., 1997; 
Gepner, Deruelle & Grynfeltt, 2001; Castelli 2005). However, research has tended to more consistently 
produce group differences when using stimuli of differing intensities, with more subtle exp ressions 
presented at low intensity being more likely to reveal group differences in emotion recognition ability 
(Hoffmann, Kessler, Eppel, Rukavina & Traue, 2010). 
What is emerging and was briefly introduced in section 1.4 is the need for an experimental 
approach to develop ecologically valid stimuli that reflects the challenges of realistic social interaction. 
Without the use of such a stimulus set the field would struggle to accurately measure FER competency. 
This is particularly true of ASC individuals who are believed to have difficulties in FER, but the current 
stimuli fail to uncover these difficulties consistently. 
The need for more realistic, subtle, and complex displays of emotion is further supported by 
previous work suggesting that expressions posed on command do not accurately convey the emotion 
pattern entirely (Carroll & Russell 1997). The widely reported ‘Duchenne smile’ as an indicator of 
genuine happiness is distinguishable from non-Duchenne smiles by the upturn in the edges of the lips and 
eyes causing ‘crow’s feet’. The ability to distinguish between the two proposes the use of non -Duchenne 
smiles serves as an illegitimate display of happiness (Ekman & Friesen 1982; Ekman, Friesen & 
O’Sullivan 1988). The purposes of non-Duchene smiles are usually to conceal embarrassment, or attempt 
to mask negative expressions (Ekman & Friesen 1976). The documented use of both genuine (Duchenne) 
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and non-genuine smiles in social interactions, further emphasises the need for stimuli that addresses 
emotions can occur in multiple scenarios beyond what may be typically expected, and the root cause of 
those emotions can be multiple antecedent ‘feelings’. The underlying theory to this approach is that 
emotions have a ‘formal object’, the cue which elicits the emotion (Kenny 1963). Focussing on the formal 
object as a recognition task and later identifying the emotion could serve as a better test of FER 
competency transferrable to real world social competencies.  
Approaching FER in this manner would assess emotion processing on two fronts; the first being 
the ability to accurately recognise facial stimuli much like previous FER tasks have done (Tracy et al., 
2011; Smith et al., 2010); the second aspect would measure the ability to recognise the antecedent 
scenario or formal object that incited the response in the individual. The ability to accurately recognise 
facial emotions as described in the first aspect, has in previous approaches, been considered to reflect the 
overall ability of FER in a social sense (Kleinhans et al., 2010, Hill et al., 2014; Pujol et al., 2009). What 
may be the case is the recognition competency of facial emotional stimuli is assessing the ability to solely 
match those stimuli to a bank of pre-defined emotions.  
The previous tasks of FER do not measure effective implementation of th e emotional 
information, what would cause such a response, or how that response is likely to alter the individual’s 
behaviour or mood. A task focussing on implementation of the semantic information associated with the 
stimuli shown would be a greater measure to assess social skills, distinguishing between recognition of 
emotional stimuli and effective social implementation of the information.  In light of this it is important to 
consider that tasks of FER, even tasks of a greater difficulty, should be rightly classified as assessments of 
emotion recognition and not of understanding or social skills although one may pre -empt the other. To 
assess understanding, an acknowledgement of appropriate formal objects would be required; similarly in 
the case of social skills there would need to be a greater focus on implementation of the information 
available in FER tasks and how this influences corresponding understanding and or behaviour. Previous 
research has focussed on difficulties of FER assuming difficulties in that area are the underlying catalyst 
to general social difficulties. Research should consider the possibility of some ASC ind ividuals’ abilities 
to recognise emotions in a matching sense, through having learned the standardised expressions of 
emotions. The learned expressions do not however effectively apply the information from those 
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expressions into their social repertoire; it may be that this effect is more pronounced with complex 
expressions which are less immediately recognisable and categorical. 
As has been introduced above in the concept of formal objects and understanding appropriate 
root causes to any given response, it is required that future tasks should effectively emulate the entire 
social episode of emotion presentation this includes both attribution and recognition. Many of the tasks 
previously used have focussed on viewing an image or video of an emotion and attemp ting to label this; 
this is problematic because emotion recognition in the real world more accurately encompasses the 
process of observing a reaction and trying to understand the cause of that reaction. In this sense observing 
a reaction and placing it in social context forms an attribution (for example Jane returns home to find her 
house has been burgled, Jane is angry). This attribution, aids in correct recognition because it provides 
social context. Attributing emotional states to others helps in the process of understanding other people’s 
internal emotional states and potential subsequent actions, this process requires ToM and so it is 
important to consider the link between ToM and emotion recognition. 
2.4.1 Theory of mind and emotion recognition 
Within the literature there is often confusion between ToM difficulties and emotion recognition 
difficulties, whilst these areas are related they are not synonymous. For example research has shown that 
ASC individuals struggle when presented with tasks that encourage them to relate to others on an 
advanced level such as determining from someone’s expressions how trustworthy they are (Adolphs et 
al., 2001). ASC individuals  demonstrate an ability to identify the emotional displays of others, with little 
difference in success rates compared to TD (Tracy et al., 2011);however, when prompted to consider why 
the individual felt as they did, or what could have induced that reaction, ASC individuals struggled when 
attributing likely scenarios that preceded complex emotions (Cassidy et al., 2014). The research in the 
literature would suggest that the ability to recognise emotions is not as impacted as previously believed, at 
least not universally among ASC individuals. However, incorporating that information into higher order 
tasks, such as attributing mental states or tasks requiring retrodictive mindreading (RM) where the 
participant is tasked with determining the scenario that preceded an emotional expression (Gallese & 
Goldman 1998; Goldman & Sripada 2005) results in difficulties within ASC individuals. 
Some evidence suggests  autistic samples and control samples can be differentiated on measures 
of first-order and second-order ToM tasks as well as emotion recognition tasks (Buitelaar, Van Der Wees, 
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Swaab-Barneveld & Van Der Gaag 1999); although these group differences only appeared on collapsed 
composite scores. When individual measures were evaluated , group differences were only present for two 
of the first-order ToM tasks (concept of brain and picture sequencing) and none of the emotion 
recognition sub tasks. The authors concluded large effects for expression complexity and context 
matching expressions but noted this was similar across all participant groups. They also noted that 
second-order false-belief tasks differentiate the participant groups more than first -order, or emotion 
recognition tasks, and corroborated this with discriminant function analysis (Buitelaar et al., 1999). 
To consider ToM as a key contributor to difficulties in ASC, particularly those of a social nature 
like emotion recognition there would be an expected relationship between ToM and emotion recognition. 
However as mentioned previously, first-order ToM tasks do not categorically identify those with ASC in 
a fail or pass manner (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985); because of this there needs to be an acknowledgement 
that ToM abilities may be present to a certain degree, allowing success at first-order tasks but potentially 
failure at second-order tasks. Such a pattern appears to be present with difficulties reported more often in 
second-order tasks than first (Buitelaar et al., 1999; Ozonoff et al., 1991). With second-order false-belief 
failure more commonly reported in ASC individuals (but not AS see Bowler 1992) it would be expected 
if ToM abilities were essential to emotion recognition the requirements of second -order false-belief tasks 
would reflect some requirements of emotion recognition tasks. 
Although the work of Buitelaar and colleagues (1999) did not differentiate groups when 
highlighting the importance of complexity and contextual matching, these two characteristics of 
expressions will present some challenges that match second-order ToM tasks.  For example complex 
emotions such as guilt, surprise, and shame require context matching and an understanding of belief in 
another person (e.g. for guilt they have done wrong) that is simultaneously predicated on the social 
expectations of that person (people expect better of them). Correct recognition of such a state requires the 
understanding that an individual feels the way they do because they believe  other people hold a social 
judgement of them.  
The reported ASC difficulties on emotion recognition tasks would appear to fall along two types 
of tasks with differing demands. On ‘simpler’ tasks which rely on basic expressions and label matching , 
the difficulties are less pronounced (Neumann et al., 2006; Rutherford & Towns 2008; Adolphs  et al., 
2001). However, when difficulty increases with more realistic stimuli, delivery, and task demands some 
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difficulties are noted (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001a; Philip et al., 2010; Kennedy & Adolphs 2012a; Golan & 
Baron-Cohen 2006; Cassidy et al., 2015). To better understand the relationship between ToM and 
emotion processing these two types of tasks should be considered. In the ‘simpler’ tasks which less 
reliably show ASC difficulties  there are demands such as ‘label the emotion you see’ (whilst correcting 
for guessing) which allows a direct measure of the ability to correctly recognise an emotion. However the 
amount of mentalizing required in completing these tasks is minimal. There is no contextual information 
to simulate, there is indeed nothing to simulate beyond matching the expression of the target to the self 
physically. This may give rise to affective feedback which aids in correct recognition but the poin t 
remains the amount of mentalizing required is quite basic. Considered from a theory -theory perspective 
the same can be said that the amount of information available for the model is sparse. This could lead to 
predictions that theoretical conclusions of the emotion would be incorrect, due to the little data available. 
It is also a possibility that the lack of data for a basic expression leads to little conflicting information in 
the model and so conclusions are easier to be made. 
Contrasting the demands of the simpler tasks with those of the research which do show 
difficulties in ASC (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Philip et al., 2010; Kennedy & Adolphs 2012a; Golan & 
Baron-Cohen, 2006; Cassidy et al., 2015), it is clear that the amount of mentalizing or ToM required is 
notably increased. For example, when inferring the trustworthiness of individuals (Adolphs et al., 2001) 
to best complete this task one would have to recognise the emotional expression on the face and then 
make an attribution of behavioural intent to that person based on their emotion. Even in description it is 
clear this process requires the mental consideration of another perspective to predict behaviour. The same 
can be said for similar tasks such as the retrodictive mindreading tasks (Cassidy et al., 2015) which 
require the ability to understand socially appropriate responses to given situations  and the eyes task 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) where individuals are asked to infer what a person is feeling from their eyes 
alone. These tasks require more than the categorical ability to match physical facial features to a label; 
instead, success on these tasks requires  the ability to determine mental states and desires from limited 
information. 
This leads to the issue of where does ToM and emotion recognition meet? As briefly suggested 
when recognising basic emotions there is little mentalizing required, the amount of simulation or theory 
consultation employed is minimal because the amount of information presented  is minimal. It is difficult 
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to then consider ToM integral or vital to emotion recognition when the method s used reduce emotion 
recognition to categorical labelling. It might be for those that consider emotion recognition a more 
holistic process beginning with correct labelling that includes  understanding of others mental states and 
attributing appropriate emotional states to others, that ToM is centrally ingrained in such a process. This 
is an important point to make because where one decides to draw the line and conclude ‘emotion 
recognition ends at this stage’ will constitute what needs to be measured; and with basic tasks the 
literature is increasingly showing that many people with ASC do not in fact have difficulties. A 
discussion is appropriate to cons ider the roles of emotion attribution, recognition and if these form part of 
one particular skill. 
2.4.1.1 Emotion attribution 
By placing the reaction viewed in context the task more readily allows the application of ToM, 
the more information available the easier it should be to assume another perspective and come to a correct 
conclusion as to their mental state and behaviour. So by providing context of the emotional episode the 
task should, in theory, be easier whilst simultaneously more realistic. However, this would only hold true 
if there is an intact understanding of what socially appropriate emotional displays are, i.e. what would be 
expected in a given situation. If this understanding of socially appropriate displays is reduced , as would 
appear to be the case in ASC where children do not mediate joint attention with positive affect (Kasari, 
Sigman, Mundy & Yirmina, 1990; Loveland & Landry 1986; Mundy, Sigman & Kasari 1990) or 
recognise social faux pas (Baron-Cohen et al., 1999), there are two possibilities. The added context is of 
no use and performance on such a task will still be below that of controls. Alternatively there is intact 
understanding of emotional context and ability to attribute emotional states, which may or may not 
present with appropriate social behaviour as a result of that correct attribution and understanding. 
The social difficulties within ASC are well documented (Kasari et al., 1990; Loveland & Landry 
1986; Mundy et al., 1990; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999; Dawson, Finley, Phillips, Galpert & Lewy, 1988), 
their prevalence prompted research to focus specifically on social attributions (Klin 2000). Yet their 
importance in social contexts was only recently incorporated into emotion processing tasks (Pillai et al., 
2012; Cassidy et al., 2014). Such inclusions are long overdue, but provide a deeper understanding of 
emotion processing in the manner in which previous research intended to hold weight. By measuring 
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attribution of emotion states to a given reaction the task assesses emotional funct ioning in a real world 
sense, rather than basic labelling.   
2.4.1.2 Emotion recognition 
Many of the tasks that currently exist rely solely on recognition, rather than attribution. The 
distinction is that to correctly recognise an expression one is only required to know the correct label for 
what they are seeing; such a task requires no unders tanding of social context or appropriateness. As 
mentioned this can result in individuals developing a pre-defined bank of expressions that are matched on 
expression appearance with no consideration to how or why that expression has been evoked. This is 
particularly likely in samples such as ASC where the research suggests that a high co -morbidity of 
Alexithymia (section 1.3.5) could result in little understanding of affective states in the self or others. 
Such methods with an ASC sample assumes recognition in the sense of social understanding is being 
assessed, in reality the task is more akin to asking individuals to discriminate between shapes. This is 
because many of the tasks rely on images that are devoid of social context consequentially the 
discrimination employed also lacks social consideration.  
2.4.2 Retrodictive mindreading 
The emerging research paradigm ‘retrodictive mindreading’ (Gallese & Goldman 1998; 
Goldman & Sripada 2005) tests individuals ability to discern from behaviour what series of ev ents are 
likely to have caused the response viewed. This task, although simple in design, is actually a far greater 
test with broader implications for social skills. In order to accurately infer what happened to someone 
from their reaction requires the ability to; a) understand what emotional responses typically occur in a 
variety of social situations; and b) accurately recognise and attribute the appropriate emotion to the 
person. This is particularly relevant to individuals with ASC who not only exhibit FER difficulties, but 
also difficulty with Theory of Mind, and understanding what emotions and behaviours are appropriate to 
social situations (Cassidy et al., 2014; Pillai et al., 2012; 2014). 
By introducing a range of complex emotions such as shyness and guilt, or emotions subject to 
display rules, the validity of the assessment improves. Viewing a more complex or blended expression 
which is more likely to be present in natural social interaction is already an improvement closer to what 
would be expected in real world interaction. Supplementing this with being asked to infer what caused 
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that reaction, the task then becomes even more representative of everyday social interaction where a 
constantly changing environment requires a fine tuned understanding of s ocially predictable responses to 
a given situation. A reduced ability to match socially appropriate emotions to reactions could have serious 
implications for overall social ability, which is inherently separate from perceiving an emotional 
expression and applying a label to it. If the aim of research is to measure emotion recognition abilities 
there must be some inherent interest in how that information is used, if recognising emotions had no 
impact on behaviour there would be no need to measure the ability  to do so.  Recognising an emotion 
should only be the first step in a chain of events that should govern behaviour in a reciprocal social 
situation. The aim of any task should also address the understanding of social situations, not just what 
expression is seen. This can be achieved in the form of RM. 
By incorporating RM into stimuli development, naturalistic expressions are captured in response 
to specific prompts and the resulting reactions are recorded covertly. Such a method allows the capture of 
expressions that are closer to truly spontaneous and governed by social display rules (Wagner 1990; 
Wagner, Lewis, Ramsay & Krediet, 1992). The expressions created are in direct response to a specific 
prompt, and so there is an objectively correct answer to an inherently spontaneous reaction more natural 
than any before. Using these expressions in an emotion recognition/understanding task means more 
advanced questions can be asked; Such as: 1) what event happened to cause the reaction in the video? 
And 2) how does the person in the video feel? This added step of emotional inference results in a task 
measuring beyond basic emotion matching.  The emergence of this technique in recent literature is 
producing naturalistic expressions with good recognition rates (Cassidy et al., 2014; 2015; Pillai et al., 
2012; 2014).  
In the newly available assessment style, research has highlighted the importance of identifying 
an appropriate emotion to the situational context when trying to identify the correct antecedent cause of 
the reaction seen (Cassidy et al., 2014). Typically developing participants demonstrated an average 
increase of 26.43% in matching consistent emotions to context when they correctly recognised the causal 
event compared to incorrect. The increase in ability of matching emotions to causal events was larger in 
an ASC sample, which showed a 55.63% increase from incorrect to correct recognition of the causal 
event. Such an improvement demonstrates that correctly recognizing the causal event of the emotional 
reaction has an effect on the perceived emotional state of the individual. This research suggests 
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understanding what could cause an emotional reaction influences correct recognition of appropriate 
emotional states; when paired, these abilities could inform the responses in reciprocal social interaction. 
The importance of the RM method becomes apparent when considering that ASC individuals 
can distinguish between basic emotions (with varying competency), but do not necessarily acknowledge 
or respond appropriately to others emotions compared to controls or children with a learning disability 
(Sigman, Kasari, Kwon & Yirmiya 1992). In a study designed to observe ASC children’s responses to an 
adult displaying emotions during play, the ASC children showed physiological acknowledgment of the 
emotion expressions from the adults (distress, fear and discomfort). However in response to the emotion 
the children failed to physically attend to the adult, and rarely ceased play to investigate further. The issue 
then is that ASC individuals have a basic catalogue of emotion labels, but this is not complimented with 
semantic information of what those expressions mean, or how they should be responded to. 
What appears to be the case is that individuals with ASC, particularly HFA individuals who have 
well learned compensatory responses, are able to list a range of basic emotions and some complex given 
more time and prompts. When prompted to give examples of what would cause such emotions, clear 
difficulties emerge and there appears to be a semantic gap between the emotional categories and what 
those emotions serve in individuals, the affective change they bring about, and any associated behavioural 
changes. Further, the tendency for the ASC children to not orientate to the source of expressions, (Sigman 
et al., 1992) means they miss vital information relevant to what may have caused that reaction initially. 
Similar perceptual pattern difficulties exist with ASC individuals opting to pay more attention to the 
physical details of an image, such as the proximity of characters, objects in view and colours rather than 
the emotionally primed content that the individuals are close friends playing together (Bauminger & 
Schulman 2001). Employing the RM method tests the ability of ASC individuals to effectively use the 
information available in deciphering likely social events that preceded the event. ASC individuals who do 
not frequently engage others emotions, should in theory perform worse on a RM task, and so the method 






2.5 Introduction to Methods in FER Research 
The measures and techniques used to assess emotion recognition competency are often based 
upon the ability to assign a standard expression to a given display. This method is somewhat basic as it 
removes the social context from emotion recognition and requires individuals to simply identify the 
expression rather than understand it. This is particularly true considering research suggests the ability to 
process emotions is related to social functioning (Hooker & Park 2002) and social judgements (Adolphs  
et al., 2001). Such methods that lack elements of social understanding may have unfounded implications 
of difficulties in certain populations, or at least question the basis of tho se claims in relation to what 
performance would be under more valid circumstances. One such example is the mixed results in the 
literature surrounding emotion processing competencies in individuals with ASC discussed briefly in 
chapter 1; the inconsistencies suggest there is a need to re-evaluate the methods employed. Particular 
attention should be paid to the stimuli itself, questioning if it accurately portrays a range of emotions 
broad and complex enough to be accepted as a test of emotion processing competency that is valid. The 
delivery methods of the stimuli currently active in the literature need to be evaluated considering if these 
could be improved to be more representative of naturalistic expressions. Finally there should be 
consideration of the tasks administered and if they effectively measure engagement and understanding of 
the emotional information available beyond label based recognition.  
Currently multiple stimuli sets exist to assess emotion recognition competency such as the AR 
face database (Martinez & Benavente 1998), the NimStim face set (Tottenham et al., 2009), UC Davis set 
of emotion expressions (UCDSEE) (Tracy, Robins & Schriber, 2009), the gold standard; Pictures of facial 
affect (POFA) (Ekman & Friesen 1976), and the later revised Japanese and Caucasian Facial Expressions 
of Emotion (JACFEE) (Matsumoto & Ekman 1988). These stimuli sets, with the exception of the 
UCDSEE, focus primarily on expressions of the basic six emotions (happiness, surprise, sadness, fear, 
disgust and anger) found to be universally presented and recognised across cultures (Ekman & Keltner 
1970; Ekman & Friesen 1971). Both the NimStim and JACFEE include all six of the basic emotions 
captured, from a multiracial participant group, to ensure recognition validity across a range of ethnicities. 
One of the larger stimuli sets that covers both the basic and complex expressions is the Cambridge 
mindreading face-voice battery (Golan, Baron-Cohen & Hill, 2006; Baron-Cohen, Golan, Wheelwright, 
& Hill 2004; Baron-Cohen, Hill, Golan & Wheelwright 2002). The mindreading face-voice battery 
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includes 412 different emotions , each with six different displays and verbal responses enacted by a wide 
range of actors/displayers from male to female, young to old and multiple ethnicities. Aside from these 
large validated stimuli sets, research has designed smaller sets of stimuli for specific purposes; some 
examples include variation in presentation rate of dynamic stimuli (Tardif, Lainé, Rodriguez & Gepner 
2007), the ability to match static and dynamic emotion expressions (Gepner et al., 2001) and investigating 
the multi-modal delivery of emotion expressions (Loveland et al., 1997). The differing avenues of 
research being employed, each addressing potential variables in stimuli type and delivery method that 
could influence recognition, demonstrate the need for a stimuli set more advanced than those currently 
being used in the literature. Ultimately the literature (until some of the most recent work Pillai et al., 
2012; 2014; Cassidy et al., 2014; 2015) has neglected to address these issues with serious concern as to 
how they may affect performance in recognition, the very purpose of their creation.  
The remainder of this chapter will address aspects of the stimuli and methods currently in use  in 
the literature highlighting the need for the creation of a stimulus set that addresses these key issues:  
I. The stimuli need to be social, elicited in response to a social situation under conditions as natural as 
possible to ensure spontaneity.  
II. The stimuli should be presented in a manner that reflects how social skills have developed, in 
response to real-time dynamic expressions.  
III. Expressions should be open to variations in complexity, referring to the expression types available 
beyond the basic six.   
IV. Similar to dynamic delivery and complexity the expressions should be multi-modal in their 
information streams; they should incorporate visual information, auditory information and allow 
enough context for body posture and language to be incorporated.  
V. The method of assessment should address correct understanding of socially appropriate responses as 
well as recognition, to separate the assumption that perceiving a display and being able to label it 





2.6 Expression Creation and Delivery 
This section will specifically address the creation and delivery of emotion expressions in 
research. This is because the task used to assess emotion recognition should be as close as possible to 
emotion recognition in a real world setting. Some of the issues most important are how the expressions 
used in the task are created, do they manifest naturally like they would in typical social interaction? And 
does this natural manifestation effect recognition? Alongside the creation of the expressions, how these 
are displayed to participants in the task is also an important factor; is the expression displayed within 
context? Or is it presented as a standalone piece of information? These issues will be addressed in 
following sections. 
2.6.1 Spontaneously evoked and posed expressions 
Research involving spontaneous reactions does not come to a clear definition to differentiate 
posed from spontaneous, not until Matsumoto and colleagues (2009a; 2009b) where a clear definition 
outlined that spontaneous expressions are not produced in response to a direct request like posed. Until 
this work a definition is distinctly absent mostly implied that such a distinction should be obvious, 
differentiating  “posed” and “evoked” (Gur et al., 2002) or between “felt” and “unfelt” emotions 
(Gosselin, Kirouac & Dore, 1995).  In the effort for clarity a definition will attempt to be deduced from 
the method of elicitation used, the distinction between posed and evoked is that something (a memory or 
event) is the catalyst for an emotional change when evoked, but when posed there is no such internal 
change. Whilst felt and unfelt is clear, suggesting a change of internal affect should be present. What has 
been deduced from these two classifications then is a similar approximation of natural expressions, albeit 
if not spontaneous. A natural expression should be the result of some external catalyst and should result in 
some change of emotional state. 
Outlining such a distinction is important because spontaneously evoked expressions can hold 
multiple root causes, which posed expressions are not likely to effectively capture in their creation. This 
could result in a singular expression of higher signal clarity (Signal clarity concerns the emotional content 
available and how readily recognisable it is) from posed than evoked expressions (Matsumoto et al., 
2009a). Ekman and Friesen (1976) alluded to this highlighting the multifaceted use of the basic emotions 
in different situations across cultures; the smile is typically an indicator of happiness, but can also be used 
as a mask in situations of embarrassment or politeness. Creating stimuli of posed expressions, particularly 
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basic expressions, does not address the way emotions manifest in typical social situations. A higher 
quality dynamic delivery will provide more information surrounding the elicitation of the smile showing 
it to be a far more complex mixture of emotions. The difference between posed and naturally evoked 
expressions could ultimately result in an entirely different emotional categorisation. 
2.6.1.1 When is an emotion reaction spontaneous? 
To come to a definition of a spontaneous emotion reaction, it might be easier to first define a 
posed emotion. This definition will vary according to the theoretical stance of how emotions come about, 
those aligning with the Darwin-Ekman stance will view emotions as evolutionary adaptive constructs that 
served behaviourally practical benefits but came to be exaggerated and communicative over time. The 
Darwin-Ekman stance is strongly underpinned by universality in presentation and recognition of basic 
natural kinds, thus it would be expected that any emotional change would fall into one of the six 
identified basic expressions (happiness, sadness, anger, fear, surprise, disgust). Two things are worth 
noting from this; an emotion should comprise some shift in affect towards one of the identified basic 
expressions and being behaviourally adaptive, the shift should be attributable to some external influence; 
this is due to the origins of emotions in evolutionary terms where changes in facial expressions are 
thought to be in response to the environment. By contrast those that align with a constructed view of 
emotions would consider emotions to be a product of a change in core affect and a subsequent 
categorization of the brain trying to make sense of instances where allostasis was not adequately 
maintained. Importantly, it is clear both of these views of emotion require a change in response to 
something. 
The points above illustrate that regardless of the theoretical stance on emotions, there is 
agreement that emotions manifest as an anticipation of, or response to, external stimuli/events. The 
methods with which posed expressions are usually created involve asking individuals to match their faces 
to prototypical expressions (Ekman 1993; Beaupré, Cheung & Hess 2000; Tracy  et al., 2009) often with 
coaching for specific AU activity (Ekman & Friesen 1978). Under these methods, posed expressions are 
not re-creating emotions per se, they recreate physical changes that are associated with emotions. As a 
result, posed expressions do not result from a change in affect and are only in response to a request. The 
request may serve as an external influence but if this were true, the instruction to raise the lip for example, 
is affectively no different from an instruction to widen the eyes. These two instructions  are unlikely to 
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produce an affective change; if they do it is unlikely to produce different affective change from each 
other. Therefore in extrapolation from a definition of what traits posed expressions contain it can be 
deduced that spontaneous emotion responses  should rely on affective change that is linked to external 
events; this premise is at the core of theories attempting to explain emotions .   
2.6.1.2 Methods of evoking emotion expressions 
Of the previous methods that have been used in an attempt to capture naturalistic expressions, 
many have been subject to limitations. In some cases, individuals are asked to re-live a past memory with 
strong emotional ties (Gosselin et al., 1995; Gur et al., 2002). Consulting our previous definitions as 
exclusion criteria, we can agree that reliving a memory will most likely result in a change in affect. Being 
asked to do so is artificial and so falls short of our criteria of natural and spontaneous. There are  also 
issues around the accuracy of those expressions; for example, memories are often re-appraised over time 
(Ellsworth, 1991); meaning the original classification of the event could have changed. In this way, 
something that was once considered an extreme cause for distress, could be reconsidered and viewed 
positively as a challenge. This changing of the valence of the emotional memory could potentially alter 
the portrayal of the expression. Re-living a memory relies on the assumption the expression produced will 
result in the same emotional content of the initial expression, which is not guaranteed if re -appraisal has 
occurred. Similarly it requires the physical production is representative of spontaneous emotions as they 
occurred in real time amplitudes, duration and intensity.  
Other attempted methods have captured real time spontaneous reactions to images or video cues 
(Lang, Bradley & Cuthbert, 2008; Valstar & Pantic, 2010). These expressions would meet the criteria to 
be considered spontaneous; the emotion reactions are not directly requested and arise in response to some 
stimulus, likely bringing about some change in affect. However, given that the purpose of emotional 
facial expressions is partly to display social information to others (Shariff & Tracy 2011), there is doubt 
that expressions gathered under isolated non-social conditions are representative of those in social 
interaction (Schmidt, Cohn & Tian, 2003). When attempting to create expressions we must consider 
spontaneity relative to posed but also the naturalness of those expressions relative to truly typical. By 




The demand for more representative expressions has resulted in research attempting to develop 
stimuli of naturally evoked expressions. Considering the previously discussed research monitoring the 
development of spontaneous smiles in social interaction and isolation (Schmidt et al., 2003), there are 
concerns to the validity of the smiles generated in both conditions; in the interview condition participants 
were aware of their recorded reactions and were also under instruction to actively deceive the interviewer. 
The instructions to actively deceive the interviewer are likely  to have produced smiles lower in ecological 
validity than those produced under a natural interview setting. During the isolated condition the 
individuals recruited for the research were part of an experiment investigating risk of depression. There is 
research suggesting expression evocation during depression can be atypical (Berenbaum & Oltmanns 
1992; Rottenberg & Vaughan 2008). Analysing expressions presented by individuals who may have 
depressive traits or diagnoses of depression and comparing these to a  separate group of individuals 
without such traits, prompts questions regarding the validity of the results being due to situational context 
or group differences.  
The comparisons of posed to evoked expressions and questions surrounding the efficacy of using 
posed expressions has resulted in research attempting to create evoked expressions to more accurately 
measure expression recognition competency. Certain designs such as Wagner, MacDonald and Manstead 
(1986) and earlier work from buck and colleagues (1972; 1978) attempted to create spontaneous 
expressions in individuals using emotionally loaded stimuli and covertly recording the expressions. The 
method of recognition used in these studies is commendable, tasking individuals that viewed the 
emotional expressions to feedback what slide the individual was seeing. Such a task is similar in design to 
the RM tasks where the response of the individual is used to retrodict what scenario is likely to have 
caused the expression (Gallese & Goldman 1998; Goldman & Sripada 2005). The method of expression 
evocation employed is still subject to scrutiny; the participants used to evoke emotions viewed static 
images of varying scenes  to elicit expressions (Wagner et al., 1986). 
Further Attempts at producing evoked expressions have tasked individuals to try and relive 
memories that are congruent to the expression required (Gur et al., 2002; Gosselin et al., 1995).This 
method is designed to more accurately reflect emotion expressions whilst still maintaining experimental 
control. While this technique is a marked improvement to relying on solely posed expressions, it still 
applies a reductionist view to the production and defining of an evoked expression. This is because 
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reliving a memory is an entirely new event from when the memory occurred, this can lead to distinctly 
different reactions; asking someone to reflect on their late spouse is just as likely to elicit happiness as 
they revisit memories of their time together as it is to produce sadness. More likely is some amalgamat ion 
of the two will appear but this is still an entirely different reaction from the intended emotion of grief. 
Reliving memories as a method to evoke emotions  would be okay if the captured emotion was accurately 
labelled and classified upon reliving, but it appears the method specifically aimed to coax distinct 
emotions from memories assuming they would be relived in the same way as initially experienced. It is 
worth noting that controls were employed such as autonomic measures and mood readings, so it is likely 
the emotions evoked affectively achieve what was aimed, but there is still concern if these emotions 
manifest in the way they would upon initial experiencing.  
Expanding on the point above, there is a further confounding variable in the likelihood t hat the 
emotion requested can be recalled to a contextually acceptable degree even if the original categorical 
recollection is appropriate. For example depending on the context of the request, individuals may be 
asked to relive an experience that made them angry. This would most likely result in the production of the 
correct affective response but its accuracy is entirely open to the individual due to which type of memory 
to recall. There are undoubtedly varying levels of intensity within the same emotion category (Fujita, 
Diener & Sandvik 1991), these are influenced by sex (Diener, Sandvik & Larsen, 1985) and age (Diener, 
Sandvik & Larsen 1985; Fujita, Diener & Sandvik 1991). As mentioned previously this would be less 
problematic if the stimuli were presented with full context of evocation method. E.G. “has this person just 
relived experience X?” rather than “has this person just relived a memory that once made them angry?” 
This distinction is small but significant; the context of the specific memory relived  would prove a 
particularly novel task and arguably engage ToM abilities to a higher degree, forcing the participant to 
consider that perceptions of specific memories can change over time. Of course this is only possible if the 
emotions are presented as relived expressions rather than as current expressions. 
By asking individuals to retrieve emotional memories related to a target emotion, there is room 
for discrepancy between the emotion desired and the memory used to retrieve it. Such discrepancy could 
lead to individuals retrieving memories of a lower or higher intensity than desired with some research 
suggesting the kind of memories people are likely to retrieve (those important to their life) are higher in 
intensity (Talarico, LaBar & Rubin 2004). With inconclusive findings surrounding emotional events 
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improving or hampering recall (see Christianson 1992) there are once again validity issues with this 
method of emotion evocation. There is little control to mediate the appropriate level of intensity of 
emotion recalled  to aid in expression evocation, this is ultimately due to the subjective nature of affect; 
what may make one person angry, can make another laugh. Resultantly conveying the correct affective 
state desired and having the actor relive a memory of the correct intensity is restrictively complex. 
Ultimately the method of recalling memories associated with emotions preselects a range of emotions far 
higher in intensity than would be expected of typical day to day emotion evocation, this is due to t ypical 
day to day events not likely intense enough to form long lasting memories where recollection would be 
necessary. 
The issues raised around intensity may seem trivial, after all the drive for spontaneous methods 
proposed in this thesis by capturing real time emotions at the moment of experience allow no control over 
how intense each individual expression might be. However, there is consistency in the event that is used 
to illicit said emotion, which allows more control than reliving expressions which can leave the range of 
memories available skewed towards more intense instances. The question then is what do relived 
expressions add that spontaneously evoked expressions can’t achieve? It would appear very little; in the 
context of the studies mentioned the reliving was not framed as a relived expression when viewed by 
participants, it was a method used to achieve spontaneous expressions of target emotions. Their 
application in a RM task as discussed might pose new and novel questions forcing consideration  that 
perceptions of events can change over time, but this specific ability is beyond the scope of real time 
recognition as discussed in this thesis.  
By opting to use posed stimuli of the basic emotional expressions as a measure of emotion 
processing competency, the rigour of the assessment is drawn into question. Failing to accurately 
replicate the array and complexity of emotional stimuli that would be on display in typical social 
environments means many of the current stimuli and methods employed lack validity in a capacity that 
holistically assesses emotion recognition. More accurate would be to consider a level of basic emotional 
processing has been established and further tests could be used with stimuli of a higher complexity to 
expand upon this. Similarly there is room for developments in the range of spontaneously evoked stimuli 
that exist, particularly in the advancement of stimuli that demonstrate expressions more accurately 




2.6.1.3 Presentation differences between spontaneous and posed expressions 
Whilst the critiques of previous spontaneous stimuli sets are outlined here and the case is made 
for greater validity, is there currently any research to suggest expressions captured spontaneously differ 
from those posed? Most well researched are the differences of posed and genuine smiles, with evidence of 
less muscular contraction around the eyes for posed smiles (Dibekglioğlu, Salah and Gevers, 2012; 
Dibeklioğlu, Valenti, Salah and Gevers, 2010), in tandem with more accelerated eyelid movement in 
posed smiles and overall shorter expressions in posed smiles (Dibeklioğlu  et al., 2010). With differences 
in display patterns, is there any evidence that expressions produced upon  request may contain less social 
information than those that occur naturally in social interaction? The inherent socially communicative 
nature of expressions leaves them open to display rules (Wagner 1990; Wagner et al., 1992) an accepted 
social filter that informs what expressions are socially appropriate. Display rules dictate how we might 
portray a certain emotional response; for example, pretending to portray happiness upon receiving an 
unwanted gift, the true emotion is likely one of disappointment but  display rules would require this 
response be concealed with a masking emotion of happiness/gratitude. This lack of social filters in posed 
expressions suggests there is less communicative information in posed expressions than spontaneous as a 
result the expressions created are narrow and do not contain the depth that display rules provide.  
Traditionally, research has shown better recognition of posed expressions (Ekman & Friesen 
1982) with recognition levels mostly at chance for ‘genuine’ emotions (for the purposes of this work 
spontaneous expressions are considered genuine, there are undoubtedly non -genuine spontaneous 
emotions this will be discussed briefly in the later paragraphs but is primarily beyond the focus of this 
work) (Manstead, Wagner & MacDonald, 1986; Motley & Camden, 1988).  By genuine and non-genuine 
emotions it is meant expressions that convey the true internal state are genuine, those that do not are non -
genuine (sometimes referred to as deceptive and unfelt). The previously discussed dis play rules underpin 
this idea that expressions are frequently shown that do not match the internal state. If the claim is that 
posed expressions do not convey the information that would be in spontaneous expressions (genuine or 
non-genuine) we should expect to see differences in the production of those expressions and subsequent 
recognition of posed and spontaneous expressions. 
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Early work quantifying differences in expressions of posed compared to spontaneously evoked 
expressions have demonstrated subtle differences in facial muscle action (Cohn & Schmidt 2004; Valstar, 
Pantic, Ambadar & Cohn 2006). Spontaneous smiles appear to be lower in amplitude (intensity in 
associated facial regions), longer in duration and have delayed onset and offset times when comp ared to 
posed smiles (Cohn & Schmidt 2004).  Findings also demonstrate altered brow activity in spontaneous 
expressions, displaying altered intensity, duration and the action units appear in altered occurrence when 
compared to posed expressions (Valstar et al., 2006). Analysis of recognition of spontaneous expressions 
in medal winners at the Athens Olympic games (Matsumoto et al., 2009a) found no evidence to support 
the phenomenon of ingroup advantage recognition (where individuals are more likely to correc tly identify 
emotions presented by individuals of the same ethnicity as themselves) reported in posed expressions 
(Elfenbein & Ambady 2002). This finding implicates the difference between spontaneous and posed 
expression production with posed expressions being subject to ‘cultural dialects’ (Elfenbein, Beaupré, 
Lévesque & Hess, 2007). The cultural dialects are permutations exclusive to specific ethnicities which 
allow more effective recognition within cultures than across (Elfenbein et al., 2007). The failure to 
replicate this effect in spontaneous expressions (Matsumoto et al., 2009a) suggests evoked expressions 
supersede posed in their production urgency and are likely to have less social filtering applied considering 
subtle cultural dialects are omitted. 
The subtle distinctions between posed and spontaneous expressions outlined above appears to 
impact the overall authenticity of posed expressions where previous research has demonstrated the 
production of posed expressions, even those of professionally trained actors, are not representative of 
those expected by natural expressions (Caroll & Russell 1997). More subtle aspects of the stimuli may 
also vary between posed and natural expressions, one such potential factor is the length of the stimuli, 
with varying lengths possibly compromising the recognisability of the stimuli (Cassidy et al., 2015). 
Previous research has attempted to address this by limiting the exposure time of stimuli more in line with 
that which would be expected in natural expressions (Kirouac & Doré 1984). This is problematic when 
considering the rate of expression development could vary across posed and naturally evoked 
expressions. The lack of research investigating expression development over time, particularly regarding 
posed stimuli compared to spontaneous, questions how effective a solution it is to simply cap expression 
viewing time to shorter intervals. This approach assumes expression formation and dissipation is uniform 
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when spontaneous or posed but research has shown this not to be the case (Cohn & Schmidt 2004) and is 
simply likely to result in expressions being cut short. 
When tasked with identifying non-genuine emotions (where an actor displays an emotion 
contrary to their internal state) participants showed particularly poor discrimination between posed and 
genuine emotions (Hess & Blairy 2001; Naab & Russell 2007; Ekman & Friesen, 1974; Ekman & 
O’Sullivan 1991; Manstead et al., 1986) and a bias towards rating expressions as authentic (Zuckerman, 
Koestner, Colella & Alton, 1984). Such a bias may be because the non-genuine/posed expressions are of a 
high quality that accurately replicates natural expressions. But the previous research shows this is not the 
case with noticeable differences (Dibeklioğlu et al., 2012; Dibeklioğlu et al., 2010; Ekman, Davidson, & 
Friesen, 1990; Valstar et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2001). But if there are clear observable differences 
between posed and spontaneous (genuine and non-genuine) emotions, a bias towards rating expressions 
as spontaneous (genuine) may be more due to a social requirement than lack of perceptive ability. A 
possible reason for such a pattern could be the social ramifications for stating distrust of others emotions 
may be far more severe than any manipulation incurred for being ‘duped’. 
2.6.1.4 Summary of spontaneous and posed expressions 
The definition of posed expressions included in this work is that any expression produced upon 
request is posed, any other displayed change in affect would be considered spontaneous. There is also a 
distinction between felt (genuine) and unfelt (non-genuine) expressions. For example trying to hide 
frustration in response to a rude comment, the expression may be one of happiness but this is non -
genuine. In the given example the non-genuine happiness is posed at the volition of the displayer, in the 
context of this thesis such an expression would still be considered spontaneous as it has occurred 
naturally in social interchange. The example given above is designed to highlight the complexity of posed 
and spontaneous distinctions as even spontaneous expres sions can be non-genuine designed to hide 
affective states. The distinction between posed and spontaneous expressions has been validated with 
evidence of altered display styles, amplitudes and onset/offset times (Cohn & Schmidt 2004; Valstar et 
al., 2006). These differences appear to translate into recognition rates with improved recognition of posed 
expressions (Ekman & Friesen 1982), however as this chapter addresses such results are based on stimuli 
sets that do not accurately recreate spontaneous expres sions. This section has made clear the observable 
differences in posed and spontaneous expressions production and display. It is paramount that these 
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differences are reflected in the stimuli used to assess FER competency; particularly in populations with 
suspected difficulties. 
2.6.2 Static and dynamic display 
Research specifically comparing the use of dynamic stimuli vs static stimuli when recognising 
emotions in an ASC sample, showed that recognition was significantly improved for static images 
compared to dynamic, when the stimuli was less complex and towards a single end of the valence 
spectrum (Cassidy et al., 2015). Whilst recognition of genuine vs feigned positive shifts of expression 
was improved for static relative to dynamic stimuli, recognition of the emotion blend of smiling and 
confusion was significantly less accurate in the static compared to the dynamic condition. The finding of 
a complex emotion such as blended smiling and confusion being better recognised via dynamic delivery 
is more likely due to the nature of the expression rather than dynamic stimuli being easier to interpret. 
This can be explained in the manner of the expression, the mixture of happiness and confusion is unlikely 
to be presented in even proportions at any one static point of the expression. Therefore the static condition 
conveys less information and is likely conveying either more of happiness or confusion and so is 
categorised that way. The results highlight the need for dynamic expressions in instances where the 
expression is more complex, isolating a single frame is not representative of the emotion label (Cassidy et 
al., 2015.)  
Much like the work from Cassidy and colleagues (2015) research shows ASC individuals may 
struggle processing dynamic stimuli suggesting that interpreting dynamic stimuli is a considerably harder 
task than interpreting static ones (Gepner & Feron 2009). However early findings demonstrate improved 
emotion recognition in intellectually disabled individuals from dynamic stimuli compared to static 
(Harwood, Hall & Shinkfield 1999). Similar findings from low functioning ASC individuals suggest a 
slow presentation of dynamic stimuli to be the most beneficial to FER (Gepner et al., 2001). Somewhat 
similar is the evidence that in ASC individuals mental state inferences to dynamic expressions showed a 
mild non-significant improvement, suggesting that the increased social information is not a hindrance to 
those with ASC (Back, Ropar & Mitchell 2007). Conversely, recognition of complex emotions (e.g. guilt, 
shame, pride) is improved in static stimuli compared to dynamic (Roeyers, Buysse, Ponnet & Pichal 
2001). Although this difficulty in dynamic recognition is complex, with evidence of improved anger 
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recognition from dynamic displays compared to static but decreased sadness recognition suggest the 
individual expressions may each have optimum delivery methods and intensities (Enticott et al., 2014).  
The mixed results highlight that the difficulties are complex and likely unique to the type of 
stimuli viewed, with prototypical emotion recognition showing a general improvement (Harwood  et al., 
1999; Gepner et al., 2001; Enticott et al., 2014), but difficulties appear for recognition of some complex 
emotions (Roeyers et al., 2001; Back et al., 2007). The differences in static and dynamic stimuli extends 
to the visual perusal patterns employed, with analysis of eye tracking data outlining differences in gaze 
direction to dynamic but not static stimuli (Speer et al., 2007) which may account for haphazard 
improvements, due to altered visual perusal and the differing regions of interest across emotion 
expression and valence. 
2.6.2.1 Summary of static and dynamic presentation 
The effects of differing stimuli delivery methods on emotion processing demonstrates that for 
complex blended emotions, there is a need for these stimuli to be displayed in a more holistic natural 
manner. When complex emotions are delivered via static images, it assumes the emotional expression is a 
uniform process with the blend of emotions showing equal clarity at any given moment. In reality the 
expressions of emotions are fluid and initial smiles and perceived happiness can morph into confusion or 
hesitance (Cassidy et al., 2015). By presenting a complex blended emotion in a static manner, the stimuli 
do not accurately reflect the emotion as it is elicited. It may be that complex emotions are series of shorter 
expressions that collectively form an overall episode. Research typically opts to isolate the point at which 
the expression appears most intense and uses this as an indicative emotional expression. By selecting the 
frame at which the expression appears most intense, tests of recognition provide a fa r easier task than 
displaying a dynamic delivery of the emotion inception to termination. This is particularly true of basic 
expressions, whereas the difficulty of interpreting complex emotions is more than likely aided by the 
extra contextual information dynamic stimuli provides compared to static images (Cassidy et al., 2015; 
Ambadar, Schooler & Cohn 2005). This in turn means the expressions used are too intense to be 
displayed in a static manner for a prolonged period of time and still be considered an e ffective measure of 
emotion recognition competency. This effect is compounded when the stimuli is used in a population of 
individuals with ASC, where the results surrounding FER competencies are conflicting.  
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Providing a task easier than typical everyday social emotional presentation serves no purpose for 
measuring an individual’s competencies and instead  provides a glass floor by not fully engaging any 
difficulties which may or may not be present resulting in an inflated performance of emotion processing 
due to testing via ill equipped measures. On the contrary as demonstrated in Cassidy and colleagues work 
(2015), the extra contextual information may also aid FER for complex expressions. This suggests for 
tasks that include complex expressions but do not present the expressions in dynamic multi-modal 
formats the opportunities for correct recognition are artificially reduced. 
2.7 Expression Complexity in FER Research 
Complexity in research is an open term and can refer to multiple factors, it can mean the t ype of 
expression shown, if it is one of the universal basic six or expressions defined as ‘complex’. Complexity 
can also be used to differentiate the amount of information available in the expression if this is delivered 
over multiple modalities; this section will address differing levels of complexity in the literature both in 
expression types and the amount of information available.  
2.7.1 Expression types 
2.7.1.1 Basic expressions 
The stimuli in the literature includes some, if not all of the basic expressions (happiness, sadness, 
anger, fear, disgust, surprise) with mixed results in emotion processing competencies, particularly in ASC 
populations (Martinez & Benavente 1998; Matsumoto & Ekman 1988; Tracy et al., 2009; Ashwin et al., 
2006; Bal et al., 2010; Teunisse & De Gelder 2001). More recent developments have begun to include 
emotions outside of the basic six (Tracy et al., 2009; Pillai et al., 2013; 2014; Cassidy et al., 2014). The 
classification of ‘basic’ and ‘complex’ emotions is convoluted, but what can be agreed is the basic six 
expressions are widely accepted as the foundational emotional responses and this is supported with cross 
cultural evidence (Ekman & Keltner 1970; Ekman & Friesen 1971).  
2.7.1.2 Complex expressions 
Classifying complex emotions is more ambiguous, indeed there have been calls from Ekman that 
the basic six expressions should be expanded to sixteen (Ekman 1999); which highlights the need for a 
classification system outside of the basic six. The distinction for the purposes of this work is that basic 
emotions are reactionary responses that can vary in intensity but are often not tempered according to 
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social or cognitive appraisal. Complex emotions however, are belief based (Harris 1989), concerning 
reflection of the change in affect in response to a situation. Complex emotions can also be social in their 
roots (e.g. guilt, shame, pride) (Kasari, Chamberlain & Bauminger 2001) leading to a mental state change 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1996; Griffiths 1997).  
Interesting research has demonstrated complex expressions in the form of mental states can 
attract a broad range of identifications (Back & Jordan 2014), questioning the method that using a 
proportion of responses to a predefined mental state as a ‘correct’ measure may be potentially simplifying 
the process of identification. Just as important a result was the finding that on repeat presentation, raters 
occasionally attributed different words to the same stimulus; Back and Jordan (2014) hypothesized this 
may be due to the preceding stimuli and individual differences in their label use. This has important 
implications, it suggests that individuals’ perceptions of mental states are not bound by a rigid 
classification system but are more fluid in response to their own mental state. One explanation for this is 
that the subtlety of mental states in realistic social interchange requires more information from less overt 
ques such as voice pitch, body pose, gestures and contextual information. This is in line with the findings 
of Jones and colleagues (2011) which demonstrated other sources of information such as verbal and non -
verbal vocal expressions explained larger variance in emotion recognition than visual input.  
Evidence suggests the eye region holds important information for identifying complex emotions 
and mental states (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright & Joliffe 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) particularly 
within dynamic expressions (Back, Jordan & Thomas 2009). There are difficulties recognising complex 
social situations not specifically limited to visual perception, with evidence of reduced understanding of 
social faux pas, irony and sarcasm in descriptions of social situations in ASC (Happé 1994; Baron -Cohen 
et al., 1999). As complex emotions include aspects of mental states of the individuals in relation to 
context, and that these are often based in social interchanges or contexts, E.G. “this person is friendly” or 
“I shouldn’t have worn this I feel embarrassed” there is once again the need to highlight the importance of  
spontaneous natural emotions that can capture this degree of complexity. Posed expressions tend to lack 
the self-regulating social filter of display rules (see section 2.6.1.3), where the internal felt emotion may 
not match the externally displayed one, it is then also possible they may not accurately portray complex 




2.7.1.3 Mixed and blended expressions 
Complex emotions can also frequently be blends of two or more basic emotions (Humphreys et 
al., 2006; Hoque & Picard 2011), which may not accurately convey the emotional state of the individual 
when shown via static image. Regarding complex emotions and the potential of blending or combining of 
basic emotions, Ellsworth (1991) notes  that often the transition from one emotion to another is due to a 
reappraisal, where the root cause of the emotion has been altered. This reappraisal poses the question that 
when emotions shift is it merely a change from one basic emotion to another or is  the emotional episode 
as a whole experienced as a complex emotion?  To present isolated stimuli of an individual pre and post 
reappraisal would most likely result in two completely different emotion labels, but presentation of the 
entire episode would display the emotional transition and provide overall greater context.  Another 
consideration is that expressions can, and do, appear simultaneously when blended (Hoque & Picard 
2011); presenting such an instance via a static image may not provide the signal c larity required for 
recognition. Well standardised stimuli sets such as the POFA and JACFEE have high signal clarity in 
their expressions (Ekman & Friesen 1976; Matsumoto & Ekman 1988) this is partly because the nature in 
which the JACFEE and POFA stimuli were designed allows for higher signal clarity with coaching and 
posing of expressions. More natural stimuli sets developed through spontaneous methods do not allow for 
coaching of expressions to achieve higher signal clarity. This may result in more ambig uous expressions 
but these are likely a truer representation of social interchange. 
2.6.1.4 Summary of expression complexity 
The stimuli in use in the literature has been a consistent majority of static basic expressions 
(Hobson 1986; Braverman, Fein, Lucci & Waterhouse, 1989; Macdonald et al., 1989; Tantam, 
Monaghan, Nicholson & Stirling, 1989; Prior & Hoffmann 1990; Fein, Lucci, Braverman & Waterhouse, 
1992 Adolphs et al., 2001; Loveland, Steinberg, Pearson, Mansour, & Reddoch, 2008; Neumann  et al., 
2006; Ogai et al., 2003; Rutherford & Towns, 2008; Spezio et al., 2007). The presence of complex 
expressions is more limited (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Baron-Cohen et al., 2001; Happé 1994; Baron-
Cohen et al., 1999; Tracy et al., 2009) but more recent studies have incorporated better methods that are 
more likely to effectively capture and display these expressions (Pillai et al., 2013; 2014; Cassidy et al., 
2014). The inclusion of mixed and blended expressions is more a type of complex expressions and may 
actually be a series of complex expressions in rapid succession that come about when processing an 
event. In summary natural emotion expressions appear in far more variety than the basic six. Whilst the 
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basic six are a good universally recognised starting point  in assessment, the field should be aiming to 
better recreate the type of expressions that would be expected in typical social interaction. 
2.7.2 Unimodal vs multimodal delivery 
Complexity, not only a variable in the emotional content available in expressions, can also be 
expanded to the method of stimuli delivery and the amount of social data available. Delivering static 
images can be considered to be less complex than dynamic; s imilarly, stimuli with no audio input can be 
considered less complex than stimuli with visual input and auditory input. It is worth note at this point to 
clarify that complexity does not equate to difficulty in recognition, complexity concerns the amount o f 
social data available, if this data is subtle or overt and if it is expressed in multiple modalities. It is 
possible that more complex stimuli are more difficult to correctly identify, but for the sake of clarity, 
complexity in this instance relates to the delivery and content of the stimuli. A unique design by Jones et 
al., (2011) conducted a factor analysis of individual emotion recognition across modalities (facial 
expression/visual, verbal vocal expression/auditory and non-verbal vocal expressions/auditory). Their 
findings demonstrated across all six basic expressions that facial expressions (i.e. visual input) never 
occurred as the strongest factor loading to recognition. For every emotion either verbal vocal expressions 
or non-verbal vocal expressions were a stronger contributor to emotion recognition than visual input. An 
example of their factor analysis loading is shown below in figure 2.2. 
 
The work by Jones and colleagues (2011) outlines the importance of the multimodal nature of 
emotion expression and the pitfalls of omitting other modalities than visual input. The limited amount of 
Figure 2.2: Six-factor (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, surprise and disgust) emotion recognition model of 3 
emotion modalities (facial expressions, verbal and non-verbal) taken from Jones et al., (2011) 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The 
unabridged version can be viewed in Lancester Library - Coventry University.
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research that has investigated vocal expression recognition in ASC has demonstrated difficulties also exist 
in this modality (Lindner & Rosén 2006; Mazefsky & Oswald 2007). Although the difficulties appear to 
exist simultaneously across modalities evidence suggests the multimodal nature of emotion processing is 
underpinned by a general processing ability which would be better addressed by a higher quality stimuli 
set of multiple modalities (Borod et al., 2000). 
This shift towards the complex side of emotion expressions more accurately reflects the nuanced 
nature of emotion expression and should be continued in future research attempting to measure emotion 
processing competency. Tracy and colleagues (2009) included alongside the basic six emotions the 
complex emotions embarrassment, pride and shame. The inclusion of a broader range of stimuli with 
dynamic delivery is equally important for research involving individuals with ASC, where the reported 
competencies are inconsistent, and appear sensitive to variations in stimuli complexity (Dalton et al., 
2005; Macdonald et al., 1989; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; Homer & Rutherford 2008). This development 
towards more realistic and complex emotional stimuli has expanded to t he delivery method, where 
research is now including the use of dynamic stimuli as well as static, to more accurately measure 
emotion processing competency (Rump, Giovannelli, Minshew & Strauss, 2009; Pillai et al., 2012; 2014: 
Cassidy et al., 2014). 
2.7.3 Validity and specificity 
 The points made thus far in sections 2.6 and 2.7 have highlighted the importance of the stimuli 
type, the expression type (basic, complex or blended), delivery style and modality. The stance in this 
work is that methods and tasks moving closer towards ecological validity allow a more complete 
assessment of abilities as they would be used in everyday interactions. However, it is important to 
acknowledge that with improved validity there is a cost of specificity. When more informatio n is included 
in a task and its complexity (or validity) increases to better reflect typical social interaction, the amount of 
control afforded is decreased. This is problematic because through increasing validity one might get a 
better assessment of abilities, but it becomes increasingly harder to identify exactly what has been 
assessed. 
 Because of this delicate balance between validity and specificity , psychometric instruments often 
focus on very specific areas, Intelligence quotient (IQ) tests for example have low ecological validity with 
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many of their sub-measures seemingly alien to everyday life, but they have particularly high construct-
specificity. In this particular example the high specificity at the cost of ecological validity is beneficial 
because it allows IQ tests to be somewhat more generalizable across cultures because the sub-measures 
are less likely to be assessing learned or practiced abilities given their abstract nature. However, in cases 
such as emotion processing particularly in ASC samples, emotion processing tasks  (historically with low 
ecological validity) are believed to have implications for the overall social functioning of the individual. 
This is partly because emotion processing is considered part of overall social and commu nication 
difficulties in the DSM-V classification, but the ability to infer mental states to eyes, or label high 
intensity instances of prototypical expressions does not adequately address social or communication 
skills. In this case the specificity does not translate to the overall ability assessed. For this reason, as 
previous sections have discussed, there is sufficient justification to sacrifice specificity for greater 
validity; this is because the inconsistencies in the literature suggest the specificity currently in use is not 
displaying particularly reliable causality or associations to certain mechanisms,  
 It is acknowledged that the creation of a task with the level of ecological validity proposed in 
this thesis will lack the ability to highlight specific mechanisms. However, much like Jones and 
colleagues (2011) displayed in their work, there are multiple contributing factors in the correct 
recognition of an emotion, to create a task that focuses only on one lacks not only the validity in assessing  
the whole ability, but also specificity across other modalities. The methods proposed in this thesis allow 
an assessment that contains much more information across multiple modalities; this can then be 
engineered towards specific mechanisms. For example, the visual information can be removed assessing 
recognition through only verbal and non-verbal (non-word vocalisations) recognition. By beginning with 
a task that has richer ecological validity the researcher can control how much information is afforded to  
the participant by limiting what is included in the stimuli. This extra control the researcher has means  
specificity is added back into the assessment through the option of how much information to include 
across multiple modalities .  
2.8 Assessment in Emotion Recognition Research 
Past research focussing on the recognition of emotions has been dominated by stimuli that are 
static and display only the basic six emotions (Calder et al., 2000; Elfenbein and Ambady 2002; Hall and 
Matsumoto 2004; Kessler et al., 2008; Matsumoto et al., 2002; Shioiri, Someya, Helmesta & Wa Tang, 
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1999). Stimulus sets such as the POFA (Ekman & Friesen, 1975) and JACFEE (Matsumoto and Ekman, 
1988; Biehl et al., 1997) have been widely used. Although these stimuli sets represent some of the highest 
quality examples of basic emotion expressions in a static format, their validity as a comprehensive and 
realistic measure of emotion recognition is debateable.  
The expressions themselves are one part of assessing emotion processing abilit ies; they need to 
accurately depict the situation in a way that is valid. How they are used and the questions that can be 
presented with these expressions are the next part of getting an accurate understanding of abilities. If the 
question or task is too s implistic ceiling effects may emerge (Adolphs  et al., 2001; Loveland et al., 2008; 
Neumann et al, 2006). This ceiling effect may be partly due to the type of task that is frequently 
employed, the emotion matching or labelling task (Ashwin, Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, O’Riordan & 
Bullmore, 2007; Bormann-Kischkel, Vilsmeier & Baude, 1995; Gross 2008; Riby & Hancock., 2008; 
Rosset et al., 2008; Wallace, Coleman & Bailey, 2008). In emotion labelling tasks  participants are shown 
an emotional face (historically static, but gradually increasing in frequency to dynamic) and must match 
an emotional label to this face. A task such as this, usually with forced choice options, of typically the 
basic six emotions is too simplistic. It results in little avenues for confusion, mostly limited between anger 
and disgust, and fear and surprise; happiness is consistently well recognised and stands alone as the only 
clearly positively valenced expression whilst sadness is rarely confused with other expressions unless 
displayed at lower intensities (Hoffmann et al., 2010). 
In respect of the previously discussed points of posed and spontaneous expressions, the long -
time gold standard POFA and JACFEE expressions are posed in their creation, they are also static in their 
presentation. Static expressions do not appear in the same manner that is to be expected in realistic social 
interchange where expressions form and dissipate naturally, something that cannot be conveyed in a static 
image. For the purposes of assessing emotion recognition competencies, the stimuli displayed should be a 
true reflection of realistic social interaction. The distinction between showing a static expression and a 
dynamic one is ultimately that dynamic expressions convey change from one point in time to another; the 
benefit of which is better context of the expression development. This context allows greater recognition 
of complex emotions (Cassidy et al., 2015) where multiple emotions may be present or blended (Hoque et 
al., 2011; Hoque & Picard 2011). Whilst the format expressions are displayed in can influence how they 
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are perceived, the expressions themselves also need to be considered in their complexity and the way they 
are elicited.   
2.9 Aims and Outline of the Thesis 
The overall aim of the thesis is to investigate emotion processing difficulties in those with a 
diagnosis of ASC, as well as typically developing adults and children. This is to be achieved with a new 
stimuli set and the RM research paradigm that allows the capture of spontaneous naturalistic expressions 
in direct response to a social scenario. The thesis also aims to evaluate the Alexithymia hypothesis of 
emotion processing difficulties in ASC. There is a growing section of research that links Alexithymia to 
ASC, Using a RM task with the proposed stimuli could potentially  provide evidence for or against this 
theory given the more ambiguous nature of the task which requires correct understanding of what would 
be socially appropriate behaviour and expressions. With Alexithymia believed to impact emotion 
labelling and understanding in the self there is less information available of emotions in response to past 
events to attribute, this is likely to have effects on the ability to infer socially appropriate behaviour to 
others. The results could have important implications for the use of the RM paradigm as an intervention 
that can better work with ASC individuals to more effectively consider what emotions expressions would 
be expected in certain situations and crucially why. This kind of intervention could be useful in improving 
overall social skills and reduce anxiety in social interactions. 
If there is evidence to suggest strong comorbidity of Alexithymia with ASC which affects RM 
performance, this has important implications for the clinical focus of ASC. Much like the DSM-V now 
collapses communication and social skills, this research may highlight the importance between the two 
that recognition of expressions combined with appropriate semantic understanding may be a more 
appropriate method of assessing ASC traits and influencing any subsequent intervention . For example, if 
there is intact recognition but poor emotion understanding there is a need to focus on the semantic 
understanding of emotions rather than perception and labelling. 
2.9.1 Outline of the thesis 
In chapter 1, autism was introduced outlining the historical development of understanding ASC 
and the changes made to the diagnostic criteria. The concept of autism was expanded into the BAP 
evidencing the presence of ASC traits in relatives of those with ASC. Several theories of ASC were 
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discussed from both a biological and a cognitive perspective with their strengths and weaknesses 
appraised. Finally the inconsistent results regarding emotion processing in  ASC were introduced with 
certain key points raised such as the inconsistent methods in the literature and the broad range of sample 
used where difficulties appear less pronounced in HFA individuals (Neumann et al., 2006; Rutherford & 
Towns 2008; Adolphs et al., 2001). 
In Chapter 2 theories of emotion were introduced and the literature surrounding emotion 
processing was discussed, explaining the functions of emotions as adaptive displays of intent that are 
designed to a) govern behaviour in the self and b) signify information to others to alter their behaviour. 
The importance of the functions of emotions via correct recognition was highlighted through research 
showing difficulties of recognition in depression (Bourke et al., 2010), Schizophrenia (Schneider et al., 
2006), ADHD (Ibáñez et al., 2011), and specific to this thesis ASC (Harms  et al., 2010; Bal et al., 2010; 
Ashwin et al., 2006; Wallace et al., 2008; Howard et al., 2000). The developmental trend of emotion 
processing was then examined demonstrating an improvement throughout age in typical development that 
coincides with developmental milestones where processing styles develop from orienting to face stimuli 
(Reid et al., 2017) to understanding emotional context (Philippot & Feldman, 1990; Boyatzis, Chazan & 
Ting, 1993) developing configural processing (Tanaka et al., 1998) and finally second order relations in 
configural processing (Bruce et al., 2000; Gilchrist & McKone 2010). The differences between emotion 
attribution and recognition in ASC were discussed followed by the introductions of the RM paradigm. 
The methods used in emotion stimuli creation, delivery, and tasks were then appraised, there was 
an argument for an improvement in the stimuli that is considered ‘spontaneous’; the improvements 
identified where that spontaneous reactions should be in response to a real social situation and not 
produced upon request. Where possible the expressions should be captured in naivety of the displayer to 
ensure valid production, the expressions should also be directed to another individual due to their 
communicative nature. Critiques of task methods highlighted the need for stimuli to be more complex 
presented in dynamic format (Cassidy et al., 2015) with multiple modalities (visual and audio feed) (Jones 
et al., 2011). Finally the requirements of the task need to better match emotion processing in real world 
situations where more inferences are made retroactively about information gleaned in social interactions. 
This should take the form of tasks that require an understanding of socially appropriate responses (pillai 
90 
 
et al., 2012; 2014; Cassidy et al., 2014; 2015) and understanding of emotional states rather than label 
matching with no semantic element. 
Chapter 3 introduces the process of stimuli development and investigates the morphology of 
expressions when posed and spontaneous to identify if: a) the expressions generated conform to typical 
patterns across participants and b) if typical display patterns are similar for posed and spontaneous 
expressions. The results of a FACS based analysis of expression development in posed and spontaneous 
expressions in response to seven social prompts are reported through factor analysis. 266 expressions 
(133 posed, 133 spontaneous) are captured from 19 participants in response to 7 social prompts. The 
results from this study are discussed in relation to prior research that investigates differential display 
patterns and intensities in spontaneous expressions and how this might have implications for FER 
research. 
In Chapter 4, the expressions created in chapter 3 are validated with a typically developing 
sample of adults (n=141). This research aimed to investigate the validity of the stimuli in  a typically 
developing population whilst also investigating if the display patterns identified in chapter 3 translated to 
recognition; the research also investigated the impacts of perceptions of expression intensity and valence 
on recognition rates. Finally the free response emotion state attributions provided in this study were 
thematically coded to allow analysis of emotion state inference to prompt situation in this study and 
subsequent studies. The results from this study are discussed in consideratio n of previous literature on 
spontaneous expression recognition rates and those reported in chapter 3. 
The research outlined in Chapter 5 used eye-tracking equipment to investigate the viewing 
patterns of typically developing children (n=32) to both posed and spontaneous expressions. This was to 
investigate if differential viewing patterns would be present based on the results from chapter 3 and 4. As 
a secondary aim, the research also investigated the contributions  of RM ability and viewing patterns in 
predicting autism traits. The results are discussed in relation to previous viewing styles , specifically 
considering the validity of previous research based on viewing styles to posed stimuli previously 
considered standard. 
In Chapter 6, the stimuli created in chapter 3, validated in chapter 4 and used to investigate 
viewing styles in chapter 5, is used to investigate the inconsistent emotion recognition performance scores 
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in ASC. Participants (n=137) with ASC (n=53) and controls (n=84) will complete the RM tas k utilised in 
chapter 5 to determine if there are indeed group differences in RM performance, a measure of both 
emotion recognition and social understanding. As a further aim Alexithymia will be measured to 
investigate the links between Alexithymia and ASC co-morbidity and to investigate the Alexithymia 
hypothesis of emotion processing within ASC.  The results will be discussed in light of previous FER 
research, RM research and the Alexithymia hypothesis. 
Finally in chapter 7, the results from Chapters 3, 4, 5 and 6 will be summarised and discussed in 
relation to each other and other results in the literature. The results will be discussed in relation to: A) the 
theories of ASC and associated emotion recognition difficulties , B) the conflicting literature regarding 
FER in ASC, C) the effects of stimuli type on recognition and D) the effects of Alexithymia on FER. The 
practical applications of the work will then be considered and future directions of the research in light of 





Chapter 3 Developing a FACS Verified Stimuli Set of 
Spontaneous and Posed Expressions 
 
This chapter will follow on from the previous by addressing the issues raised in chapter 2 around 
stimuli validity. This will culminate in the creation of a new stimulus  set that aims to overcome many of 
the shortfalls in current methods. This is to be compounded with analysis of the physiological features of 
the expressions created, investigating if there are justifications for a drive towards spontaneous stimuli 
closer in validity to socially typical expressions.  
3.1 Introduction 
As discussed in chapter 2, the recognition of emotion expressions is an important part of social 
communication, relationship formation, and maintenance. This is all the more important when individuals 
are diagnosed on the autistic spectrum where there are some difficulties in these areas. This ability is 
typically assessed by showing people the emotional faces of others and tasking them with matching an 
emotion to the face. This method is limited as an approach to measuring emotion recognition abilities for 
a number of reasons. Firstly, research has tended to use posed expressions, largely ignoring any 
differences there may be between posed expressions and those that spontaneously occur (section 2.6.1) 
(Calder et al., 2000; Elfenbein & Ambady 2002; Hall & Matsumoto 2004; Kessler et al., 2008; 
Matsumoto et al., 2002; Shioiri et al., 1999). Secondly, the methods used in questioning recognition can 
be overly simplistic, often relying on basic expressions (section 2.8) (Calder et al., 2000; Elfenbein & 
Ambady 2002; Hall & Matsumoto 2004; Kessler et al., 2008; Shioiri et al., 1999) and presuming an intact 
understanding of socially appropriate emotional states (Section 2.4.1). Thirdly the act of recognis ing an 
emotion expression is only one small part of the social skillset that ultimately dictates social 
communication and competence, one that would be better addressed through a method such as RM 
(section 2.4.3) (Izard et al., 2001; Leppänen & Heitanen 2001). The ability to understand appropriate 
responses and recognise root causes of emotions from examples can be assessed by RM (Cassidy  et al., 
2014; Gallese & Goldman, 1998; Pillai et al., 2012). This ability is just as important as correctly 
recognising the emotion and has been shown to be linked with correct recognition (Cassidy et al., 2014). 
The issues discussed here and in more detail in chapter 2, make the argument that although some previous 
measures have high specificity in focussing on individual mechanisms; their application is limited in what 
can be deduced about emotion recognition as a whole given that verbal information, gesture and voice 
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tone can all provide valuable information. Subsequently, the implications for social skills generally are 
somewhat limited because the tasks do not measure social skills ; very little of the abilities tested focusses 
on understanding appropriate social emotions. Attempting to create a spontaneous stimuli set, this 
research will use the RM paradigm, which allows  objective assessment of reactions in context, across a 
range of expressions higher in complexity than those previously used. 
3.1.1 Towards a new method of assessment 
For research looking at expression development or recognition, a stimuli set is required that can 
be considered accurate, the gold standard is to have expressions that have been analysed according to the 
facial action coding system (FACS) (Ekman & Friesen, 1978; Ekman, Friesen & Hager, 2002; Hjortsjö 
1969). The FACS allows an objective assessment of what morphological aspects of the face are present 
and what these typically infer; part of the FACS is identifying  ‘action units’ (AUs) which are the building 
blocks of facial expressions. The movement of individual muscles or groups of muscles  make up AUs 
which can be rated on a five point scale from: A – trace, to E - maximum. The early work on codifying 
expressions by Hjortsjö (1969) identified 23 facial action units which was subsequently expanded upon in 
the work of Ekman and Friesen (1978) and later updated again (Ekman et al., 2002). The FACS system 
now consists of 46 main AU codes relating to facial muscular movement and further codes for gross 
motor movement, eye and head movement, and face visibility.  
The current research aims to create expressions that are more representative of those that would 
be expected in typical social interactions. This can be summarised into three characteristics: 1) 
Expressions should be spontaneous as a direct result of some social cue which produces fundamen tally 
different display patterns (Schmidt et al., 2003) that can be subject to display rules. 2) Expressions should 
be dynamic displayed in real time, as research has shown dynamic expressions allow greater recognition 
of socially complex emotions (Cassidy et al., 2015). 3) Expressions should be open to more types and 
blends of emotion than the basic six which would better reflect the open ambiguous nature of social 
interactions (Hoque et al., 2011; Hoque & Picard 2011). Separately from expression type, more advanced 




This research will incorporate the RM paradigm (Cassidy et al., 2014; 2015; Gallese & Goldman 
1998; Goldman & Sripada 2005; Pillai et al., 2012; 2014); expanding upon previous work by 
incorporating seven reactions building upon the smaller ranges used previously. The reactions cover more 
of the emotion spectrum from positive to negative, confusion, frustration, relief, feigned positive and 
hesitance. The experimental design enables all potential reaction types to be collected from each 
participant; this is an improvement upon previous research (Cassidy et al., 2014; Pillai et al., 2012), where 
a single prompted reaction was collected from each participant. By collecting all possible reactions from 
each participant, further analyses can be conducted on the intensity and attributed valence of the reactions 
without individual differences confounding a single expression type, addressing some of the issues of 
displayer depth and holistic expression understanding raised in previous research (Back & Jordan 2014). 
Asking participants to pose expressions after capturing spontaneous reactions allows comparisons to be 
explored between posed and spontaneous expressions.  
As screening measures, the research will also incorporate the autism quotient (AQ) (Baron -
Cohen et al., 2001) and Toronto Alexithymia scale (TAS) (Bagby, Parker & Taylor 1994; Bagby, Taylor 
& Parker 1994). These are included as early research indicates expressions from those with autistic traits 
are less recognisable than typically developing individuals, and this effect is still unclear specific to 
Alexithymia due to its highly comorbid nature (Brewer et al., 2016; Macdonald et al., 1989; Volker, 
Lopata, Smith & Thomeer, 2009). To the author’s knowledge this is the first screening of this kind 
employed in stimuli development; measuring the prevalence of these traits will allow for extra confid ence 
in the  recognisability of the expressions, and open the door to new research avenues wanting to 
investigate the impacts of emotional responsivity in those with ASC or Alexithymia traits. 
In order to capture naturalistic responses, seven specifically designed social prompts were used 
to elicit a reaction which would be recorded without the participant’s knowledge (renewed consent gained 
upon debrief). The seven social prompts included: Being given positive feedback, being given a reward of 
monopoly money, being asked a difficult maths question, being given negative feedback, being  told the 
audio recorder had not been recording (wasting the participants time), being asked to repeat the 
experiment, and being told there was no need to repeat the experimen t. This selection of prompts allows a 
range of social responses that were likely to span from positive (positive feedback) to negative (negative 
feedback), with a range of complex reactions such as confusion/feigned gratitude (monopoly money), 
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shock/surprise (maths question), concern/irritation (told the audio recorder has not been recording), 
hesitance/frustration (asked to repeat the experiment) and relief/suspicion (told there is no need to repeat 
the experiment).  
These expressions were identified to best reflect a range of emotional experiences in a controlled 
environment. Although the basic emotions would seem ideal targets, the aim of the thesis is to better 
assess emotion recognition in a more valid way. To achieve this, target expressions focussed on obscure 
situations, this should allow more varied responses likely higher in complexity, with the potential of 
display rules in effect. The reasoning for this is because the adherence to basic emotions as the only type 
of emotions that warrant investigation is considered too narrow a focus . This argument was highlighted 
previously in section 2.1 specifically 2.1.4, that the labelling of emotions  phenomenologically would 
appear to align with simple basic expressions. This might be because tasks require such categorizations 
whereas free recall would allow divergence into more complex blends or social emotions. By targeting 
obscure situations across the emotional spectrum it is possible whatever reaction is elicited adheres to 
simple categorical structures or alternatively, more nuanced blends are evoked.  
Creating spontaneous examples of the basic expressions would be useful in testing the Darwin -
Ekman theory that specific kinds of emotions exist and that under better methods (more natural evocation 
for example) results may support this. However, this thesis is not attempting to explain the aetiology of 
emotion, it is attempting to investigate recognition; to assert that emotion display and recognition is 
limited to 6 (or 7 if contempt is included) distinct kinds of expressions reduces human experience to only 
those 6 (or 7) emotions which would seem wholly inaccurate. The use of more obscure emotions in this 
thesis attempts to capture more realistic displays of emotions that might not align with the defined 
structures of basic expressions; instead presenting with blends or altogether different emotions such as 
confused or sceptical. It is believed this presents a more realistic assessment of emotion recognition in 
practical terms. 
In order to provide detailed data of the expressions captured, the most expressive frame 
identified by human raters will be analysed with FaceReader software (Noldus, Wageningen, 
Netherlands). This will provide an overview of the AUs present per prompt and  condition. The FACS 
coding system allows a fine-grained analysis of the facial activity within expressions; this is particularly 
useful to investigate the underlying AU’s that are present within displays. These can allow a better 
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understanding of how individual expressions types differ and if there are differences between posed and 
spontaneous expressions that may not be obvious to naïve raters. Individual AU activity can be associated 
with specific expressions using the FACS manual, for example AU 9-nose wrinkler is associated with 
disgust while AU-26 jaw drop is associated with surprise (Ekman & Friesen 1978). 
Given that the analysis of facial structures from the expression types is exploratory there is no a  
priori hypothesis around the patterns that may emerge  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Design 
The research employed a within participants design where all potential expressions were 
captured from each participant. Analysis of expression composition for each condition and prompt type 
was conducted through principle component analysis (PCA) where the  ratings of the 20 most frequent 
AUs on a 6 point scale ranging from A/0 (not active) to E/5 (fully active) were provided per image from 
the Facereader analysis. Separate PCA were conducted for each prompt type and stimuli type, totalling 14 
in all, analysing the data in this way allowed a data reduction technique to suggest which AUs are most 
activated for specific expression types. This is possible because PCA reduces a set of observations to a 
singular value (Factor/component) that combines separate but similar observations to more simply convey 
patterns present in the data. Any possible clustering onto factors could also indicate important sequences 
of AUs that hold semantic information. 
3.2.2 Participants 
Nineteen participants (9 males Mean age = 22 SD = 2.79, 9 females Mean age = 23 SD = 4.03, 1 
participant who identified as non-binary aged 37) were recruited via opportunistic sampling 
predominantly from Coventry University undergraduate and postgraduate populations with six overseas 
students visiting the University as part of ‘summer school’ for potential students.  
3.2.3 Materials and Apparatus 
Two cameras were used in the research; a SONY HANDYCAM DCR-SR58 was used to capture 
the participants’ facial expressions and body posture positioned on a tripod . A second SONY 
HANDYCAM DCR-SX15 was used to capture the profile view of the interaction between the researcher 
and participant also positioned on a tripod. The research was conducted in an observation laboratory at 
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Coventry University. The researcher sat directly opposite the participant with a desk between them, with 














The Autism quotient (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was used as a measure of autistic traits due to 
recent research suggesting individuals with high autistic traits do not display emotions easily recognised 
by others (Brewer at al., 2016).  It was selected for its reliability evidenced by good  internal consistency 
scores (Cronbach’s Alpha =.71 (general population) .81 (student sample) and test -retest reliability (r = .78 
p<0.1) (Hoekstra, Bartels, Cath & Boomsma, 2008). The AQ also demonstrates good face validity as 80% 
of the adults tested with AS or HFA scored above the threshold for clinical traits compared to only 2% in 
the control group (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001). 
The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) (Bagby, Parker & Taylor 1994; Bagby, Taylor & 
Parker 1994) was chosen as a self-report measure of Alexithymia. The TAS-20 is considered the gold 
standard measure of Alexithymia and presents good internal reliability (Cronbach’s alpha = .81) and test -
retest reliability (r = .77 p<.01) (Bagby, Parker & Taylor 1994; Bagby, Taylor & Parker 1994). The block 
design subtask of the Wechsler abbreviated scales of intelligence 2
nd
 edition (WASI-II) was used to 
simultaneously uphold the legitimacy of the fake experimental aims and was also used as a measure of 
performance from which participants could be given feedback to illicit a reaction. The results of the block 
Figure 3.1: Layout of laboratory 
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design subtask were not part of the experiment it was used specifically as a device to facilitate experiment 
legitimacy and allow prompt delivery in the form of feedback. 
3.2.4 Procedure 
Ethical clearance for the research was obtained from Coventry University ethics board (see 
appendix A).  Due to the deception involved, renewed written informed consent was obtained upon 
debriefing with explanation of the deceptive recording which was required to capture natural spontaneous 
emotion reactions. Part of the renewed consent gave optional levels of consent for participants to have 
their expressions altered, used in future research and made available for use in others research.  
Participants were told the aim of the research was to investigate the effects of feedback on task 
performance with a recorded portion at the end to discuss how the feedback made them feel. It was made 
expressly clear to participants the video cameras in the room were not yet turned on and the recording 
would begin after the tasks were complete, participants were unaware cameras were recording from the 
beginning of the experiment to capture their reactions. After they were seated, the deceptive version of 
the research explained to them, and consent provided, the experiment began with completion of the AQ 
and TAS-20. Once completed, the experimenter delivered a scripted series of social prompts as the 
participant completed different tasks. Participants were presented with all of the following seven social 
prompts in the order outlined below (see appendix B for full details): 
Positive feedback : Participant was told they performed above average on the WASI-II block design sub-
task. 
 
Monopoly money: Participant was told because they had performed well they were to receive a reward, 
they were then handed some monopoly money. 
 
Maths questions: Participants were asked five maths questions the first four were notably easier (what is 
20-7) followed by a much harder last question (what is 616/7). 
 
Negative feedback : Participants were told performance on the maths was poor and that they were 
expected to perform better. 
 
Not recording: The participant was informed the audio recorder used in the experiment had not been 




Repeat experiment: The participant was asked if they would be willing to repeat the experiment again as 
the audio recording was a vital part of the experiment. 
 
No repeat: The participant was informed there was no need to repeat the experiment. 
 
Upon completing the series of scripted prompts the participant was informed the experiment was 
complete and that the cameras had been recording the entire time. The cameras were tu rned off and the 
participant asked to report how they felt in response to each social prompt via a questionnaire, they were 
provided with example emotional states to facilitate this (see Appendix C). The participant was then 
debriefed as to the true aims of the research and an additional stimuli consent form presented outlining the 
research, deceptions involved and purposes of the stimuli obtained. Optional levels of consent were 
provided that allowed: A) modification of the stimuli such as shortening of clips; it was made clear to 
participants that modification would not involve artificially changing the content that would be damaging 
to themselves, it would only involve removing audio or changing audio across expressions to create 
incongruent information s treams or physically restricting the image clarity. B) Presenting the stimuli in 
published research/ at conferences, C) making the stimuli available for use in future research; this 
included the explanation that the expressions would be available for use in others research provided it was 
not edited in a way that breached the ethics outlined and explained to participants in the present research 
(see Appendix D for debrief and renewed consent)  
Upon completion the participant was informed the second aspect o f the research would involve 
posing the expressions that were previously obtained spontaneously. The responses the participant 
provided on the emotional state feedback questionnaire were used to coach participants to pose the 
expressions they stated they felt during the spontaneous elicitation. Once all the expressions had been 
posed to the best of their ability and recorded the participant was thanked for their particip ation and the 
experiment ended. 
3.2.5 Stimuli editing 
The videos clips were edited with Final cut pro X video editing software (Apple, Cupertino, 
California, USA), removing all cues that would make the objectively correct answer obvious (e.g. 
researchers voice, monopoly money in the frame). For the purposes o f this research the most expressive 
frame in each video was isolated by the lead researcher, 50% of the stimulus set was verified by 
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independent raters to check reliability.  Each rater coded exactly half of the stimulus set (133 expressions) 
there was 79.70% (106 out of 133) agreement between rater 1 and the lead researcher, and 73.68% (98 
out of 133) agreement between rater 2 and the lead researcher. To check reliability Krippendorff’s Alpha 
(Krippendorff 2011)  was calculated between rater 1 and rater 2 as including the lead researcher would 
cause a singularity, the percentage of agreement between rater 1 and rater 2 was 71.43% which resulted in  
α = 0.203 p=0.032. Given the percentage of agreement between the lead researcher and each rater and 
that between the two raters being >70% the lead researchers frame selections were used for the analysis. 
The resulting 266 static images were analysed using FaceReader software. 
3.3 Results 
3.3.1 Data screening 
Analysis of missing data showed that Facereader could not accurately map the face for three 
images out of the 266 total. The specific prompts and stimuli types that could not be mapped were: posed 
negative feedback, spontaneous not recording and spontaneous positive feedback. Two of these images 
were from the same participant but overall there appeared to be no patterns of difficulty in Facereader 
recognising a specific prompt type or stimuli type of individual participants. The 3 images that were 
unable to be analysed represented 1.13% of the overall dataset.  
3.3.2 Were participants self-report emotions consistent with FaceReader? 
 To investigate if the self-reported emotions matched those that FaceReader identified in the 
images the qualitative emotions needed to be coded into one of the 6 basic expressions or neutral. In total 
126 emotion reports were coded, in five cases of the total 133 expressions participants did not report an 
emotional state to accompany their reaction, in two cases as previously mentioned FaceReader could not 
map the facial structure of spontaneous expressions . The agreement between the lead researcher and an 
independent rater was high, measured via Krippendorff’s  α=.91, p<0.001 with agreement on 119 out of 
the 126 reported emotions. 
 Facereader provides an estimation of the activation of basic expressions in any given image; this 
is provided on a 0 to 1 scale with 0 signifying the emotion is not active at all and 1 indicating full 
activation. To investigate if there are consistencies between the self-reported emotion (after coding) given 
by participants and the strongest basic expression identified present in the image by FaceReader the two 
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were compared. Results showed that in 42 cases of 126 (33.33%) the coded self-report emotion matched 
that identified as the strongest expressions by FaceReader. The consistency between self-report emotions 
and the most active basic expressions identified is underwhelming but it is important to note that this is 
still over two times as likely as chance would expect (14.29%), a binomial distribution shows  the 
probability of 42 successful trials over 126 total trials with 14.29% chance of success to be  p<0.001. The 













The overall trends on how participants reported their emotional states in each situation after 
coding to reflect the basic 6 is displayed below in table 3.1. It can be seen that positive feedback, 
monopoly money and no repeat appear to have the most consistent emotional state reported across the 
sample with all three showing happiness as the most frequently reported emotion. The repeat experiment 
prompt also presented happiness as the most frequently reported emotions but this was less pronounced 
with responses in each of the other emotion categories suggesting the individual differences to this 
prompt were larger. The maths question and negative feedback prompt showed mixed responses with fear 
and surprise reported for the maths question and sadness and surprise equally as prevalent for negative 
feedback. The mixed responses suit the context from which the expressions were gathered, for example 
































Figure 3.2: Percentage agreement of self-report emotion to FaceReader most intense emotion 
identified with error bars ± 1 SE. 
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much likely to cause surprise due to its unexpected difficulty as fear towards the idea of tackling the 
question. Equally the negative feedback provided was designed to criticise the participants ability to 
better illicit a response, it is understandable some individuals would report feelings of sadne ss to this 
news whilst others would be surprised at the nature of the comment. 
 
Table 3.1: Frequency of coded  emotion response provided for each prompt category  
  Prompt category 








Happiness 2 10 2 10 2 15 7 
Sadness 1 1 5 0 8 0 1 
Anger 2 0 0 1 1 0 1 
Fear 7 2 1 1 0 1 3 
Disgust 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
Surprise 5 6 5 5 6 2 3 
Neutral 2 0 2 1 1 0 3 
Note: Bold items indicate most frequent emotion reported  
  
3.3.3 Are the pattern of action units for each prompt and condition different? 
The data for each image consisted of an activation rating for 20 of the most frequent AUs 
ranging from 0 (not active) to 5 (fully active). Table 3.2 below shows the mean activation of all AUs per 
prompt type when posed and spontaneous. It can be seen that the AUs: 43-eyes closed, 25-lips part and 
12-lip corner puller were the most active AUs across the entire stimuli set being the three most active 
AUs in all prompts in both conditions except the posed repeat experiment prompt. AUs that were notably 
less active included: 9-nose wrinkler, 15-lip corner depressor, 23-lip tightener and 26-jaw drop. 
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Table 3.2: Average action unit intensity (0-5) between prompt types when posed and spontaneous 






































































1 - Inner Brow Raiser 0.05 0.37 0.05 0.32 0.11   0.21 0.26 0.16         0.16 
2 - Outer Brow Raiser 0.26 0.21   0.11   0.26 0.26 0.37 0.16 0.39 0.32 0.11     
4 - Brow Lowerer 0.16 0.89 0.58 0.84 1 0.58 0.84 0.74 0.58 0.56 0.32 0.22 0.32 0.79 
5 - Upper Lid Raiser 0.21 0.16 0.05 0.11   0.16   0.05   0.44 0.05 0.06 0.05   
6 - Cheek Raiser 0.68 0.63 1.53 1.53 0.78 0.42 0.95 1 0.84 0.5 1.32 0.89 1.05 0.79 
7 - Lid Tightener 0.53 0.26 0.68 0.63 0.61 0.42 0.68 0.32 0.58 0.06 0.16 0.67 0.63 0.37 
9 - Nose Wrinkler         0.06                   
10 - Upper Lip Raiser 0.37 0.21   0.53 0.17 0.68 0.37 0.53 0.11   0.68 0.5 0.32 0.32 
12 - Lip Corner Puller 1.42 2.26 3.05 3.53 2.11 1.89 2.63 1.89 2.95 2 2.95 2.56 2.37 2.58 
14 - Dimpler 0.84 1.05 0.42 0.11 0.67 0.58 0.37 0.84 0.32 0.72   0.39 0.95 0.63 
15 - Lip Corner Depressor 0.16 0.16   0.05 0.39   0.05 0.05   0.44     0.05 0.16 
17 - Chin Raiser 0.32 1.16 0.37 0.47 0.56 0.68 0.32 1 0.32 0.17 0.21 0.28 0.79 0.26 
18 - Lip Puckerer 0.16 0.26   0.16 0.39 0.21   0.37 0.21 0.44 0.11 0.17   0.21 
20 - Lip Stretcher 0.42 0.21   0.16   0.32 0.05 0.05   0.17 0.21   0.05 0.68 
23 - Lip Tightener 0.16   0.26 0.05 0.22 0.16   0.11   0.06     0.21 0.21 
24 - Lip Pressor 0.68 0.11 0.63 0.05 0.61 0.32 0.53 0.37 0.68 0.28 0.37 0.44 0.63 0.37 
25 - Lips Part 1.32 1.53 1.58 2.16 1 1.42 1.89 2.32 1.11 1.06 2.21 1.61 2 1.63 
26 - Jaw Drop   0.16                 0.21 0.11   0.16 
27 - Mouth Stretch 0.21 0.21 0.05 0.21   0.26 0.32   0.21 0.39   0.06 0.58 0.11 
43 - Eyes Closed 1.47 1.79 1.79 2.37 1.56 2.32 1.95 1.63 1.11 0.78 1.37 2.22 0.79 2.21 
Note: where AU’s did not appear in a reaction the cell is left blank to aid interpretation, bold cells indicate AU activation >1 
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In order to effectively measure the contribution of AUs to peak expression, Principal Component 
Analyses (PCA) were carried out on each individual prompt type. PCA is a statistical analysis that uses 
orthogonal transformations to reduce observations to singular components which capture related 
observations that may present in a pattern. In the case of this research, the observations are the presence 
of the AUs and their intensity that might appear in a single expression. In this way PCA can highlight 
specific reaction patterns that are occurring throughout the stimuli set to different prompts. PCA will also 
identify if there is more than one type of reaction and if this is consistent across the posed and 
spontaneous conditions.  The results of the PCA will be presented for the posed expressions first followed 
by spontaneous.  
Although factor analysis is typically quite demanding in the number of participants required for 
reliable dimension reduction and convergence, literature has investigated the amount of variance that can 
be explained with smaller sample sizes. Specifically smaller sample sizes and the contributing effects of 
communalities and variables per factor (p/f). Such work has shown that dimension reduction can be 
reliable with N<50 and in some cases N<10 (de Winter, Dodou & Wieringa, 2009). Their simulations 
showed  
“When λ (loadings) = 8, f (factors) = 1, p (variables) = 24, and the structure was simple, N = 6 
was adequate. A small sample solution (N = 17, λ = 8, f = 3, p = 24) was markedly robust against single 
small distortions.” (de Winter et al., 2009 p168). 
 
The parameters outlined above are not dissimilar to those in the current study, helping support 
the use of PCA to identify underlying patterns of AU in expressions; particularly as the analyses are 
exploratory in nature.  
 
3.3.3.1 What is the clustering of action units within posed expressions?  
In order to ensure the correct number of factors was used to explain the variance in the data 
parallel analyses were used rather than relying on Eigen values greater than 1, as this can be liberal in 
factor retention (Ledesma & Valero-Mora, 2007). By using a parallel analysis with the same parameters, 
it allows comparisons of the amount of variance explained within the data to multiple iterations of 
random datasets. Any factors with Eigen values that were not greater than parallel analysis were rejected 




For the maths question prompt a parallel analysis showed random data would achieve a greater 
Eigen value (3.29) than the actual data did for the strongest loading factor (3.05). Due to no factors in the 
actual data explaining greater variance than a random data set a second PCA forced the data into the 
strongest single factor structure (see table 3.3 below for factor structure and item loadings) to explore the 
AUs that best characterise the prompt. The single factor model that best measured expression prediction 
had strong loadings (>0.5) for items: 5-upper lid raiser, 6-cheek raiser, 10-upper lip raiser and 25- lips 
part. These AUs when combined present an image of surprise or shock, the presence of cheek raiser 
would suggest squinted eyes as can be expected in complex thought. 
The monopoly money prompt was best described in a one-factor model (Eigen value 3.35) 
incorporating two factors reduced the Eigen value in the actual data (2.04) below that of a parallel 
analysis (2.18). The strongest loading items were: 14-dimpler, 24-lip pressor, 27-mouth stretcher and 43-
eyes closed. The presence of dimpler, eyes closed and mouth stretch would portray Happiness and joy, 
whilst lip pressor is a sign of frustration. 
The negative feedback prompt was best explained in a one-factor model (Eigen value 3.97) with 
the variance explained by a two factor model (2.34) less than a parallel analysis (2.42). The single factor 
model showed strong item loadings of: 6-cheek raiser, 9-nose wrinkler, 10-upper lip raiser and 25- lips 
part; All strong indicators of a negative reaction akin to disgust. 
 The no repeat prompt was poorly fit in the data (2.64) when compared to a parallel analysis 
(2.93), a single-factor model provided the strongest Eigen value and was fitted for exploratory purposes. 
The strongest loading items were: 20-lip stretcher and 27- mouth stretcher there were also items that 
showed strong negative loadings these were: 1-inner brow raiser, 2-outer brow raiser and 43-eye closed. 
These loadings do not indicate a clear image, mouth and lip stretcher would indicate a degree of surprise 
or hesitance but this is not supported by negative associations with inner and outer brow raiser. Results 
are consistent with a wide array of AUs across expression with no clear pattern, as such it would be 
expected the no repeat prompt would be poorly recognised in the posed condition as the AUs do not 
appear to arrange in any readily identifiable pattern. 
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The not recording prompt once again showed a lower Eigen value (2.63) for a single factor 
structure than a parallel analysis (2.74). Subsequently as the simplest model a one factor structure was 
forced and explored. The strongest loading items where: 4-brow lowerer, 7-lid tightener, 18-lip puckerer 
and 24-lip pressor. All of these items are indicative of frustration or anger and match the prompt. 
The positive feedback prompt was best explained by a three- factor model as the fourth factor 
presented a lower Eigen value (1.53) than a parallel analysis (1.58). The first factor (Eigen value 2.98) 
presented strong loadings from items: 10-upper lip raiser, 17-chin raiser and 20-lip stretcher, suggesting 
this factor measures mild approval. The second factor (Eigen value 2.59) was strongly loaded with items: 
5-upper lid raiser, 25-lips part and 26-jaw drop, suggesting this factor is measuring an element of shock or 
surprise. The third factor (Eigen value 2.25) had strong loadings from items: 6-cheek raiser, 10-upper lip 
raiser and 25-lips part; there was also reasonable loading from item 7-lid tightener. Together these AUs 
hint a measure of suspicion is present in certain positive feedback images, but three distinct factors 
highlight the presence of three distinct ‘types’ of posed happiness. 
The repeat experiment prompt was best explained by a four-factor model, inclusion of any 
factors beyond these yielded better results from a parallel analysis (1.39) than actual data (1.19). The first 
factor (Eigen value 3.19) had strong loading from items: 4-brow lowerer, 27-mouth stretch and 43- eyes 
closed. The second factor (Eigen value 2.95) had strong loadings from two items 18-lip stretcher and 24-
lip pressor. The third factor (Eigen value 2.14) had strong loading from 6-cheek raiser, 7-lid tightener, 10-
upper lip raiser and 17-chin raiser. The fourth factor (Eigen value 1.70) only displayed a strong loading 
from item 12-lip corner puller but was also negatively loaded with items: 14-dimpler and 15-lip corner 
depressor. Between the factors there is a clear measure of some form of disgust, frustration and anger 
being detected in no repeat images. Example images that best depict the factor structure for each 
expression type can be seen below in figure 3.3.  
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Table 3.3: Factor structures and loadings for posed prompts 
 Maths* Monopoly* Negative No repeat* Not recording* Positive Repeat 
Action Units Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 
1 - Inner Brow Raiser -0.28 0.27 -0.21 -0.59 0.02               
2 - Outer Brow Raiser -0.30     -0.66 0.02 -0.20 -0.17 0.17         
4 - Brow Lowerer -0.24 -0.15 -0.26 -0.15 0.56 -0.15 0.06 0.20 0.91 -0.08 0.03 0.04 
5 - Upper Lid Raiser 0.79 -0.17       0.14 0.90 -0.20 -0.24 -0.20 -0.35 0.29 
6 - Cheek Raiser 0.57 -0.71 0.86 0.11 -0.43 -0.57 -0.13 0.66 0.01 0.27 0.78 0.36 
7 - Lid Tightener -0.04 -0.49 0.45 0.25 0.59 -0.34 0.12 0.48 0.38 -0.24 0.63 -0.43 
9 - Nose Wrinkler     0.80                   
10 - Upper Lip Raiser 0.74   0.80 -0.19 0.45 0.59 -0.20 0.57 -0.17 -0.28 0.87 0.08 
12 - Lip Corner Puller 0.28 -0.76 0.58 -0.05 -0.45 -0.59 -0.47 0.08 -0.10 -0.08 0.17 0.81 
14 - Dimpler -0.26 0.83 -0.25 0.59 0.39       -0.20 0.49 -0.06 -0.71 
15 - Lip Corner Depressor -0.15   -0.41 -0.19         -0.15 -0.09 -0.03 -0.64 
17 - Chin Raiser 0.15 0.14 -0.40 0.49 -0.06 0.90 -0.18 0.30 -0.32 0.20 0.64 0.34 
18 - Lip Puckerer -0.09   -0.12   0.57 0.01 -0.17 -0.42         
20 - Lip Stretcher -0.10     0.60   0.90 -0.18 0.30 -0.10 0.78 0.20 0.17 
23 - Lip Tightener -0.18 -0.19 -0.13           -0.07 0.32 -0.08 -0.34 
24 - Lip Pressor -0.37 0.54 -0.34 0.18 0.65 -0.16 -0.34 -0.32 -0.12 0.92 0.08 -0.07 
25 - Lips Part 0.87 -0.15 0.82 0.21 -0.56 -0.34 0.58 0.53 -0.05 -0.65 0.21 0.29 
26 - Jaw Drop           0.14 0.90 -0.20         
27 - Mouth Stretch 0.34 0.49   0.60 -0.27       0.86 -0.09 -0.08 0.16 
43 - Eyes Closed -0.29 0.77 -0.31 -0.55 0.33 0.04 -0.30 -0.61 0.84 -0.04 -0.07 0.00 
Blank cells denote cases where the action unit was not active and not eligible for inclusion in analysis. 
Where more than one factor better describes the variance in the data orthogonal rotated (Varimax) loadings are given. 
* indicates prompt types where the strongest factor was less than parallel analysis  











3.3.3.2 What is the clustering of action units within spontaneous expressions?  
The maths question prompt showed a four-factor model best explained AU activity (see table 3.4 
below for full factor structures and item loadings), including more factors beyond this would result in 
greater variance explained by parallel analysis (1.63) than the actual data (1.48).  The first factor (Eigen 
value 3.91) showed strong loadings (>0.5) with items: 7-Lid tightener, 10-upper lip raiser, 18-lip puckerer 
and 43-eyes closed; these AUs would indicate the presence of disgust or discomfort. The second factor 
(Eigen value 2.69) was strongly loaded with items: 1-inner brow raiser, 5-upper lid raiser and 27 mouth 
stretch this is concurrent with surprise and fear. The third factor (Eigen value 2.51) loaded strongly with 
items: 2-outer brow raiser, 14-dimpler and 15 lip corner depressor; these AUs are indicative of positive 
surprise. The fourth factor (Eigen value 1.98) showed strong loading with items:  6-cheek raiser, 12-lip 
corner puller, 17-chin raiser and 24-lip pressor; these AUs displaying narrowing of the eyes raising of the 
chin and tightening of lips suggest mild discomfort and complex though t.  
The monopoly money prompt was best explained by a single factor structure, adding more 
factors resulted in better explained variance in parallel analysis (2.66) than the collected data (2.44). This 
factor (Eigen value 4.88) was loaded strongly with items:  14-dimpler, 15-lip corner depressor, 20-lip 
Figure 3.3: Example images that best depict posed prompt types based on AU loadings                                                                                  
Note: images best depict the factor structure in a single participant. They may not completely capture the factor structure w hich 
accounts for all images. 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can be 





stretcher and 23-lip tightener. These AUs suggest an element of confusion in this prompt with the lips 
tightened but this is masked by dimpler and stretchers portraying happiness. 
The negative feedback prompt was best explained with a three-factor structure, including further 
factors beyond this yielded less explained variance (1.67) than a parallel analysis (1.74). The items loaded 
most strongly on the first factor (Eigen value 3.47) were: 7-lid tightener, 17-chin raiser, 20-lip stretcher 
and 23-lip tightener; this factor is indicative of disgust or anger. The second factor (3.05) was most 
strongly loaded with items: 4-brow lowerer, 6-cheek raiser, 12-lip corner puller and 27-mouth stretcher; 
this sequence of AUs would suggest frustration tapered with scepticism. The third factor (2.20) was 
strongly loaded with the items: 10-upper lip raiser and 25-lips part, as the only strongly associated items 
with this factor the theme of the factor is not clear. 
The no repeat prompt was best explained by a single factor structure, including further factors 
would reduce the amount of variance explained by the data (2.57) to that in parallel analysis (2.60). The 
single factor (3.69) was strongly loaded with the items: 1-inner brow raiser, 2-outer brow raiser, 5-upper 
lip raiser and 18-lip puckerer; these AUs are representative of a surprised response. 
The not recording prompt was best explained by a single factor structure, a parallel analysis 
showed including more than one factor provided less variance in the data (2.46) than a random data set 
would provide (2.51). The items loading most strongly onto the single factor (Eigen value 3.49) were: 6-
cheek raiser, 12-lip corner puller, 25-lips part and 43-eyes closed. In combination these AUs present a 
face of frustration with the eyes closed and scrunched, and the lips part. 
The positive feedback prompt was not well explained by the collected data with an Eigen value 
of 2.56 compared to a parallel analysis of random data showing an Eigen value of 3.00. Because no 
factors structures present greater explained variance than random chance the data was forced into the 
simplest one factor structure to explore any loadings present. Only one item loaded onto the single factor 
structure above 0.5 (lip pressor). As such no clear theme emerges from this factor structure which would 
be expected to be clearly positive. 
The repeat experiment prompt was best explained by a three-factor structure, parallel analysis 





The first factor (Eigen value 3.16) was strongly loaded by items: 6-cheek raiser, 7-lid tightener, 10-upper 
lip raiser and 12-lip corner puller; these AUs would suggest an element of d isgust with the wrinkling of 
the nose pulling of the lips. The second factor (Eigen value 2.65) was strongly loaded by items: 12-lip 
corner puller, 17-chin raiser, 23-lip tightener and 24-lip pressor; these items in combination are very clear 
indications of frustration with lip pressing. The third factor (Eigen value 2.26) loaded strongly with items:  
4-brow lowerer, 7-lid tightener and 10-upper lip raiser; these AUs suggest disgust tempered with anger is 
present in images of repeat experiment. Example images that best depict the factor structure for each 
expression can be seen below in figure 3.4 
Figure 3.4: Example images that best depict spontaneous prompt types based on AU loadings                                                                                  
Note images best depict the factor structure in a single participant, they may not completely capture the factor structure which 
accounts for all images. 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party copyright. The unabridged version can 





Table 3.4: Factor structures and loadings for spontaneous prompts 
 Maths Monopoly Negative No repeat Not recording Positive* Repeat 
Action Units Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 
1 - Inner Brow Raiser -0.07 0.91 -0.05 0.23 -0.12    0.66   0.24 -0.14 -0.10 
2 - Outer Brow Raiser -0.06 0.27 0.84 -0.07 -0.11 0.12 -0.49 -0.14 0.78 -0.57 -0.62    
4 - Brow Lowerer 0.16 -0.09 -0.20 0.45 -0.22 0.12 0.59 -0.31 -0.45 0.10 0.44 0.48 -0.34 0.54 
5 - Upper Lid Raiser -0.12 0.89 0.05 -0.15 0.15 -0.15 -0.48 0.14 0.79 -0.66 -0.17    
6 - Cheek Raiser -0.09 -0.21 -0.19 0.62 -0.36 -0.30 0.62 0.27 -0.54 0.51 -0.16 0.71 0.06 0.12 
7 – Lid Tightener 0.68 -0.10 -0.16 0.11 -0.32 0.82 0.24 0.13 -0.53 0.31 -0.04 0.64 0.12 0.62 
10 - Upper Lip Raiser 0.94 -0.03 -0.01 -0.02 -0.11 0.05 0.23 0.85 0.02  -0.62 0.62 -0.05 0.57 
12 - Lip Corner Puller 0.24 -0.23 -0.47 0.57 -0.81 -0.22 0.79 0.23 -0.39 0.79 -0.03 0.65 0.52 -0.26 
14 - Dimpler -0.16 -0.28 0.67 0.01 0.97 -0.05 -0.78 0.08 0.23 -0.33 0.22 -0.65 -0.28 0.42 
15 - Lip Corner Depressor -0.10 -0.01 0.84 -0.06 0.97    -0.14 -0.69  -0.39 -0.27 0.08 
17 - Chin Raiser 0.36 -0.02 0.46 0.67 0.12 0.90 -0.08 0.02 -0.24 -0.30 0.12 -0.03 0.58 0.09 
18 - Lip Puckerer 0.84 -0.03 0.03 0.03 -0.02 -0.15 -0.20 -0.12 0.70 -0.48 0.44 -0.41 -0.18 0.48 
20 - Lip Stretcher -0.20 -0.06 -0.01 -0.29 0.97 0.90 -0.13 -0.18 0.04 -0.05  -0.23 -0.08 -0.12 
23 - Lip Tightener     0.97 0.78 0.02 -0.26 -0.42 0.08  -0.14 0.66 -0.11 
24 - Lip Pressor 0.01 0.13 -0.11 0.79 -0.06 -0.31 0.13 -0.14 -0.38 0.03 0.70 -0.14 0.90 -0.03 
25 - Lips Part -0.08 0.15 -0.51 -0.60 -0.12 0.02 -0.02 0.80 0.34 0.69 -0.70 0.31 -0.44 -0.51 
26 - Jaw Drop 0.03 -0.07 -0.18 -0.36       -0.08 -0.07 -0.14 0.13 
27 - Mouth Stretch -0.06 0.94  -0.12 -0.06 -0.07 0.54 -0.18  0.26 0.44 0.13 -0.18 -0.48 
43 - Eyes Closed 0.68 -0.10 -0.18 0.19 -0.29 0.13 0.42 -0.77 -0.23 0.53 0.35 -0.46 0.47 0.47 
Blank cells denote cases where the action unit was not active and not eligible for inclusion in analysis. 
Where more than one factor better describes the variance in the data orthogonal rotated (Varimax) loadings are given. 
* indicates prompt types where the strongest factor was less than parallel analysis  





3.3.4 What are the relationships between AU activation and screening measures?  
The average AU presence in both posed and spontaneous images is presen ted along with the 
Autism Spectrum Quotient score and Toronto Alexithymia scale score per participant in table 3.5 below. 
The relationship between AU activity in posed and spontaneous images is investigated separately because 
the ability to assume emotional states in posing expressions is expected to be directly related to 
Alexithymia scores. 
 








1 0.79 0.78 27 38 
2 0.48 0.76 18 57 
3 0.47 0.64 19 30 
4 0.58 0.44 13 51 
5 0.55 0.61 31 60 
6 0.43 0.56 12 39 
7 0.57 0.48 8 33 
8 0.51 0.58 20 39 
9 0.41 0.64 25 46 
10 0.67 0.51 9 28 
11 0.51 0.51 17 39 
12 0.66 0.61 15 40 
13 0.44 0.56 30 58 
14 0.58 0.43 22 37 
15 0.42 0.44 7 52 
16 0.38 0.54 15 58 
17 0.44 0.56 19 32 
18 0.54 0.49 20 41 
19 0.45 0.52 17 38 
 
 
Pearson’s correlations showed non-significant relationships between posed AU activation and 
both AQ scores (r=0.06, p=0.82) and TAS scores (r=-0.35, p=0.14). There was a significant medium 
positive correlation between spontaneous AU activation and AQ scores (r=0.49, p=0.03) but no 








The aim of the current research was to create a stimuli set of expressions broader in range than 
those that have been previously used (See Cassidy et al., 2014; Pillai et al., 2012).  Through PCA the 
research hoped to identify patterns of AU activity inves tigating if specific patterns emerged for each 
prompt type and if this differed between the conditions. Results showed for posed expressions, the factors 
identified for four of the prompts were a poor fit (maths, monopoly, no repeat and not recording).  Th e 
negative feedback prompt was best explained by a single factor structure and the positive feedback and 
repeat experiment prompts were best explained by 3 and 4 factor structures respectively.  
For spontaneous expressions only a single prompt was a poor fit (positive feedback); the 
monopoly money, no repeat and not recording prompts were best explained by a single factor structure 
whilst negative feedback and repeat experiment were best explained by a 3 factor structure and the maths 
question prompt best explained by a 4 factor structure. Comparisons between the prompts suggest repeat 
experiment was the only prompt with multiple identifiable response patterns in both posed (4 factors) and 
spontaneous (3 factors) conditions. Differences between the posed and  spontaneous conditions showed 
four separate prompts in the posed condition, where the strongest factor explained less of the variance 
than a random dataset, compared to only a single prompt in the spontaneous condition. 
Overall the number of identifiable AU patterns that emerged in spontaneous prompts was higher 
than in posed, as many of the posed factor structures did not present stronger loadings than a parallel 
analysis of random data. These results suggest spontaneous expressions are more likely to pre sent facial 
patterns that are consistent across individuals than posed expressions. Further, spontaneous reactions 
present in multiple statistically identifiable patterns from the same prompts more frequently than posed 
expressions.   
Analyses of the AU patterns through PCA were exploratory in purpose to highlight clusters of 
AUs that most frequently occur per prompt, and if these combine to display a typically expected reaction. 
The differences in component structures, particularly where a single component  structure explained less 
variance than random data, would suggest there is no pattern across participants in how they posed these 
expressions. Given that patterns could be determined for all of these expressions (except positive 





inaccurate and individuals could not accurately portray the complex nature of these expressions on 
request. This may be due to the complexity of these expressions, they involve blends of emotions and this 
may be difficult to replicate with enough clarity for software such as FaceReader to detect. 
The findings are supportive of those from Hoque and Picard (2011) that showed spontaneous 
smiles can manifest in multiple ways (frustration for example) and may explain the poor fit of 
spontaneous positive feedback. Participants gave such unique and distinct reactions to a prompt that 
should illicit happiness; this likely resulted in the inability to identify a single factor. Another potential 
explanation for the three factor structure of posed positive feedback is the refined skill of displaying 
happiness in accordance of social display rules (Hoque & Picard 2011; Hoque et al., 2011). Happiness is 
far more likely to be one of the expressions  frequently posed for social purposes, and so it is to be 
expected a larger arsenal of happiness ‘types’ would be present than other posed expressions.  
The inclusion of the AQ and TAS-20 as measures to simultaneously screen for effects on 
expressivity is the first, to the author’s knowledge, implemented in the creation of stimulus sets. 
Investigating the relationship between AU activation in posed and spontaneous expressions and AQ and 
TAS-20 scores showed the only significant relationship present was a med ium positive one between 
spontaneous AU activation and AQ scores. This relationship would seem counterintuitive given that 
expressions created by ASC individuals are typically poorly recognised (Brewer et al., 2016), although 
the difficulties in recognising ASC expressions in Brewer and colleagues’ work (2016) were not fully 
explained, just highlighted, there is potential that this difficulty is due to an overactive expressive arsenal 
which is confusing to others.  
Research has highlighted the atypical movement in ASC (Cook, Blakemoor & Press, 2013) and 
awkward, often exaggerated intensity of expressions (Faso, Sasson & Pinkham, 2015; Grossman, Edelson 
& Tager-Flusberg, 2013). Such positions should be met with caution in this research and are merely 
speculative at this point as none of the individuals from which expressions were captured in this research 
had a clinical diagnosis of autism. In light of previous research where expressions from ASC individuals 
are poorly recognised, combined with the findings that ASC expressions are rated awkward and overly 
expressive, there is clearly a need for work of a more empirical nature quantifying expression 





The lack of a relationship between Alexithymia and AU activation is an important finding given 
the comorbid relationship of ASC and Alexithymia. It may suggest the comorbidity of Alexithymia and 
ASC is not a linear relationship but Alexithymia becomes more pronounced past a point of severity on the 
ASC spectrum. There is a need for future research to investigate the comorbidity of ASC and Alexithymia 
across respective severity. 
There are some potential limitations with using software such as FaceReader to detect AUs in 
expressions, FaceReader has a facial mapping function that fits a polygon mesh overlay to the face and 
uses this to track relative AU positions. This meshing can become distorted if it is fit to individuals with 
glasses, or if the individuals face is angled too far from the camera; the rotation method available can 
attempt to rotate the facial mesh in these instances but is sometimes unreliable (although this is more 
relevant to dynamic stimuli) and can skew readings. Another potential limitation is the inab ility of the 
Facereader software to infer AU positions based on the rest of face if the overall fit cannot be applied. 
When comparing this to a human rater, the ability to infer facial states, even with slight obstructions, can 
be overcome because the prior knowledge of facial states before and after the obstruction allows for 
contextual inference.  
On a similar note to FaceReader lacking human insight, the very nature of applying an algorithm 
to detect AU activity seems counter intuitive given that this work believes displays of emotions have 
evolved to be communicative to other humans. However this process, as has been discussed, takes on a 
holistic form, very rarely in non-scientific settings do humans consciously analyse the individual features 
of the face with the local processing taking precedence over global. The FACS serves to understand and 
explain the unconscious features of expressions that make this recognition so seamless. Without specific 
training human raters would not identify the individual aspects of expressions, or likely think them 
important at all. In this context FaceReader is a tool to apply the FACS system with minimal human 
error; it is not employed to identify the emotion, although this function exists . The self-report emotional 
states serve this purpose and the observations of emotions present by viewers can similarly achieve this. 
In places there are discussions of sequences of AU’s that are prototypical of specific emotions but 
primarily the FACS analysis serves to identify the phys ical display characteristics of the expression types 





For the potential drawbacks that using FaceReader brings there are also positives, the automated 
analysis removes human error, it also provides a quality estimation of the image of how well it could be 
analysed allowing researchers to set their own threshold of quality and remove any images falling below 
this. For other analyses FaceReader gives estimations of the six basic emotions (plus neutral and 
contempt) present in the stimuli as well as facial states; such as left and right eyebrow (raised or lowered) 
and eye and mouth states (open or closed) along with estimates of valence and arousal.  
Along with the potential benefits of the method used to illicit the emotions such as the control in 
standardised prompts , the ability to capture all expressions from all participants , and ability to capture 
expressions without the expressed aim of doing so being divulged to displayers , there are also negatives. 
One such negative is the limited range of expressions; for a stimulus set, the full library of 266 
expressions is a reasonable size but it is important to note that exactly half of this set is a posed 
replication of the spontaneous expressions. With seven unique expressions per displayer, considering the 
aim was to create a stimulus set that better reflects social interaction, the end product is quite limited in 
the range of emotions created. However, this is partly constrained by the design because all expressions 
were captured from all displayers, introducing more expressions risked expanding the collection process 
beyond acceptable limits given that novel eliciting situations need to be acted out and these then need to 
be posed afterward. It was believed introducing more target expressions would result in an overall fatigue 
to displayers where they would be exposed (unknowingly) to an array of emotional experiences. 
The use of the video recorder in view of participants also has implications for the expres sions 
created. Although participants were told the camera was switched off, it is still likely their behaviour 
would be less natural than if the camera had been out of view. This was unfortunately limited by the 
requirements to capture good quality shots of the face at conversation distance. Attempting to hide the 
video recorder is one potential option and might be a direction for future research to pursue. The decision 
taken in this research was to inform participants that there would be recording at a lat er stage so 
participants expected cameras to be present, this was because it was ethically more acceptable to have 
participants agree to some video recording at some stage, to allow an element of informed consent.  
Similarly, the procedural process of having the spontaneous expressions always captured before 





expressions created after spontaneous are themselves potentially different from posed expressions created 
before spontaneous or altogether independently. This is because the affective change from the 
spontaneous expression could aid in posed expression creation, in effect the posed expressions in this 
research may more closely resemble the previously discussed attempt of using relived memories to create 
spontaneous expressions. Consequentially, the results that posed and spontaneous expression activity 
differed, support some of the previous claims made in chapter 2 that reliving events is unlikely to produce 
the same emotion expression as a lived event. The alternative to combat this would be to counterbalance 
expression order with some participants posing expressions first and some naturally evoking them; 
however this would undermine the deception involved in the research that the true aim was to capture 
naturalistic expressions. Just as spontaneous expressions may influence subsequent posed expressions, it 
is almost certain that asking participants to display how they would feel in situation X will have 
subsequent effects when they are then placed in situation X. It is likely the response would be one of 
confusion for most prompts or cues, as the participants become aware of the true aim of the research.  
A further issue with the current design, and research focusing on quantifying expression 
development in general, is the reliance on static images to define the emotion episode as a whole. Using 
static images is problematic because expressions are formed in a gradual process, and the emotional state 
conveyed at the beginning of this process can be different from that at its peak or end (Calvo, Marrero & 
Beltran 2013; Valstar et al., 2006). By opting for a single frame approach as a measure of recognition, the 
elicited emotion presented is a reduced version of a social episode. A single frame during a shift in 
emotional state throughout the episode means the social data of context is lost, this is particularly 
important because expressions can be subject to display rules (Wagner 1990; Wagner et al., 1992). An 
example of this can be the reaction to an unwanted gift; the initial disappointment is (typically) quickly 
masked by a socially appropriate gesture of happiness and gratitude. Opting for a single frame approach 
in this instance would result in either; A) a picture of disappointment or B) happiness, neither is fully 
explanatory of the situation that occurred.  
This issue is problematic in emotion expression research, the nature of means based statistical 
testing would reduce the trends in expressions to a singular point losing context; similarly a single frame 
does not sufficiently capture the expression episode on show. The quantity of analyses that would be 





highly likely to be correlated to the subsequent time point resulting in collinearity issues . Alternatively, 
separate ANOVAs can be used for each time point, which the data does not typically lend itself to with 
action unit measurements where the IVs can run into double digits resulting in power issues. 
In classifying the expressive episode, there appear to be two routes: to average the entire episode 
and consider this a good approximation, or to identify the most expressive point and use this as an  
example under the assumption that being the most expressive point it must encapsulate the most relevant 
social data. The issue with averages is that the average may not be exactly representative of any singular 
time point and so can result in a measurement that never occurred. Secondly, over the time course of 
expression development for an average to be a reliable measure, a normal distribution of expression 
activation would be expected. Expressions do not form and dissipate at the same rate (Cohn and Schmidt, 
2004; Hoque et al., 2011), an expression slow to form would result in an average far lower than the actual 
formation would portray.  
By comparison identifying the most expressive frame is limited too in that it does not account 
for other points in the expressive episode which convey the overall social context. However, when human 
raters are used to identify this point, they do see the entire episode including any emotion sequences and 
can identify the point which best conveys the most social data. Given the two options identifying the most 
expressive frame is recommended as a better route of assessing the emotion in an episode as one can be 
fairly confident that at least the most expressive frame of that episode is accurately measured whereas an 
average will always be some approximation of the entire episode open to bias in skew over time. This was 
particularly true when considering the current analysis which would require a single data stream to 
represent each expression. Previous research has similarly opted to identify the most expressive frame 
from a range (Matsumoto & Willingham 2006), or captures a photograph of an intentionally posed 
expression which could reasonably be presumed to depict the apex of an expression period (Tracy  et al., 
2009).  
In an effort to overcome this issue, future research could investigate developmental trajectories 
of emotion activity over time. Such a method is outlined in Thomas and colleagues (2009) work on 
language and cognitive difficulties throughout development , which may translate well to the current topic. 





aforementioned basic expression activation FaceReader provides across posed and spontaneous 
expression development over time. Issues still exist if one wanted to include AUs in a trajectory where 
the options are to create separate trajectories of the most intense action units or an overall mean (which 
again dilutes the very specificity of interest). Nevertheless statistical methods are becoming available that 
better suit the needs of such a topic. 
In summary this chapter has created a stimuli set that consists of 266 dynamic colour videos 
from 19 individuals, reacting to 7 social prompts to address the issues raised. These stimuli were captured 
in both a spontaneous and posed format to allow analysis of expression patterns. An additional 266 static 
images are also available of the most expressive frame per video identified by the researcher (133 of 
which were validated by two independent raters). The results of expression patterns showed more 
statistically identifiable patterns in spontaneous expressions than posed; making a strong case for future 
research to include more spontaneous expressions as these conform to universal display patterns more 
readily than posed expressions do. The stimuli set was created ascribing to the RM paradigm, which 
allows the stimuli to be used as a more in depth task of emotion recognition ability; the stimuli set is 
broader in expression range than those previously used, and has the option of either posed or spontaneous 
stimuli types to suit the researchers’ needs. The dual set of both posed and spontaneous expressions 
reflective of true social interchange, provide exciting new opportunities for research where there have 
been inconsistent results such as in the field of ASC (See Harms  et al., 2010). The availability of a 
broader stimulus set of naturalistic spontaneous reactions can be used to better assess individuals on the 
autism spectrum and help to better understand the methods used when processing expressions closer to 
natural social interaction created under controlled conditions. This stimulus set is freely available for use 






Chapter 4 Adults are More Successful at Interpreting 
Spontaneous than Posed Emotional Responses 
 
With the newly created stimuli introduced in chapter 3, and evidence that spontaneous 
expressions conform to universal display patterns more than posed expressions it is important to consider 
if this display pattern translates to differential recognition rates. It is also important that the expressions 
created are recognisable and convey the affective component intended befo re they can be used to 
accurately assess an individual’s emotion recognition abilities. As such this chapter will investigate the 
communicative aspect of emotion expressions considering if posed expressions convey the same meaning 
as spontaneous and why this would be important. The results could have implications for previous 
methods which may have been limited in their approach to assess emotion recognition, overlooking 
complex variables such as emotion intensity. New methods need to address this issue by using stimuli 
that more accurately reflect expressions encountered in typical social interaction. Therefore the aim of the 
current research is to validate the newly created stimuli set of spontaneous emotional reactions captured 
in a realistic social interchange. 
4.1 Introduction 
 As was discussed in chapter 2, the expressions captured in response to viewing images and 
videos are questionable as truly spontaneous. This is because reactions captured in response to stimuli 
without another person present are fundamentally different to expressions captured with others present 
(Schmidt et al., 2003). This is evidenced by stronger amplitudes of onset in social conditions than 
isolation, and the peak duration being significantly longer in isolation than in social conditions (Schmidt 
et al., 2003). Expressions captured in isolation do not have clear beginnings like social expressions, and 
tend to develop at a gradual rate rather than the more intense beginning and clear peak of social 
expressions (Cohn & Schmidt 2004). This could result in expressions from non-social situations having 
worse recognition due to more ambiguous developmental trends.  
With posed expressions being open to many fundamental differences in their display patterns 
(Dibeklioğlu et al., 2010; Calvo et al., 2013; Valstar et al., 2006; Ekman, Davidson, & Friesen, 1990; 
Williams et al., 2001), intensity (Valstar et al., 2006) and complexity (Naab & Russell, 2007) there is 





valence, the affective component of the expression, is different in posed and spontaneous expressions. 
Namely, do people experience a change of internal emotional state when posing expressions? The 
potential is that posed expressions may lack the affective component, not accurately portraying the felt 
emotion, merely replicating the physical changes. Posed expressions could then be showing emotion 
responses but not appearing genuine with affective changes that are perceivab le and resonate with others. 
Research has highlighted differences in expression physiology (Namba, Makihara, Kabir, Miyatani & 
Nakao, 2016) and measured expression valence (Partala, Surakka & Vanhala, 2005), but not investigated 
valence differences in posed and spontaneous expressions. This is important because affective changes in 
emotional valence, if perceivable by others, may influence the likelihood of empathic responses and 
emotional mimicry (Likowski, Mühlberger, Seibt, Pauli, & Weyers , 2008) which can influence the 
physiological system (Kraft & pressman, 2012) and subsequently feedback into emotion processing. 
Currently no distinction has been found between recognition of specific types of expressions in 
posed and spontaneous format, only a global improvement for posed expressions (Hess & Blairy, 2001; 
Wagner 1990; Wagner et al., 1992; Naab & Russell, 2007). This appears to be due to variations in 
complexity such as emotion blends (Naab & Russell, 2007), or signal clarity (Cassidy et al., 2016), and 
the inability of posed emotions to accurately replicate social display rules (Wagner 1990; Wagner et al., 
1992). The reported prominence for posed expression recognition over spontaneous, may be a result of 
the stimuli used and methods employed. The posed expressions used over-simplify the communicative 
intent of expressions, lacking the social element required to effectively recreate expressions with 
meaningful social information beyond basic physical changes of the facial muscles. The spontaneous 
expressions previously created overlook the true nature of spontaneity in expressions in typical social 
interaction by using methods of evocation not truly spontaneous or social. 
Through the use of the RM paradigm this research aims to validate the newly developed stimuli 
set by investigating the specific recognition patterns of posed and spontaneous expressions and what 
emotions people associate to specific reactions. The presence of intentionally posed expressions in typical 
social interaction would suggest there will be differences in recognition within the posed expressions of 
those more frequently encountered and those not typically engaged in a socially manipulative manner. It 
is hypothesized in line with previous research there will be a significant difference  in the recognition of 





predicted this improvement in recognition will be concentrated on the more frequently socially posed 
emotions of positive and negative feedback when displayed in a posed format. A secondary aim will 
investigate the relationship of autistic and Alexithymia traits influencing the recognisability of 
expressions and the relationship of those traits to expression recognition in those that view expressions. 
4.2 Method 
4.2.1 Design 
A between participants design was employed with the 266 expressions divided into five groups, 
each consisting of 50 - 66 expressions. The distribution of expressions between the groups was matched: 
posed and spontaneous expressions from the same displayer;  and an even spread of each prompt and 
displayer type. The research was granted ethical clearance by Coventry University ethics board (See 
Appendix F) 
4.2.2 Participants 
141 participants (36 male, 104 female, 1 non-disclosed, mean age = 24.80, SD = 12.44, age 
range = 18-74) were recruited from Coventry University via the online research participation scheme and 
the Cambridge Autism Research Database (CARD) volunteer mailing list , the research was only mailed 
out to control volunteers . 
4.2.3 Materials and apparatus 
 There were 266 expressions (19 targets: 9 males, 10 females each displaying 7 posed, and 7 
spontaneous responses) developed for use in the current study, displayed at a rate of 29 frames per second 
via Qualtrics online survey tool. Videos were embedded in the survey webpage displaying only one video 
per page with subsequent questions; videos would begin playing once the participant pressed the play 
button. 7 example prompt videos showed the researcher demonstrating the prompts that were used in the  
stimuli development. Participants also completed The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron -Cohen et 
al., 2001) and The Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20; Bagby, Parker & Taylor, 1994; Bagby, Taylor & 
Parker, 1994). The expressions created and edited in chapter 3, as outlined in sections 3.2.3, 3.2.4 and 







Participants accessed the survey via a webpage. On accessing the link, participants were 
informed the aim of the experiment was to validate a newly develo ped stimulus set of naturalistic 
expressions to be used in future research. Upon providing consent to take part, participants provided 
demographic details (age, sex, employment status, highest level of qualification, IQ if known, and any 
diagnoses). Participants then completed the TAS-20 followed by the AQ. Participants were then informed 
that they would see videos of peoples’ reactions to different social prompts, and would have to decide 
whether; a) they thought the response was genuine or posed; b) which  prompt caused the reaction (forced 
choice of 7 options); c) the emotional state of the person (free response, but with emotion glossary 
provided the same as that provided in appendix C); d) how intense the emotion was (scale 0-100); and e) 
how positive or negative (valence) the emotion was (scale -100 to +100). Seven example videos displayed 
each prompt. Participants were then randomly assigned to view either 50 or 66 videos in random order.  
Participants were instructed to watch the videos only once. 
4.2.5 Analysis 
4.2.5.1 Emotion description coding 
To allow a better understanding of the emotional states a bottom up approach was used rather 
than arbitrarily labelling an expected mental state to each given scenario. This entailed participants 
providing free emotion responses. To allow analysis, a coding scheme was developed to capture the range 
of emotion labels provided. Hence, participants’ emotion attributions were coded into one of eight 
categories: 
Positive – Labels with a positive connotation: happy, pleased, enjoying, positive, glad. 
Negative – Labels with a negative connotation that doesn’t more readily fit the code of frustrated: 
unhappy, disappointed, shy, anxious, overwhelmed, unfriendly. 
Confused – Labels that infer a lack of understanding of the s ituation: unsure, uncertain, confused, 
puzzled. 
Shocked – Labels that convey something unexpected: surprised and shocked. 
Engaged – Labels with a connotation of being mentally engaged or focussed on the task at hand: thinking, 
informed, sure, listening. 





Sceptical – Labels which infer an element of scepticism towards the researcher or situation: disbelieving, 
doubtful, cynical. 
Frustrated – Labels which infer annoyance: bothered, annoyed, fed up, angry. 
 
6958 emotion labels were coded, 34 were uncategorised (0.48% of the total sample) as they were 
neutral: neutral, steady, unsurprised and fair. These 34 labels were initially included as ‘other’ in an 
analysis of model fit with likelihood-ratio, results showed that the ‘other’ code category did not occur 
above a chance expectation model would predict for any of the emotional prompts. As such this category 
and the 34 codes were removed from the data set resulting in a total of 6924.  
4.2.5.2 Inter-rater agreement  
To ensure accurate coding of emotion labels, a 20% (1385 cases) randomly selected sample 
(using RAND function in excel) of emotion labels were coded by an independent rater.  Krippendorff’s 
Alpha was used to determine inter-rater agreement of codes ascribed when using the above scheme. Inter-
rater agreement was α = 0.88, p<0.001 with a 91% agreement rate between raters  (1251 of 1385). The 
most notable disagreements were between positive and engaged, in 104 instances the raters disagreed 
with one coding the emotional state as positive and the other as engaged or vice versa , there were only 26 
instances of disagreement outside of positive-engaged.  Emotion labels used in analyses were coded by 
the experimenter. 
4.3 Results 
Total recognition scores were calculated and differences compared between the individual 
groups which saw differing expressions. There were no Significant differences in recognition rates 
between groups (F (4,136) = 2.22, p=0.070, ηp² = 0.06). In order to allow analyses of the entire stimuli set 
the data were pooled and proportion correct recognition of each prompt type were calculated for each 
participant, this allowed repeated measures analyses across the entire stimuli set by comp aring 
recognition rates of stimuli and prompt type. A similar method in validation of pooling data from 







4.3.1 The pattern of emotion recognition  
In order to investigate the recognition rates the proportion of correct recognition of each prompt 
type was calculated in each condition (posed and spontaneous). Recognition rates varied between the 
expressions and the conditions, for example, posed positive feedback was more accurately recognised 
than spontaneous positive feedback. The same recognition pattern was present in posed and spontaneous 


















Overall, participants correctly identified prompts more from spontaneous (1425) than posed 
(1261) reactions. The results of participants’ inferences for posed (a) and spontaneous (b) reactions are 
displayed in Table 4.1 below. 
The errors in recognition show that some expressions appear more ambiguous in their 
presentation, and these can be confused with other prompt types which share a similar valence. For 
example posed not recording is often confused with negative feedback/repeat experiment (prompts that 
Figure 4.1: Percentage of correct prompt inferences between posed and spontaneous stimuli. Line 









































would typically result in a negative reaction), whilst monopoly money and no repeat can be confused with 
positive feedback (similarly these prompts would be expected to produce a positive reaction). When 
viewing spontaneous expressions , error patterns showed positive feedback was sometimes confused with 
negative feedback. This would seem counter intuitive if not for the reactions to positive feedback being so 
varied; individuals were often embarrassed or sceptical of the information given to them. Interestingly 
negative feedback did not present the same confusion with positive, suggesting negative responses are 
less ambiguous. These error patterns suggest there is a step of inferring the emotional state of the 







Table 4.1: Confusion matrices showing frequency of correct and incorrect prompt inferences for posed and spontaneous stimuli . 
  Correct answer (% in brackets) 
a) Posed stimuli participants responses Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not rec Repeat No repeat 
 Positive 199 (36.7) 112 (21) 33 (6.14) 61 (11.5) 41 (7.72) 31 (5.73) 86 (16.2) 
 Monopoly 58 (10.7) 133 (25) 18 (3.35) 14 (2.64) 23 (4.33) 17 (3.14) 39 (7.35) 
 Maths 21 (3.88) 46 (9) 235 (43.7) 62 (11.6) 66 (12.4) 35 (6.46) 48 (9.05) 
 Negative 66 (12.1) 93 (17) 94 (17.5) 205 (38.6) 117 (22.0) 100 (18.4) 54 (10.1) 
 Not rec 32 (5.91) 40 (7) 66 (12.2) 50 (.43) 128 (24.1) 59 (10.9) 65 (12.2) 
 Repeat 62 (11.4) 55 (10) 51 (9.49) 72 (13.5) 100 (18.8) 243 (44.9) 90 (16.9) 
 No repeat 69 (12.7) 28 (5) 17 (3.16) 36 (6.79) 31 (5.83) 30 (5.54) 118 (22.2) 
 Blank 34 (6.28) 32 (6) 23 (4.28) 30 (5.66) 25 (4.70) 26 (4.80) 30 (5.66) 
 Total 541 539 537 530 531 541 530 
b) Spontaneous stimuli participants response Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not rec Repeat No repeat 
 Positive 131 (24.2) 81 (15.0) 15 (2.79) 79 (14.9) 24 (4.51) 21 (3.88) 78 (14.7) 
 Monopoly 56 (10.3) 275 (51.0) 12 (2.23) 21 (3.96) 43 (8.09) 11 (2.03) 46 (8.67) 
 Maths 37 (6.83) 48 (8.90) 340 (63.3) 78 (14.7) 60 (11.2) 38 (7.02) 29 (5.47) 
 Negative 88 (16.2) 48 (8.90) 61 (11.3) 123 (23.2) 87 (16.3) 52 (9.61) 71 (13.3) 
 Not rec 50 (9.24) 25 (4.63) 36 (6.70) 41 (7.73) 196 (36.9) 74 (13.6) 97 (18.3) 
 Repeat 72 (13.3) 21 (3.89) 35 (6.51) 100 (18.8) 69 (12.9) 290 (53.6) 114 (21.5) 
 No repeat 78 (14.4) 19 (3.52) 10 (1.86) 59 (11.1) 23 (4.33) 25 (4.62) 70 (13.2) 
 Blank 29 (5.36) 22 (4.08) 28 (5.21) 29 (5.47) 29 (5.46) 30 (5.54) 25 (4.71) 
 Total 541 539 537 530 531 541 530 






4.3.2 The effects of stimuli type on recognition rates 
To explore recognition levels between conditions and prompt types, a two way repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted with stimuli (posed, spontaneous) and prompt type (maths question, 
monopoly money, positive feedback, negative feedback, repeat experiment, no repeat, not recording) as 
independent variables. The dependent variable was proportion of correct prompt inferences , Mauchly’s 
test of sphericity was violated (Greenhouse-Geisser prompt type = .87, stimuli x prompt = .92) as such 
Greenhouse-Geisser adjustments are reported. Results showed a significant main effect of stimuli (F (1, 
140) = 16.70, p<0.001, ηp² = 0.11) with spontaneous expressions (37%) recognised significantly more 
than posed (33%). There was also a significant main effect of prompt type (F (5.22, 731.26) = 67.04, 
p<0.001, ηp² = 0.32), and a significant interaction between stimuli and prompt type (F (5.49, 769.02) = 
29.90, p<0.001, ηp² = 0.18). Simple main effects analysis followed up by Bonferroni corrected t-tests 
were used to explore this interaction, in each condition separately. 
Bonferroni corrected t-tests showed significant differences in recognition between the stimuli 
types for each prompt type. The maths question (62.5%, p<0.001), monopoly money (50%, p<0.001), not 
recording (34%, p<0.001), and repeat experiment (52%, p<0.05) prompts were recognised significantly 
more in a spontaneous format. The negative feedback (38%, p<0.001), no repeat (21%, p<0.01) and 
positive feedback (36%, p<0.001) prompts were recognised significantly more in a posed format means 
and confidence intervals can be viewed in table 4.2. To further investigate the recognition levels within 
posed and spontaneous stimuli subsequent analyses were carried out. 
4.3.2.1 Recognition rates within posed stimuli 
To better understand the main effects, differences in recognition rates between the prompts were 
investigated. Bonferroni corrected t-tests showed that for posed stimuli the maths question prompt was 
recognised significantly more accurately than the monopoly money, no repeat and not recording prompts 
(all p<0.001). The monopoly money prompt was recognised significantly less than negative feedback 
(p<0.05) positive feedback (p<0.05) and repeat experiment (p<0.001). The negative feedback prompt was 
recognised significantly more than no repeat and not recording (p<0.001). The no repeat prompt was 
recognised significantly less accurately than positive feedback and repeat experiment (p<0.001). The not 
recording prompt was recognised significantly less than positive feedback and repeat experiment 






4.3.2.2 Recognition rates within spontaneous stimuli 
Bonferroni corrected t-tests showed for spontaneous stimuli the maths question prompt was 
recognised significantly more accurately than all other prompts (all p<0.001 except repeat experiment 
p<0.05). The monopoly prompt was recognised significantly more than negative, no repeat, not recording 
and positive feedback (all p<0.001). The negative feedback prompt was recognised significantly more 
than no repeat (p<0.01), but significantly less than not recording (p<0.05) and repeat experiment 
(p<0.001). The no repeat prompt was recognised significantly less than not recording, positive feedback 
and repeat experiment (all p<0.05). The not recording prompt was recognised significantly less than 
repeat experiment (p<0.001). The positive feedback prompt was recognised significantly less than repeat 









4.3.3 What is the pattern of errors? 
To investigate if participants could systematically infer the correct antecedent prompt from 
observed behaviour, each participant’s responses were tabulated and a three way repeated measures 
ANOVA was conducted. Frequency of answer given was the dependent variable, there were three 
independent variables; stimuli type (posed, spontaneous), correct answer (maths question, monopoly 
money, negative feedback, no repeat, not recording, positive feedback and repeat experiment), and 
participants’ response (maths question, monopoly money, negative feedback, no repeat, not recording, 
positive feedback and repeat experiment). 
Results showed a significant three-way interaction between stimuli type, correct answer and 
participants’ response F (22.58, 3161.71) = 11.89, p<0.001 although this effect size was small (ηp² = 
0.08). As expected a significant interaction was present between correct answer and answer given F 
(12.51, 1751.57) = 99.48, p<0.001, this appeared to account for more of the variance (ηp² = 0.42). To 
Table 4.2: Mean proportion correct recognition and confidence intervals 
  Mean proportion correct   
Prompt type Posed 95% CI Spontaneous 95% CI 
Positive 0.37 0.32, 0.41 0.26 0.22, 0.30 
Monopoly 0.27 0.22, 0.31 0.50 0.46, 0.54 
Maths 0.43 0.39, 0.48 0.63 0.57, 0.68 
Negative 0.38 0.34, 0.42 0.23 0.19, 0.27 
Not recording 0.23 0.19, 0.26 0.34 0.29, 0.39 
Repeat 0.44 0.40, 0.48 0.52 0.47, 0.58 
No repeat 0.21  0.17, 0.24 0.12 0.10, 0.15 





explore this interaction, analyses of simple main effects compared the frequency of correct to incorrect 
prompt inferences, in each condition separately. 
The following analyses will report the frequency of participants responses within the correct 
categories, the mean frequency of correct answers given will be compared to the frequencies of incorrect 
answers. This will highlight if participants could clearly differentiate the correct answer for each 
expression type. This will be carried out first for posed stimuli and then for spontaneous. 
4.3.3.1 Within posed stimuli 
Bonferroni corrected t-tests showed for the maths question, negative feedback, positive feedback 
and repeat experiment prompts the correct answer was chosen significantly more than all other incorrect 
options (p<0.001). Participants were significantly more likely to choose the correct monopoly money 
prompt above all other options (p<0.001) except positive feedback (p=1). Participants were significantly 
more likely to choose the correct no repeat than incorrect Monopoly money and Maths question 
(p<0.001) but not significantly more than incorrect positive (p=1), negative (p=0.165), not recording 
(p=0.072) and repeat (p=0.832). Participants were significantly more likely to correctly distinguish not 
recording from incorrect positive feedback (p<0.001), monopoly money (p<0.001) and no repeat 
(p<0.001); But could not distinguish correct not recording from incorrect maths question (p=0.57), 
negative feedback (p=1) or repeat (p=1). The mean frequencies of answers given to each prompt type and 
Confidence intervals are reported are presented in table 4.3 below. 
4.3.3.2 Within spontaneous stimuli 
Bonferroni corrected t-tests showed for the maths question, monopoly money, not recording and 
repeat experiment prompts participants could correctly identify the appropriate answer significantly more 
than all other incorrect options (p<0.001). Participants could significantly correctly identify negative 
feedback over all other incorrect prompt types (p<0.05) except repeat experiment (p=0.808). Participants 
could not correctly distinguish the no repeat prompt from all other incorrect options (p>0.05) instead 
incorrectly guessing repeat experiment significantly more than the correct no repeat prompt (p<0.01). 
Participants could correctly distinguish the positive feedback prompt from all other incorrect options 
(p<0.05) except negative feedback (p=1). The mean frequencies of answers given to each prompt type 





Table 4.3: Mean frequency of correct and incorrect answers given to posed stimuli with con fidence intervals 
  Correct answer 
  Positive 95% CI Monopoly 95% CI Maths 95% CI Negative 95% CI Not recording 95% CI Repeat 95% CI No repeat 95% CI 
Answer given Positive 1.34 1.18, 1.50 0.81 .67, .95 0.23 .16, .31 0.43 .33, .54 0.29 .20, .38 0.2 .12, .27 0.71 .57, .85 
Monopoly 0.41 .31, .52 0.92 .78, 1.07 0.13 .07, .19 0.21 .13, .29 0.2 .12, .28 0.12 .06, .18 0.26 .18, .35 
Maths 0.16 .10, .23 0.47 .35, .58 1.67 1.49, 1.85 0.43 .31, .55 0.57 .46, .69 0.23 .15, .32 0.35 .26, .43 
Negative 0.46 .35, .58 0.57 .45, .70 0.67 .55, .79 1.41 1.26, 1.57 0.76 .63, .89 0.71 .58, .84 0.48 .36, .60 
Not recording 0.26 .18, .35 0.23 .15, .32 0.47 .35, .59 0.29 .20, .38 0.78 .65, .92 0.53 .42, .64 0.47 .36, .58 
Repeat 0.48 .38, .57 0.38 .28, .49 0.36 .27, .46 0.48 .38, .58 0.76 .63, .89 1.65 1.47, 1.84 0.54 .42, .65 
No repeat 0.5 .39, .62 0.21 .14, .29 0.12 .06, .18 0.29 .20, .38 0.22 .14, .30 0.21 .14, .28 0.74 .61, .86 
 
Table 4.4: Mean frequency of correct and incorrect answers given to spontaneous stimuli with confidence intervals 
  Correct answer 
  Positive 95% CI Monopoly 95% CI Maths 95% CI Negative 95% CI Not recording 95% CI Repeat 95% CI No repeat 95% CI 
Answer given Positive 0.87 .74, 1.00 0.64 .50, .77 0.08 .03, .12 0.45 .35, .55 0.3 .20, .41 0.16 .10, .23 0.48 .37, .59 
Monopoly 0.37 .27, .47 1.85 1.69, 2.02 0.12 .06, .18 0.13 .07, .18 0.33 .24, .42 0.13 .07, .19 0.36 .26, .46 
Maths 0.23 .16, .31 0.25 .17, .33 2.45 2.24, 2.65 0.61 .48, .74 0.43 .34, .53 0.24 .16, .33 0.24 .16, .32 
Negative 0.71 .57, .85 0.42 .31, .53 0.43 .32, .55 0.96 .81, 1.12 0.6 .48, .72 0.41 .30, .52 0.48 .36, .60 
Not recording 0.43 .31, .54 0.21 .13, .28 0.19 .12, .27 0.26 .17, .35 1.21 1.00, 1.42 0.54 .42, .66 0.67 .54, .81 
Repeat 0.52 .41, .63 0.15 .08, .22 0.26 .17, .36 0.7 .56, .84 0.55 .41, .68 1.97 1.72, 2.22 0.94 .78, 1.09 






4.3.4 Does the stimuli type influence the intensity and valence ratings of emotion responses?  
To analyse the influence of each stimuli and prompt type on the perceived intensity and valence 
of emotion responses, a two way repeated measures ANOVA was conducted on participant’s intensity 
(Scored 0 to 100) and valence (Scored -100 to +100) ratings, in each condition (posed, spontaneous) and 
prompt type, results of which are presented below in table 4.5. 
 
The results in table 4.5 show the mean intensity differences between posed and spontaneous 
stimuli is marginal, however the differences are more prominent within each type. The largest differences 
for both types of stimuli was between monopoly money rated the most intense and negative feedback 
(within spontaneous expressions) and repeat experiment (within posed expressions) rated the least intense 
with spontaneous negative feedback marginally lower in intensity suggesting an element of social display  
rules are in effect with targets downplaying their negative response in spontaneous reactions but not (as 
much) in posed. This effect is mirrored in ratings of valence where the spontaneous negative feedback 
was rated as less negatively valenced than posed negative feedback again suggesting the target was able 
to mask their negative state more effectively in spontaneous expressions than posed.  
4.3.4.1 The effect of stimuli type on intensity ratings 
According to Mauchly’s test the assumption of sphericity was violated for prompt type and the 
stimuli and prompt type interaction (Greenhouse-Geisser =.88 and .95 respectively) as such Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustments are reported. There was a non-significant effect of stimuli type on intensity ratings (F 
(1, 140) = .71, p=0.401, ηp²=0.005). There were however significant differences in the intensity ratings 
Table 4.5: Mean intensity and valence of prompt types when posed and spontaneous  
Prompt types Posed (SD) 95% CI Spontaneous (SD) 95% CI 
 Intensity  
Positive 35.50 (18.75) 32.38, 38.62 35.08 (19.60) 31.82, 38.34 
Monopoly 36.98 (19.85) 33.68, 40.29 39.41 (21.16) 35.89, 42.94 
Maths 35.89 (20.76) 32.43, 39.34 37.79 (20.86) 34.32, 41.27 
Negative 33.63 (19.43) 30.39, 36.86 31.85 (18.47) 28.78, 34.93 
Not recording 35.50 (19.90) 32.19, 38.81 33.66 (18.96) 30.51, 36.82 
Repeat 32.14 (18.31) 29.09, 35.19 34.08 (19.42) 30.85, 37.32 
No repeat 34.90 (19.02) 31.74, 38.07 34.81 (18.07) 31.81, 37.82 
 Valence   
Positive 21.01 (18.37) 17.96, 24.07 11.60 (19.52) 8.35, 14.85 
Monopoly 12.04 (21.84) 8.40, 15.68 24.59 (21.85) 20.95, 28.23 
Maths -3.75 (19.28) -6.96, -.54 -2.76 (17.95) -5.75, .23 
Negative -3.60 (17.98) -6.60, -.61 0.41 (18.19) -2.62, 3.44 
Not recording -3.28 (19.95) -6.60, .05 -7.92 (19.64) -11.19, -4.65 
Repeat -2.18 (18.90) -5.33, .97 1.97 (20.20) -1.40, 5.33 





ascribed to the prompts (F (5.29, 740.82) = 9.25, p<0.001, ηp²=0.06). There was also a significant 
interaction effect between the stimuli and prompt type on intensity ratings (F (6,840) = 2.74, p=0.012, 
ηp²=0.02). Analyses of the prompt ratings showed the main effect was largely driven by the monopoly 
money prompt which was rated as significantly more intense than all other prompts (Negative p<0.001, 
Repeat p<0.001, No repeat p<0.05, Not recording p<0.01, Positive p<0.05 ) except maths question (p=1). 
The maths question prompt was also rated as significantly more intense than negative feedback (p<0.001) 
and repeat experiment (p<0.05). The significant interaction was due to more fluctuation between 
expression ratings within stimuli types specifically with monopoly money and negative feedback rated 
more and less intense respectively in spontaneous delivery than posed. 
4.3.4.2 The effect of stimuli type on valence ratings 
According to Mauchly’s test the assumption of sphericity was violated for prompt type and the 
stimuli and prompt type interaction (Greenhouse-Geisser =.81 and .92 respectively) as such Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustments are reported. There was a non-significant main effect of stimuli type on valence 
ratings (F (1,140) = 3.47, p=0.065, ηp²=0.02). There was a significant main effect of prompt type on the 
valence ratings (F (4.87, 681.72) = 83.05, p<0.001, ηp²=0.37) and a significant interaction between 
stimuli type and prompt type (F (5.54, 776.16) = 15.42, p<0.001, ηp²=0.10). Simple main effects analyses 
showed there were significant differences in the valence ratings ascribed to prompt types depending on 
the stimuli type; monopoly money (p<0.001) negative feedback (p<0.05) and repeat experiment (p<0.05) 
were rated significantly more positively valenced when displayed in a spontaneous format, whereas 
positive feedback (p<0.001) and not recording (p<0.01) were rated significantly more negatively valenced 
when displayed in a spontaneous format. The monopoly money prompt was rated as the most positively 
valenced reaction with significant differences from all other prompts (maths p<0.001, negative p<0.001, 
no repeat p<0.001, not recording p<0.001, repeat experiment p<0.001) except positive feedback (p=1) by 
contrast the not recording prompt was rated as the most negatively valenced reaction with significant 
differences from all other prompts (monopoly p<0.001, no repeat p<0.001, positive p<0.001,  repeat 
experiment p<0.01) except maths question (p=1) and negative feedback (p=.109)  
4.3.4.3 Does the valence of the expressions influence recognition? 
To investigate if the differences in recognition rates between the prompt types were influenced 





prompt types as the independent variable with seven levels (as p revious) and recognition rates as the 
dependent variable. The valence ratings participants gave to reactions were averaged to provide an overall 
valence score per prompt type that would reflect their proportion recognition in the dependent variable. 
Results showed a significant main effect of expression type on recognition rates  (F (6,979) = 55.85, 
p<.001 ηp² =.26) after controlling for expression valence (F (1,979) = .79, p=.375). 
4.3.5 Are emotion and prompt inferences systematic? 
In order to check if participants were providing systematic emotion attributions to the different 
prompts, the responses were coded into the eight emotion categories described previously in section 
4.2.5.1 (positive, negative, confused, shocked, engaged, pretend, sceptical and frustrated). To investigate 
if participants tended to attribute different emotion categories to different prompts, likelihood -ratios were 
calculated as described in Cassidy and colleagues’ work (2014; 2015). Here the observed frequencies of 
emotion and prompt inferences are compared to chance, for both correct (table 4.6) and incorrect (table 
4.7) responses. 
In the tables below it can be seen that for correct spontaneous responses the positive feedback 
prompt was overwhelmingly attributed with a positive emotional state, the monopoly money prompt 
showed the greatest proportion of observed inferences to expected was for a shocked emotion attribution. 
However, there was also a strong attribution above expected levels for a positive attribution to monopoly 
money, both those are to be expected as it accurately reflects that responses to monopoly money were 
both positive and shocked. The maths question prompt was mos tly attributed an emotional state of 
engaged whilst the greatest attribution for negative feedback was a negative emotional response. Both of 
the not recording and no repeat prompts were most frequently attributed the frustration emotional state 
above expected levels. The no repeat prompt was most frequently attributed a positive emotional state.  
The greatest ratio of observed emotion state inferred to expected emotional state inferred by raters when 
they correctly retrodicted the category prompt are considered consistent emotions for their respective 
categories. This is to allow comparisons of what participants believed to be the most appropriate emotion 
for specific prompts when they correctly retrodicted the prompt to when they incorrectly retrodicted the 
prompt. By defining consistent emotions based on participant perceptions it ensures comparisons of 
emotions inferences to correct and incorrect retrodictions are grounded in the most frequent inference  





There is the potential to define the correct emotion by the self-reported emotions taken at stimuli 
creation, however it was believed the volume of emotion states provided by participants in this 
experiment (>6000) would provide a clearer image of the overall emotions being portrayed than the self-
report emotions which totalled  less than 150. 
 Comparing those attributions of spontaneous emotions to posed displayed a similar pattern as 
previous recognition rates . Where attributions of positive feedback, negative feedback and no repeat 
(expressions recognised better when posed) had higher consistent attributions when posed and the 
remaining expressions (monopoly money, maths question, not recording) showed a decrease in consistent 
emotion attributions in comparison to spontaneous expressions (the repeat experiment prompt showed a 
marginal increase in consistent attributions for posed expressions which is contrary  to the pattern outlined 
above). This would suggest the type of stimuli (posed or spontaneous) influences the likelihood of 
providing correct emotional inferences which in turn is used in retrodicting events. 
For incorrect prompt responses the same pattern is not present, it would appear spontaneous 
stimuli resulted in an overall lower consistent emotional state attribution than posed stimuli. However the 
proportion of correct prompt inferences observed to those that would be expected was minimised 
throughout incorrect prompt recognitions (except posed positive feedback) which would suggest when 
participants could not correctly identify the appropriate cause of the expression they also struggled to 





















Table 4.6: Frequency of emotion inferences for correct retrodictions in spontaneous and posed stimuli. 
  Correct prompt response (expected frequencies in brackets) 
 Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
A)  Spontaneous  Positive 108A (36.8) 129 (78) 13 (95.2) 9 (32.5) 12 (55.2) 85 (81.7) 43A (19.6) 
Emotion Inference Negative 2 (16.8) 13 (35.6) 28 (43.4) 49 A (14.8) 40 (25.5) 44 (37.3) 6 (8.9) 
 Confused 2 (19.9) 45 (42.2) 72 (51.5) 17 (17.6) 39 (29.9) 35 (44.2) 6 (10.6) 
 Shocked 7 (11.2) 63A (23.6) 2 (28.9) 4 (9.9) 29 (16.7) 9 (24.8) 7 (5.9) 
 Engaged 3 (28) 3 (59.2) 213A (72.3) 11 (24.7) 12 (41.9) 56 (62) 5 (14.9) 
 Pretend 1 (1.2) 4 (2.5) 3 (3.1) 1 (1.1) 2 (1.8) 2 (2.7) 0 (.6) 
 Sceptical 4 (4.4) 11 (9.4) 0 (11.5) 6 (3.9) 16 (6.6) 11 (9.8 0 (2.4) 
 Frustrated 1 (9.7) 3 (20.5) 0 (25.1) 16 (8.6) 42A (14.5) 42A (21.5) 1 (5.1) 
B) Posed         
Emotion Inference Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
 Positive 165A (61) 48 (39.4) 7 (71.7) 11 (61.7) 9 (38.8) 64 (75.4) 80A (36) 
 Negative 4 (31.6) 8 (20.4) 16 (37.1) 91A (32) 17 (20.1) 53 (39.1) 10 (18.7) 
 Confused 5 (31.3) 36 (20.2) 74 (36.8) 18 (31.6) 22 (19.9) 33 (38.1) 9 (18.5) 
 Shocked 14 (15.3) 19A (9.9) 6 (17.9) 17 (15.4) 24 (9.7) 10 (18.9) 6 (9) 
 Engaged 5 (26.1) 4 (16.8) 118A (30.6) 12 (26.3) 4 (16.6) 17 (32.3) 4 (15.4) 
 Pretend 1 (2.5) 2 (1.6) 3 (3) 2 (2.6) 1 (1.6) 5 (3.1) 2 (1.5) 
 Sceptical 1 (9.4) 8 (6.1) 5 (11) 13 (9.5) 20 (6) 9 (11.6) 3 (5.5) 
 Frustrated 0 (17.8) 1 (11.5) 0 (20.9) 33 (18) 27A (11.3) 50A (22) 1 (10.5) 
Note: frequencies bolded and with subscript A denote correct prompt and consistent emotion inference 
Table 4.7: Frequency of emotion inferences for incorrect retrodictions in spontaneous and posed stimuli . 
  Incorrect prompt response (expected frequencies in brackets) 
A) Spontaneous Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
Emotion Inference Positive 112a (115.4) 111 (73.2) 16 (50.9) 128 (113.5) 51 (92.8) 71 (66.4) 156a (132.8) 
 Negative 86 (74.8) 45 (47.4) 41 (33) 56a (73.6) 77 (60.1) 45 (43) 68 (86.1) 
 Confused 48 (52.2) 30 (33.1) 30 (23) 38 (51.4) 53 (42) 26 (30.1) 67 (60.1) 
 Shocked 23 (30.8) 18a (19.5) 21 (13.6) 17 (30.3) 24 (24.7) 18 (17.7) 51 (35.4) 
 Engaged 36 (46) 20 (29.2) 14a (20.3) 69 (45.2) 51 (37) 27 (26.5) 40 (52.9) 
 Pretend 4 (3.8) 1 (2.4) 3 (1.7) 3 (3.7) 2 (3) 3 (2.2) 5 (4.3) 
 Sceptical 19 (15.6) 5 (9.9) 10 (6.9) 10 (15.3) 15 (12.5) 10 (9) 18 (17.9) 
 Frustrated 44 (33.5) 6 (21.2) 29 (14.8) 45 (32.9) 26a (26.9) 14a (19.2) 23 (38.5) 
         
B) Posed  Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
Emotion Inference Positive 122a (89.1) 148 (105.4) 46 (78.9) 80 (82.7) 60 (107.1) 61 (79.8) 134a (108) 
 Negative 69 (62) 53 (73.3) 64 (54.9) 46a (57.6) 80 (74.5) 79 (55.5) 62 (75.1) 
 Confused 36 (54.2) 58 (64.1) 49 (48) 41 (50.3) 101 (65.1) 48 (48.6) 63 (65.7) 
 Shocked 12 (19.3) 22a (22.8) 44 (17.1) 24 (17.9) 18 (23.2) 3 (17.3) 18 (23.4) 
 Engaged 45 (37.6) 38 (44.5) 21a (33.3) 52 (34.9) 39 (45.2) 40 (33.7) 40 (45.6) 
 Pretend 3 (4) 4 (4.7) 8 (3.5) 2 (3.7) 7 (4.8) 4 (3.6) 1 (4.8) 
 Sceptical 6 (12.5) 15 (14.7) 12 (11) 13 (11.6) 20 (15) 12 (11.2) 13 (15.1) 
 Frustrated 14 (28.3) 25 (33.5) 28 (25.1) 27 (26.3) 44a (34.1) 28a (25.4) 41 (34.3) 





For simplicity the percentage of emotion inferences to each prompt when correct and incorrect 
are displayed below in tables 4.8 and 4.9 respectively. 
 
Table 4.8: Percentage of emotion inferences for correct retrodictions in spontaneous and posed stimuli. 
  Correct prompt response 
 Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
a) Spontaneous  Positive 84.38 47.60 3.93 7.96 6.25 29.93 63.24 
Emotion Inference Negative 1.56 4.80 8.46 43.36 20.83 15.49 8.82 
 Confused 1.56 16.61 21.75 15.04 20.31 12.32 8.82 
 Shocked 5.47 23.25 0.60 3.54 15.10 3.17 10.29 
 Engaged 2.34 1.11 64.35 9.73 6.25 19.72 7.35 
 Pretend 0.78 1.48 0.91 0.88 1.04 0.70 0.00 
 Sceptical 3.13 4.06 0.00 5.31 8.33 3.87 0.00 
 Frustrated 0.78 1.11 0.00 14.16 21.88 14.79 1.47 
b)  Posed         
Emotion Inference Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
 Positive 84.62 38.10 3.06 5.58 7.26 26.56 69.57 
 Negative 2.05 6.35 6.99 46.19 13.71 21.99 8.70 
 Confused 2.56 28.57 32.31 9.14 17.74 13.69 7.83 
 Shocked 7.18 15.08 2.62 8.63 19.35 4.15 5.22 
 Engaged 2.56 3.17 51.53 6.09 3.23 7.05 3.48 
 Pretend 0.51 1.59 1.31 1.02 0.81 2.07 1.74 
 Sceptical 0.51 6.35 2.18 6.60 16.13 3.73 2.61 
 Frustrated 0.00 0.79 0.00 16.75 21.77 20.75 0.87 
Note: percentages bolded denote correct prompt and consistent emotion inference 
Table 4.9: Percentage of emotion inferences for incorrect retrodictions in spontaneous and posed stimuli . 
  Incorrect prompt response 
 Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
a) Spontaneous 
Emotion Inference 
Positive 30.11 47.03 9.76 34.97 17.06 33.18 36.45 
Negative 23.12 19.07 25.00 15.30 25.75 21.03 15.89 
 Confused 12.90 12.71 18.29 10.38 17.73 12.15 15.65 
 Shocked 6.18 7.63 12.80 4.64 8.03 8.41 11.92 
 Engaged 9.68 8.47 8.54 18.85 17.06 12.62 9.35 
 Pretend 1.08 0.42 1.83 0.82 0.67 1.40 1.17 
 Sceptical 5.11 2.12 6.10 2.73 5.02 4.67 4.21 
 Frustrated 11.83 2.54 17.68 12.30 8.70 6.54 5.37 
b)  Posed         
Emotion Inference Positive Monopoly Maths Negative Not recording Repeat No repeat 
 Positive 39.74 40.77 16.91 28.07 16.26 22.18 36.02 
 Negative 22.48 14.60 23.53 16.14 21.68 28.73 16.67 
 Confused 11.73 15.98 18.01 14.39 27.37 17.45 16.94 
 Shocked 3.91 6.06 16.18 8.42 4.88 1.09 4.84 
 Engaged 14.66 10.47 7.72 18.25 10.57 14.55 10.75 
 Pretend 0.98 1.10 2.94 0.70 1.90 1.45 0.27 
 Sceptical 1.95 4.13 4.41 4.56 5.42 4.36 3.49 
 Frustrated 4.56 6.89 10.29 9.47 11.92 10.18 11.02 





For correct prompt responses, results showed that significantly more consistent and less 
inconsistent emotion and prompt responses were made than the model predicted (Spontaneous stimuli: 
observed consistent=560, expected consistent=203.1, observed inconsistent=827, expected 
inconsistent=1180.5, Lχ
2
 (42) = 1131.54, p<0.001; Posed stimuli: observed consistent=550, expected 
consistent=202.8, observed inconsistent=677, expected inconsistent=1023.8, Lχ
2 
(42) = 1059.73, 
p<0.001).  
For incorrect prompt responses, results showed significant differences between consistent 
emotion and prompt responses to those predicted by the model although the differences are much less 
pronounced and largely driven by inferences made from posed stimuli (Spontaneous stimuli: observed 
consistent=396, expected consistent=407.7, observed inconsistent=1683, expected inconsistent=1671.5,  
Lχ
2
 (42) = 202.97, p<0.001; Posed stimuli: observed consistent=416, expected consistent=370.3, observed 
inconsistent=1815, expected inconsistent=1872.6, Lχ
2
 (42) = 229.86, p<0.001). 
4.3.6 What role does Autism and Alexithymia play? 
As autism and Alexithymia traits were measured in both the participants who created the 
expressions and those who viewed them, there is ample opportunity to investigate how both conditions 
influence expression recognisability from senders and recognition ability in the receivers. 
4.3.6.1 Do Autistic and Alexithymia traits influence recognisability of one’s emotional responses? 
Investigating the relationship of Autistic and Alexithymia traits in the displayer (n=19) on 
recognisability of their emotion responses via two-tailed Pearson’s correlations showed non-significant 
relationships between expressers’ self-reported autistic traits and judges accuracy in interpreting their 
responses, irrespective of stimuli type (is this expression posed or spontaneous?) (Total recognition r=-
0.227 p=0.349, posed recognition r=-0.243 p=0.316, spontaneous recognition r=0.030 p=0.903) and or 
prompt type recognition (recognition of emotional states) (total recognition r=-0.146 p=0.552, posed 
recognition r=-0.193 p=0.429, spontaneous recognition r=-0.031 p=0.899). Similar relationships were 
shown between Alexithymia traits in the displayer and recognition of stimuli type (total recognition r=-
0.449 p=0.054, posed recognition r=-0.178 p=0.467, spontaneous recognition r=-0.405 p=0.085) and 
recognition of prompt types (total recognition r=-0.340 p=0.154, posed total r=-0.288 p=0.231, 





The distribution of AQ scores can be seen in Figure 4.2 below with a peak around the expected score of 
17 for a typically developing sample. The distribution follows a normal curve from minimal traits to  30 














4.3.6.2 Do Autistic and Alexithymia traits in the judges influence recognition rates? 
Investigation of autistic and Alexithymia traits in the expression viewers via two-tailed 
Pearson’s correlations showed a significant moderate positive correlation between AQ scores and 
Alexithymia scores (r= 0.495, p=<0.001). There was a significant negative correlation between AQ 
scores and overall recognition (r= -0.175, p=0.019), this was driven by difficulties in spontaneous 
emotion recognition (r= -0.232, p=0.003), not posed (r= -0.060, p=0.239). Alexithymia displayed the 
same trend although not statistically significant (r= -0.137, p=0.053) the trend was once again driven by 
association with recognition of spontaneous stimuli (r= -0.159, p=0.030) but not posed (r= -0.086, 
p=0.156).  
4.4 Discussion 
This research aimed to validate a new naturalistic set of emotion responses for studies exploring 
RM in typical and atypical development. A secondary aim was to compare methods of eliciting emotion 
responses, either spontaneously felt during a social interact ion, or deliberately posed on direct request 
from the experimenter. Results showed that overall participants were significantly better at recognising 





spontaneous expressions than posed. However, this varied according to specific emotions; the positive, 
negative and no repeat prompts were significantly more accurately recognised from posed than 
spontaneous expressions. The opposite effect was found with maths question, monopoly money, repeat 
and not recording which were significantly better recognised when s pontaneous than posed.  
The overall improved recognition of spontaneous expressions compared to posed was contrary to 
expectations from previous research, which present a unanimous improvement for posed expressions 
(Hess & Blairy, 2001; Wagner 1990; Wagner et al., 1992; Naab & Russell, 2007). Potential reasons for 
this contradictory finding could be the method of emotion evocation used in this experiment. By 
capturing naturalistic reactions to social cues under covert recording, the responses collected are higher in 
ecological validity than those captured in isolation (Schmidt, Ambadar, Cohn & Reed, 2006; Schmidt et 
al., 2003) or in contexts that don’t require a socially reactive response (Valstar & Pantic 2010; Lang  et al., 
2008; Gur et al., 2002; Gosselin et al., 1995). This in turn would suggest the reactions used in this 
experiment are closer to truly naturalistic socially typical responses than those used previously. Therefore 
the improvement in spontaneous recognition may be a result of expressions more  accurately reflecting 
true social interaction which participants could more readily identify. Coupling this with the work of 
Schmidt and colleagues (2003), which demonstrated stronger onset amplitudes of expressions captured in 
social situations, and those of chapter 3 evidencing less consistent display patterns in posed expressions, 
the improved recognition of spontaneous expressions in this research further highlights the importance of 
truly social cues that may be more intense and subsequently invoke expressions that better resemble 
typical reactions. 
Analysis of participants’ error patterns showed there were systematic choices evident for most 
expressions where the correct answer was chosen significantly more than the incorrect alternatives. Only 
the no repeat and not recording prompts showed participants had difficulty in distinguishing the correct 
answer from incorrect options. This systematic pattern was mirrored in emotion attributions to each social 
prompt, where more emotion and prompt observations  we would expect to be consistent with one another 
(e.g. positive to positive feedback, engaged to maths question) were present than a model expected and 
less inconsistent observations (e.g. negative to positive feedback, monopoly money to frustration) tha n a 
model expected. The pattern of emotionally consistent attributions across prompt and stimuli types was 





attributions when presented in a posed format compared to spontaneous. This may be due to incorrect 
prompt inferences in spontaneous stimuli being caused by low signal clarity in the stimuli. The higher 
consistent emotion attribution in the posed stimuli is potentially due to participants forming a singular 
basic expression less complex than those in naturally occurring spontaneous expressions. The systematic 
nature of the prompt recognition and emotion attributions present similar findings to (Cassidy et al., 2014; 
2015), suggesting the emotional inference ascribed to a reaction influences what people perceive to have 
caused said reaction. Furthermore, participants can successfully gauge a person’s emotional response in 
order to correctly infer what actually happened to them. The findings in this study add  to this evidence 
base, showing the importance of stimuli type (posed or spontaneous) in influencing this decision making 
process.  
Analysis of participants’ intensity and valence ratings of videos showed  no significant effect of 
stimuli type on intensity but a significant effect on valence with spontaneous expressions rated more 
positive than posed. Differences in intensity were present between the prompts but this was to be 
expected given the varied nature of the reactions, the most intense expression was  maths question and the 
least intense was negative feedback, which suggests elements of social display rules were present. Such 
findings should be considered for future research looking to measure emotion recognition; this evidence 
would suggest the subtle changes in both intensity and valence are tempered by the social context. In this 
instance participants’ spontaneous reaction to negative feedback was perceived as both less intense and 
less negatively valenced than their attempt at posing the same reaction. This could be due to social 
display rules minimising the negative reaction or a flawed attempt to recreate the expression, in either 
case the difference is noticeable to raters and as such research should consider the aims being explored 
and if posed expressions can answer the questions set.  
There were no significant relationships between traits of autism or Alexithymia in the emotion 
displayer influencing recognition. This is contrary to previous research (Brewer et al., 2016; Volker et al., 
2009; Macdonald et al., 1989) but not unexpected as no individuals used to create the stimuli scored 
highly enough to indicate risk of clinical autism (scores >32) (two participants were borderline scoring 31 
and 30). However considering the small sample size used, it is likely that given the associations shown 
and in the expected directions (Self-report autistic traits negatively associated with posed emotion 





recognition), a significant effect would be found with a larger sample on the autistic spectrum. 
Investigating the presence of self-report autism and Alexithymia traits in participants used to validate the 
expressions showed significant negative correlations between both AQ and TAS scores and spontaneous 
expression recognition. Such a finding is consistent with previous research highlighting difficulties in 
these populations (Harms et al., 2010); the specificity of this relationship to spontaneous expressions is 
not surprising given previous research has identified group differences can emerge with more subtle 
stimuli (Hoffmann et al., 2010) and evidence that spontaneous expressions are shorter in length than 
posed (Schmidt et al., 2003). 
The findings then suggest the stimuli set consists of valid spontaneous and posed expressions 
that viewer’s process in a systematic way with recognition rates significantly above chance for six of the 
seven categories (no repeat prompt falling below chance). The secondary aim of the rese arch to 
investigate recognition patterns across emotions did not support the hypothesis that posed expressions 
would be better recognised than spontaneous. However typically socially posed emotions (positive 
feedback/happiness and negative feedback/sadness /anger) were better recognised when displayed in a 
posed format which may be due to the similar nature in the manifestation of those expressions. This 
finding has important implications for future research assessing emotion recognition and the methods 
employed. These results question previous reports of improved recognition of posed stimuli, particularly 
with the stimuli used which are captured in a controlled naturalistic social interchange. Future research 
should consider the stimuli used, if posed expres sions can be considered easier recognised than 
spontaneous expressions and the validity of those spontaneous expressions. Including naturalistic 
spontaneous expressions in future research may shed new light on reported differences in emotion 
recognition between the sexes (Hall 1984; 1978; Hall & Matsumoto, 2004; McBain et al., 2009) and those 
with atypical development (Harms et al., 2010).  
These findings have implications for methods in future research investigating emotion 
recognition. They question the validity of previous stimulus sets as adequate measures of emotion 
processing competency and expand a new paradigm with which to explore emotion processing in realistic 
social situations. This stimulus set has practical applications in research investigatin g recognition 
competencies and eye tracking research interested in visual perusal patterns. The high er quality stimuli set 





and if these are likely to vary between posed and spontaneous expressions. Similarly , there is room for 
research to investigate the physiological differences in a stimuli set of matching posed and spontaneous 
expressions where the spontaneous expressions are of a high quality.  
This research has its limitations due to its use of judges ’ emotion inferences as a method to 
establish a ‘consistent’ emotion to a given situation. This method, although it has its strengths, relies on 
inferences external to the displayer to define the displayers felt emotions and subsequently use this as an 
objectively correct answer. This of course may be entirely contradictory to what the individual in the 
stimuli reports to feel. However, the stance in this work is that emotions are communicative in nature,  to 
apply uneven weight to one side of this communication process by assuming whatever people report to 
feel is unquestionably what they have communicated or displayed may be too simple an approach. By the 
same line of argument, to assume what someone see’s is how someone else feels is also simplistic, but the 
latter approach does have the benefit of consensus in large sample sizes. Future research may find it 
fruitful to investigate the degree to which self-report emotions are corroborated by judges ratings, this 
particular question would be better addressed with spontaneous expressions where genuine changes in 
emotional state are more likely to occur. 
The stimuli validated in this research contain 133 spontaneous expressions captured in a 
naturalistic social interchange via covert recording from participants unaware of the true aim of the 
research. 133 matching posed expressions were created to allow comparisons in recognition, emotional 
inferences, intensity and valence in a depth not covered previously. Participants used for expression 
development were screened with the AQ and TAS to control for difficulties in emotion production ability, 
similarly the participants used to validate the expressions were screened to control for difficulties in 
recognition that could confound the validity of the stimulus set. The finished stimulus set is larger than 
many spontaneous sets currently available; with expressions more representative of typical social 
interchange due to the strict methods employed. 
In summary this chapter presents evidence that the expressions created are recognised above 
chance for six of the seven prompts (No repeat not above chance). Contrary to previous work the 
spontaneous expressions were recognised significantly better than pos ed. Only for ‘positive feedback’, 
‘negative feedback’ and ‘no repeat’ prompts was recognition significantly better in a posed format. 





likelihood of inferring the correct prompt to the video. These results underpin the importance of correct 
emotional attributions in inferring socially appropriate responses and highlight the usefulness of the RM 





Chapter 5 The Relationship between Viewing Patterns, 
Retrodictive Mindreading Ability and Autistic Traits 
 
The previous chapters have highlighted the need for a new stimulus set and shown stimuli that 
address some of the concerns of complexity, spontaneity, and task demands can result in different display 
patterns and recognition rates. The current chapter will expand this further by investigating if this is 
emulated in viewing styles and if those viewing styles are predictive of ASC traits. 
 5.1 Introduction 
 
Chapter 2 highlighted the importance of emotion recognition and processing as a vital part of 
social cohesion as well as relationship development and maintenance.  This ability is used in virtually 
every aspect of daily living from social chit-chat to forming sustained relationships with loved ones. The 
development of emotion processing was also discussed previously, with infants displaying the ability to 
orient to faces at birth (Johnson & Morton 1991; Morton & Johnson 1991), developing to holistic 
processing (focussing on the eyes, nose and mouth to produce a whole) (Tanaka et al., 1998) and later 
advanced featural processing (Bruce et al., 2000). Research involving emotion processing with children 
has tended to focus on expressions that do not accurately reflect the emotion responses that would be 
expected in daily situations. Much research utilizes the JACFEE (Matsumoto and Ekman, 1988; Biehl et 
al., 1997) which only contain examples of the basic six expressions and are typically presented as 
monotone colour, static images (Kessler et al., 2008; Shioiri et al., 1999; Hall & Matsumoto 2004; 
Matsumoto et al., 2002; Elfenbein & Ambady 2002). As the research in chapter 3 showed differential 
display patterns in posed and spontaneous expressions and chapter 4 showed differential recognition, it is 
required to investigate further if these results are translating to viewing styles. 
As methods in the literature have advanced, paradigms such as the part -whole paradigm can be 
replaced with eye tracking measures which allow detailed analysis of where visual attention is directed. 
When using eye-tracking equipment to monitor how visual attention is allocated multiple measures are 
considered important. These measures can include; the number of fixations to a specific region of interest, 
the duration of those fixations, the sequence of fixations and distance and velocity of saccades  and scan 
paths (Jacob & Karn 2003). Numbers of fixations provide a metric for how many times individuals focus 





as a region of interest). The duration of fixations allows an understanding of where most of the time is 
spent viewing the stimuli, Duchowski (2007) suggests fixation duration is correlative of cognitive 
function, with greater durations associated with more cognitive activity. Scan  path analysis or 
sequence/time course analysis is more prevalent in newer research with better eye-tracking equipment, it 
is particularly useful for highlighting different viewing styles between individuals (Rutherford & Towns 
2008; Yi et al., 2013)  
Eye-tracking research has highlighted that visual scanning of faces develops from an analytical 
style (scanning across the facial features) to holistic with age (schwarzer, Huber & Dümmler, 2005; 
Durand, Gallay, Seigneuric, Robichon & Baudouin, 2007). After early infancy it appears most attention is 
focussed on the eyes (Haith, Bergman & Moore, 1977) sometimes up to three times as much time is spent 
viewing the eyes as the mouth (Speer et al., 2007; Wagner, Hirsch, Vogel-Farley, Redcay & Nelson, 
2013). Crucially the first fixation to a stimulus is typically made to the eyes (Hernandez et al., 2009; 
Fletcher-Watson, Leekam, Benson, Frank, & Findlay, 2009). These findings would suggest the eyes are a 
key region in gleaning social information; this is true for when attention is directed to the eyes as much of 
the cumulative duration of time is spent fixated there.  
The eyes also hold important information because they provide a window into another 
perspective on the world. By paying attention to other people’s eyes we are able to gain more information 
about what is important and worth attention in the current environment . Put simply, where people focus 
their attention will tend to draw the attention of others (Langton & Bruce 1999; Ristic  et al., 2005; Senju, 
Csibra & Johnson 2008). Research has shown that typically developing individuals attend to people and 
faces as a priority when shown complex photographic scenes (Birmingham, Bischof & Kingstone 2009). 
The results in autism show a different pattern of visual attention with ASC individuals  less attentive to 
people, specifically faces, along with other social cues (Dawson et al., 2004; Dawson, Meltzoff, 
Osterling, Rinaldi & Brown 1998; Pelphrey et al., 2002).  
In some research there appears to be no differences in viewing styles between ASC participants 
and matched controls (Van Der Geest, Kemner, Cafferman, Verbaten & van Engeland 2002). However, 
the particular method in this research involved the viewing styles to cartoon faces, the previously 
discussed research of Rosset and colleagues demonstrated no differences between ASC and control 





likely causes for this result. It is possible the same effect is present in van der Geest and colleagues work 
with cartoon faces posing different demands in viewing styles and salience than would be expected of real 
faces. The authors do make note of this limitation suggesting other factors such as social interaction or 
scenes more social in nature play a bigger role. 
 More recent research has investigated viewing styles to more realistic social scenes with 
inherently social information embedded in the form of gaze cues. Comparing the viewing styles of high -
functioning ASC individuals to typically developing matched controls showed similarly large portions of 
time spent viewing the face in both groups (Freeth, Chapman, Ropar & Mitchell 2010). However 
differences did emerge in attention to the eyes, and perhaps most importantly although the ASC 
individuals did show responsiveness to gaze direction cues, this was not reflected by fixation duration 
increase to the gaze location. This lack of looking to informative cue but not translating to meaningful 
information suggests ASC individual can identify someone is looking at something in this direction that 
they find interesting, but this saliency of a worthwhile object  or event does not translate to the ASC 
individual as they show notably less time fixated at the gaze cue location. Gaze cues also provide more 
information than the immediate environment; they allow a window into the mental states of others as 
demonstrated by Baron-Cohen’s (1995) work which showed children as young as four can infer the 
mental state of thinking to an image of someone looking up. Similarly , looking down can be associated 
with shame or embarrassment, the idea was further developed in the ‘reading the mind in the eyes task’ 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 2001), 
The previously discussed results of display rules and their lack of presence in posed expressions 
have implications for social emotions, such as pride, shame and embarrassment. These are oft en 
associated with gaze cues (looking down in shame or avoiding eye contact in embarrassment); this rich 
information is almost entirely governed by the eyes (and some head gesture). Preferential looking to or 
away from these regions could have key implications for social understanding, and different viewing in 
posed or spontaneous expressions could hold similarly important results. 
Thinking spontaneous expressions are an improvement towards more ecologically valid 
approximations of true social interaction is logical; but such a claim should be supported by evidence of 
differences in display patterns and recognition rates. Some such evidence suggests the physical 





posed smiles (Cohn & Schmidt, 2004). There also appears to be altered action unit (the distinct elements 
that make up expressions such as upturned lips for smiling) occurrences, durations, and intensity of 
eyebrow movements in spontaneous expressions. The evidence of altered expression formation, ranging 
from distinct physiological patterns to duration and intensity means there is legitimate reason to continue 
investigating the differences between posed and spontaneous expressions in more avenues. It is important 
to consider if the previously reported effects of spontaneous expressions translate to the manner in which 
these expressions are viewed. This has implications for the established viewing styles that are considered 
normative, and that which is (haphazardly) reported as atypical in ASC. As is sound scientific practice a 
control baseline is required to compare everything else to, currently the baseline in emotion perception is 
formed from expressions that for various reasons outlined in chapter 2 are highly unlikely to invoke 
viewing styles that would be representative of real world processing. 
Incorporating the RM paradigm with a newly developed stimulus set of matched spontaneous 
and posed evoked emotion expressions, the current research aims to investigate the recognition rates of 
typically developing children on a task that should better asses emotion processing and contextual 
understanding with stimuli that is more naturalistic to allow valid assessments. Through the use of eye 
tracking software the research also aims to investigate the viewing patterns children exhibit, if these are 
governed by the stimuli type, and crucially if viewing style and the ability to retrodict events can predict 
autistic traits. An age range of 6-12 is identified to investigate the ability of a developing sample to 
complete a retrodictive mindreading task; research typically focusses on labelling of emotions at this age 
range but there is scope to investigate if children have developed a socially appropriate unders tanding of 
emotions at this age. It is also important to consider with the distinct factor structures present between 
posed and spontaneous expressions how children view these expressions to establish data for a viewing 
style of posed and spontaneous expressions before processing maturity is reached. The results could have 
implications for the type of stimuli that is deemed appropriate for future investigation of emotion 
recognition/processing in children. 
Fixations and durations were chosen as dependent variables because they provide a reliable 
indicator of areas of high salience they are commonly used in eye-tracking research (Dalton et al., 2005; 
Klin et al., 2005; Pelphrey et al., 2005; Speer et al., 2005; Freeth et al., 2010; Cassidy et al., 2014; 2015). 





between individuals with inherent differences (such as autism and control) but this was not the sample 
intended for this research. Similarly, the analysis of scan paths can become over complex, this is 
particularly true in the case of multiple types of expressions in different display formats (posed and 
spontaneous). To this end it was decided fixations and duration of fixations provided a more manageable  
whilst informative measure of which areas are deemed salient, 
It is predicted based on performance in typically developing adults and evidence of expression 
expressivity, that recognition of spontaneous expressions will be significantly better than posed.  As 
previous findings with the stimuli have shown less consistent emotion patterns in posed expressions, it is 
predicted there will be significantly more fixations to posed expressions where participants should be less 
likely to have their attention drawn to specific regions. It is also predicted significantly longer will be 
spent viewing the highlighted regions of interest (the eyes, mouth, face and body) in spontaneous 
expressions where participants should find clear expression patterns to direct their at tention towards for 
longer periods of time. Finally it is predicted that RM ability and viewing patterns will significantly 
predict autistic traits, it is expected worse performance on the RM task and more time viewing the mouth 
and body will predict higher autistic traits according to the autism quotient.  
5.2 Method 
5.2.1 Design 
The research employed a repeated measures design, participants viewed both posed and 
matching spontaneous expressions. Analysis of recognition rates between the expression types was 
investigated via one-way ANOVA with RM performance as DV and expression type as IV with four 
levels (maths, monopoly, negative, positive).  Analysis of viewing behaviour was analysed via three -way 
ANOVA comparing stimuli with two levels (posed, spontaneous), expression with four levels (maths, 
monopoly, negative, positive) and region of interest (eye-to-mouth ratio, face-to-body ratio)  this analysis 
was completed twice; once with number of fixations as the dependent variable and again for duration of 
fixations as the dependent variable. The eye region spanned both eyes including the nose in the middle , 
the mouth region expanded to the bottom of the chin, this is because key AU activity for certain 
expressions such as disgust and surprise rely on nose and  chin movement respectively. Finally a multiple 
regression was conducted investigating RM performance, eye-to-mouth and face-to-body viewing 





Young Researchers event as a whole, evidence of submission to Coventry young researchers and 
confirmation of event clearance can be seen in appendix G. 
5.2.2 Participants 
The research recruited 38 participants. Parents were invited to bring children to Coventry Young 
Researchers, a science engagement event organised by the Psychology department at Coventry 
University. Children were invited to take part in various educational activities as well as research. Of the 
38 participants that took part usable eye-tracking data was collected from 32 children (16 males, 16 
females, Mean age = 9.12, SD= 1.57, range 6 – 12.75), this was the remaining sample that achieved 
accurate calibration and tracking. Analysis of the validity ratings showed 82.66% of the fixations 
identified achieved the recommended validity ratings of 0 or 1 for analysis. Of the 6 children where 
accurate tracking of the eyes could not be achieved this was usually attributed to children wearing glasses 
which interrupted the infrared tracking system, whilst other children were unable to maintain a static 
seated position long enough to complete the task.   
5.2.3 Materials and apparatus 
Thirty-two videos (ranging in duration from 2 to 8.3 seconds) from four emotion expression 
categories were selected for this experiment, sixteen of which were posed and sixteen were spontaneous .  
These were presented on a Tobii (TX300) eye tracker in high definition (1920x1080). Eye movements 
were recorded at a rate of 300Hz per second. The WASI-II short form of vocabulary and matrix reasoning 
was used as a measure of IQ and a parent report version of the autism quotient was used to measure 
autistic traits in the children. 
The autism spectrum quotient: child version (Auyeung et al., 2008) was used as a screening measure for 
autism traits. The scale has shown high sensitivity (95%) and specificity (95%) with high test -retest 
reliability (r = 0.88) and good internal consistency with all sub-scales presenting α > 0.8 and on overall α 
= 0.97.  
5.2.3.1 Stimuli  
The stimuli used in the present study were created in chapter 3. The detailed process of the 
stimuli creation can be seen in sections 3.2.4 and 3.2.5. A smaller range of expressions were used in this 
research; this included the maths question, monopoly money, positive feedback and negative feedback. 





manageable expectations of children who would be required to sit still to allow accurate use of the eye 
tracker. Secondly, the four previously mentioned expressions showed good recognition rates across 
various different emotional categories; they also showed reasonable factor structures or the most marked 
differences in factor structures between posed and spontaneous expressions. There was a strong case for 
the inclusion of the repeat experiment prompt as this too showed good recognition rates , however the 
frequency of emotion inferences to this prompt were more varied across other emotion options suggesting 
this reaction could be interpreted multiple ways which may be beyond the competencies of the sample 
proposed. 
The process by which expressions were selected for this research was constrained by the interest 
in measuring viewing styles and recognition rates between posed and spontaneous expressions. To ensure 
any differences were due to stimuli expression type and not individual differences any spontaneous 
expressions selected also required the paired posed expression from that displayer to be chosen. This 
presented issues where some ideal spontaneous expressions with good recognition rates had a paired 
posed expression with poor recognition or vice versa.  
Thirty-two expressions were used in the current study from the four expressions types listed 
above. Four matching posed and spontaneous  videos were chosen from each expression type with good 
recognition rates resulting in a total of 16 posed and 16 matching spontaneous expressions. The 
recognition rates of individual expressions across the entire stimuli s et along with highlighted chosen 








Participants’ parents had given consent to the Coventry Young Researchers event before arriving 
but renewed verbal consent was gained after the research had been explained. Participants sat at a 
standard 2 seater desk approximately 70 centimetres in distance from the Tobii eye-tracker directly in 
front of them. The researcher sat on the opposite side of the 2 seater desk administering the experiment 
via laptop computer. The task was explained to the participants that they would see a short video and be 
asked which of the four options that would appear on the screen in front of them do they think caused the 
reaction (see appendix H for example options). They would then be asked how they thought the person in 
the video felt from a four choice forced option with a guidance sheet to aid them (see appendix I for 
guidance sheet) finally it was made clear it is important to stay as still as possible to allow the eye-tracker 
to work. The expressions were administered in two counterbalanced parts to allow a short break for 


















































































1 0.21 0.74 0.13 0.85 0.12 0.52 0.00 0.12 0.08 0.26 0.39 0.09 0.36 0.58 
2 0.20 0.72 0.21 0.00 0.19 0.24 0.15 0.12 0.09 0.39 0.05 0.03 0.22 0.48 
3 0.33 0.70 0.08 0.81 0.36 0.17 0.04 0.20 0.12 0.84 0.42 0.04 0.29 0.39 
4 0.33 0.67 0.04 0.63 0.71 0.40 0.23 0.13 0.24 0.12 0.38 0.16 0.44 0.91 
5 0.04 0.67 0.05 0.11 0.33 0.52 0.43 0.05 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.17 0.32 0.88 
6 0.89 0.73 0.17 0.63 0.29 0.48 0.04 0.61 0.38 0.41 0.59 0.39 0.42 0.68 
7 0.38 0.17 0.28 0.74 0.67 0.28 0.00 0.04 0.42 0.17 0.51 0.63 0.63 0.39 
8 0.91 0.26 0.23 0.52 0.64 0.28 0.61 0.13 0.19 0.59 0.25 0.00 0.16 0.26 
9 0.78 0.57 0.3 0.42 0.56 0.12 0.12 0.04 0.29 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.12 0.61 
10 0.80 0.68 0.23 0.76 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.00 0.23 0.77 0.78 0.60 0.81 0.65 
11 0.00 0.81 0.46 0.42 0.26 0.19 0.42 0.13 0.12 0.40 0.26 0.07 0.00 0.83 
12 0.63 0.96 0.30 0.38 0.17 0.08 0.06 0.11 0.09 0.57 0.63 0.40 0.70 0.59 
13 0.96 1.00 0.12 0.41 0.88 0.42 0.42 0.05 0.22 0.19 0.25 0.54 0.58 0.5 
14 0.32 0.71 0.00 0.35 0.28 0.00 0.15 0.15 0.44 0.40 0.42 0.58 0.45 0.38 
15 0.13 0.39 0.08 0.44 0.25 0.08 0.56 0.31 0.19 0.32 0.17 0.08 0.78 0.39 
16 0.11 0.73 0.83 0.83 0.65 0.09 0.21 0.24 0.52 0.24 0.11 0.19 0.75 0.92 
17 0.83 0.57 0.81 0.49 0.74 0.21 0.75 0.00 0.44 0.42 0.75 0.04 0.88 0.50 
18 0.77 0.92 0.54 0.63 0.25 0.11 0.09 0.09 0.40 0.84 0.61 0.33 0.60 0.25 
19 0.28 0.65 0.13 0.68 0.29 0.25 0.14 0.24 0.18 0.22 0.51 0.08 0.52 0.89 
Average 0.47 0.67 0.26 0.53 0.41 0.25 0.24 0.15 0.26 0.40 0.40 0.25 0.48 0.58 






participants in between and allow recalibration of the eye-tracker halfway through the experiment. 
Matching expressions were ensured within each part (e.g. if person A showing a posed reaction to 
monopoly money was shown in part 1, the matching spontaneous reaction to monopoly money was also 
in part 1) the expressions were presented in a randomised order within each part. After completing the 
eye-tracking portion of the experiment participants completed the WASI-II. Parents completed the parent 
report form of the autism quotient while the child was participating in research. 
 5.3 Results 
 5.3.1 Screening 
The AQ scores of participants were calculated to ensure the sample was majority typically 
developing. Only two participants (scores of 80 and 120) presented AQ scores greater than the 76 
threshold outlined in the manual for accuracy of sensitivity and specificity (Auyeung et al., 2008). These 
participants were retained as their exclusion did not overly affect the mean and only the participant 
scoring 120 was shown to be an outlier during regression which did not subsequently show high leverage. 
The mean AQ score of the sample was 53.94 (SD=17.44), the mean of the sample with the two 
participants removed was 50.86 (SD=12.33). 
5.3.2 What are the patterns of expression recognition? 
Participants’ responses were collated and a confusion matrix compiled, it shows the responses 
given relative to the correct answer. In table 5.2 below it can be seen the maths question response and 
monopoly money response had more correct recognition than the three alternative responses. The 
negative feedback and positive feedback responses show poor recognition, often confused with maths 
question and monopoly money responses respectively. The confusion matrix shows the expressions are 
likely to be confused with an alternative that fits the same valence category. Although the maths question 
and monopoly money prompts were clearly recognised, the next most frequent response was negative 
feedback for maths question and positive feedback for monopoly money sugg esting there is a clear 
distinction between responses that convey a positive valence (monopoly money and positive feedback) 
and those that convey a negative valence (maths question and negative feedback). The same pattern of 
confusion is found in negative and positive, where the respective valence congruent responses (maths -
negative/ monopoly-positive) are actually more consistent than the correct answer but still more frequent 







Table 5.2: Confusion matrix of participants emotion responses when  stimuli is posed and spontaneous  
  Correct answer  
  Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total 
a) Posed stimuli 
participants 
responses 
Maths 77 21 55 23 176 
Monopoly 17 74 22 47 160 
Negative 25 4 42 29 100 
 Positive 21 38 24 39 122 
 Don’t know 4 7 1 6 18 
 Total 144 144 144 144  
    
  Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total 
b) Spontaneous stimuli 
participants 
responses 
Maths 75 17 36 30 158 
Monopoly 15 86 23 46 170 
Negative 33 3 44 32 112 
 Positive 16 32 33 32 113 
 Don’t know 5 6 8 4 23 
 Total 144 144 144 144  
Note: Shaded cells denote correct answer 
 
 
5.3.3 Are there differences in the recognisability of the expressions? 
In order to investigate the differential recognition rates of the four expressions, percentage of 
correct recognition was calculated and two-way ANOVA conducted. Percentage correct recognition was 
the dependent variable and expression type as the first independent variable with four levels (maths 
question, monopoly money, positive feedback and negative feedback) and stimuli type as the second 
independent variable with two levels (posed, spontaneous).   
Results showed the main effect of Stimuli type was non-significant (F (1, 32) = .06, p=.82. 
There was a significant main effect of expression type on percentage correct recognition (F (3, 96) = 3.45, 
p=0.02) ηp² (.09). There was no interaction between stimuli type and expression type on recognition rates 
(F (1, 32) = 1.14, p=.29. Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses showed the main effect of expression 
was specific to posed expressions where the monopoly money expression was recognised significantly 
more than positive feedback (p=.02) There were no other significant differences in recognition rates 
between posed and spontaneous stimuli or individual expression types. A graph depicting the mean 





















5.3.4 Are the emotion inferences given to expressions systematic? 
To check if participants gave situationally appropriate emotion inferences to the expressions the 
occurrences of each inference made when the expression recognition was correct and incorrect was 
tabulated as was conducted in Chapter 4 and in previous research (Cassidy et al., 2014). The consistent 
emotion to reaction inferences were maths question to thinking, monopoly money to surprised, negative 
feedback to sad and positive feedback to happy. The consistent emotion to reaction follow the same 
coding scheme developed when the stimuli was validated with typically developing adults (Chapter 4) 
Using maximum likelihood theory, the observed number of consistent emotion to reaction attributions is 
compared to chance via likelihood ratio for both correctly retrodicted expressions and incorrect.  
The frequencies of emotion attributions for correct and incorrect prompt retrodiction can be seen 
in table 5.3 and 5.4 respectively. Table 5.3 shows the frequency of emotional states that were reported 
when participants correctly retrodicted the prompt (e.g. the participant is shown a video of someone 
reacting to being given monopoly money and correctly retrodicts that the person in the video has been 
given monopoly money). Table 5.4 shows the frequency of emotional states that were reported after 
incorrect retrodiction of a prompt (e.g. the participant is shown a video of someone reacting to some 
negative feedback but incorrectly retrodicts that they were asked a maths question). The columns in table 
5.4 refer to the incorrect answer the participant gave. Between table 5.3 and 5.4 it is possible to compare 
the frequency of emotions inferred to the same video after correct and incorrect retrodiction of the 
preceding event, this allows an insight into the importance of correct  retrodiction on subsequent emotions 












































inferred. In correct recognition for both the posed and spontaneous  prompts the consistent emotion is 
observed more frequently than would be expected. Only the monopoly money expressions shows an 
inconsistent emotion attribution occurring more frequently than would be expected, in this instance 












Table 5.3: Frequency of emotion inferences for correct retrodictions to posed and spontaneous expressions. 
      Posed correct response           Spontaneous Correct response 
 Emotion 
inference 













 4 1 0 51 
Expected Count 21.24 20.41 11.59 10.76 64 Expected Count 16.14 18.51 9.47 6.89 51 
% within column 67.5 % 13.5 % 4.8 % 0.0 % 27.6 % % within column 61.3 % 4.7 % 2.3 % 0.0 % 21.5 % 








 5 1 44 
Expected Count 17.92 17.22 9.78 9.08 54 Expected Count 13.92 15.97 8.17 5.94 44 
% within column 16.9 % 40.5 % 16.7 % 10.3 % 23.3 % % within column 16.0 % 30.2 % 11.4 % 3.1 % 18.6 % 
              
Sad 
Count 8 2 32
A
 0 42 
Sad 
Count 7 3 37
A
 0 47 
Expected Count 13.94 13.40 7.60 7.06 42 Expected Count 14.87 17.05 8.73 6.35 47 
% within column 10.4 % 2.7 % 76.2 % 0.0 % 18.1 % % within column 9.3 % 3.5 % 84.1 % 0.0 % 19.8 % 
              
Happy 




Count 10 53 0 31
A
 94 
Expected Count 23.56 22.65 12.85 11.94 71 Expected Count 29.75 34.11 17.45 12.69 94 
% within column 3.9 % 43.2 % 2.4 % 89.7 % 30.6 % % within column 13.3 % 61.6 % 0.0 % 96.9 % 39.7 % 
              
Don’t 
know 
Count 1 0 0 0 1 
Don’t 
know 
Count 0 0 1 0 1 
Expected Count 0.33 0.32 0.18 0.17 1 Expected Count 0.32 0.36 0.19 0.14 1 
% within column 1.3 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.4 % % within column 0.0 % 0.0 % 2.3 % 0.0 % 0.4 % 
Note:  
A







Table 5.4: Frequency of emotion inferences for incorrect retrodictions to posed and spontaneous expressions.  
      Posed incorrect response           Spontaneous incorrect response 
 Emotion 
inference 













 11 3 1 52 
Expected Count 20.65 17.94 12.1 17.31 68 Expected Count 13.66 13.82 11.19 13.33 52 
% within column 50.5 % 14.0 % 6.9 % 2.4 % 20.9 % % within column 44.6 % 13.1 % 4.4 % 1.2 % 16.5 % 








 9 5 49 
Expected Count 17.31 15.04 10.14 14.51 57 Expected Count 12.87 13.03 10.54 12.56 49 
% within column 23.2 % 26.7 % 12.1 % 4.8 % 17.5 % % within column 22.9 % 19.0 % 13.2 % 6.2 % 15.5 % 
              
Sad 
Count 10 14 43
A
 0 67 
Sad 
Count 12 11 53
A
 0 76 
Expected Count 20.35 17.67 11.92 17.06 67 Expected Count 19.96 20.20 16.35 19.48 76 
% within column 10.1 % 16.3 % 74.1 % 0.0 % 20.6 % % within column 14.5 % 13.1 % 77.9 % 0.0 % 24.1 % 
              
Happy 




Count 15 45 3 75
A
 138 
Expected Count 35.57 33.50 22.60 32.33 127 Expected Count 36.25 36.68 29.7 35.37 138 
% within column 14.1 % 41.9 % 5.2 % 89.2 % 39.0 % % within column 18.1 % 53.6 % 4.4 % 92.6 % 39.7 % 
              
Don’t 
know 
Count 2 1 1 3 7 
Don’t 
know 
Count 0 1 0 0 1 
Expected Count 2.13 1.85 1.25 1.78 7 Expected Count 0.26 0.27 0.22 0.26 1 
% within column 2.0 % 1.2 % 1.7 % 3.6 % 2.1 % % within column 0.0 % 1.2 % 0.0 % 0.0 % 0.3 % 
Note:  
A





For correct responses, results showed significantly more consistent (e.g. Positive to happy) 
attributions were made than inconsistent (e.g. Positive to sad) (Spontaneous stimuli: observed consistent 
= 140, expected consistent = 53.53, observed inconsistent = 96, expected inconsistent 182.48, Lχ
2 
(12) = 
262.5, p<0.001; Posed stimuli: observed consistent 149, expected consistent 58, observed inconsistent = 
82, expected inconsistent = 173, Lχ
2 
(12) = 243.2, p<0.001) 
The pattern of inferences made to incorrectly recognised expressions mirrored those to correctly 
recognised. There were more consistent emotion inferences observed than would be expected and less 
inconsistent inferences. Only in the case of monopoly money which has happiness attributed more than 
would be expected, this was again more pronounced in spontaneous expressions. There was also a minor 
decrease in the number of observed consistent monopoly money inferences (surprised) within incorrect 
expression recognition compared to correct. 
For incorrect responses results showed again significantly more consistent attributions were 
made than a model would expect and significantly less inconsistent attributions. (Spontaneous stimuli: 
observed consistent = 181, expected consistent = 78.41, observed inconsis tent = 134, expected 
inconsistent = 236.58, Lχ
2 
(12) = 257.6, p<0.001; Posed stimuli: observed consistent = 190, expected 
consistent = 79.94, observed inconsistent = 129, expected inconsistent = 239.06, Lχ
2 
(12) = 256.5, 
p<0.001) 
5.3.4.1 Summary of expression inferences 
Consistent emotion inferences were made significantly more frequently than chance would 
expect. This occurred whether the expression was correctly recognised or not. The Monopoly money 
expression had happiness attributed to it more frequently than would be expected and more frequently 
than the consistent emotion (surprised) for that reaction. This was more pronounced in spontaneous 
monopoly money suggesting it may be delivered with a blended expression. Overall the margin of 
difference in observed consistent to expected consistent was larger when expressions were correctly 
retrodicted; there was also less inconsistent emotion inferences relative to expected when the expression 









5.3.5 How were the expressions viewed? 
As participants viewed responses the number and duration of fixations made to regions of 
interest was monitored. Four regions of interest were tracked; the eyes, mouth, face and body. This 
allowed detailed analysis of where the participant was looking and for how long; enabling summaries of 
how long was spent looking at the face and then a breakdown of time within the face. The time spent 
viewing the eyes and mouth summed does not necessarily equate to the time spent viewing the face as the 
eye and mouth regions do not physically cover the entire face. Where the duration of time spent viewing 
does not amount to 100%, this is due to instances where the target would clap or make hand gestures 
these were identified as regions of interest but did not occur frequently enough to influence overall 
viewing pattern and so are not included in analyses. Similarly, in rare cases the sum of eyes and mouth 
can be greater than time spent viewing the face this may be in certain instances where the region of 
interest outlined as the eyes may fall outside the region outlined as the face.  In such instances, this is due 
to either rapid head movement from frame to frame where the movement of identified regions of interest 
can be slightly erratic and jarred, or an expanded eye region to accommodate glasses frames. An example 
















Figure 5.2: Example image of expressions viewed (with defined regions of interest 
displayed for clarity) 
Some materials have been removed due to 3rd party 
copyright. The unabridged version can be viewed in 





Figure 5.2 demonstrates the defined regions of interest; in this case the regions eyes and mouth 
include the nose and chin respectively. This is because scan path analysis for the eye region typically  
involves a back and forth between the eyes which encapsulates the nose (Rutherford & Towns 2008; Yi et 
al., 2013; Cassidy et al., 2014; 2015), the nose also holds valuable information in emotions highlighted by 
its presence in the FACS (AU 9 nose wrinkler) for indicating disgust. Similarly the chin is included in the 
‘mouth’ region because deviations from the mouth and lips at rest are the informative actions; again this 
is demonstrated in AU activity associated with this region (AU 17 chin raiser, AU 26 jaw drop) 
In viewing table 5.5 below it can be seen there were consistently more fixations to the mouth 
than the eyes, this translated to longer durations spent fixated on the mouth than the eyes; this difference 
was consistent between both posed and spontaneous expressions. As would be expected there was more 
time spent viewing the face than the body, again this was consistent between posed and spontaneous 
stimuli. A notable trend between the expressions was a much larger duration of time spent fixated on the 
body in negative expressions than the other three, this increase in viewing time to the body of negative 








Note: higher ratios represent more fixations or duration to eyes or face 
Table 5.5: Mean number of fixations and mean percentage of duration spent fixated per region of interest SD in brackets 
 Maths Monopoly Negative Positive 
Region Fixations % Duration Fixations % Duration Fixations % Duration Fixations % Duration 
A) Posed stimuli         
Eyes 8.31 (6.48) 26.88 (14.68) 5.22 (5.37) 15.16 (15.66) 7.94 (6.04) 21.60 (17.25) 5.75 (4.58) 21.59 (15.15) 
Mouth 12.69 (5.91) 48.88 (14.62) 11.66 (4.43) 53.78 (19.44) 12.97 (6.20) 54.33 (21.25) 10.00 (4.36) 54.64 (21.96) 
Eye to mouth ratio 0.35 (0.22) 0.35 (0.18) 0.27 (0.22) 0.22 (0.22) 0.37 (0.24) 0.29 (0.25) 0.34 (0.23) 0.30 (0.24) 
Face 25.31 (10.47) 88.28 (5.99) 21.28 (7.29) 82.13 (10.58) 25.91 (8.41) 76.85 (7.50) 18.75 (6.43) 87.14 (6.86) 
Body 1.91 (2.37) 3.66 (3.08) 4.47 (3.04) 7.99 (4.63) 1.84 (2.19) 15.42 (6.66) 2.88 (3.00) 5.66 (3.77) 
Face to body ratio 0.92 (0.10) 0.96 (0.03) 0.80 (0.13) 0.91 (0.06) 0.93 (0.08) 0.84 (0.07) 0.86 (0.12) 0.94 (0.04) 
B) Spontaneous stimuli         
Eyes 8.41 (5.03) 31.35 (13.55) 5.16 (6.14) 14.19 (15.81) 6.94 (11.15) 18.88 (18.15) 3.31 (3.03) 14.68 (15.14) 
Mouth 10.34 (4.37) 45.70 (14.98) 13.47 (5.11) 54.17 (19.88) 12.72 (7.21) 54.92 (21.08) 8.31 (2.93) 61.47 (20.97) 
Eye to mouth ratio 0.43 (0.14) 0.41 (0.17)  0.23 (0.22) 0.21 (0.22) 0.29 (0.27) 0.26 (0.10) 0.27 (0.22) 0.20 (0.22)  
Face 21.50 (7.31) 87.26 (7.42) 22.16 (9.10) 79.55 (15.04) 18.19 (15.07) 62.24 (11.87) 13.56 (3.57) 85.29 (9.00) 
Body 2.28 (1.95) 5.43 (4.36) 5.59 (3.35) 9.21 (6.63) 8.28 (7.24) 29.74 (11.33) 2.19 (1.94) 7.36 (6.68) 





5.3.5.1 Does the stimuli type affect the number and duration of fixations?  
To investigate if displaying expressions in a posed or spontaneous format affected the number 
and duration of fixations , 2x4 ANOVAS were conducted between the stimuli types (posed and 
spontaneous) and regions of interest (eyes, mouth, face and body). This analysis was conducted twice 
with total number of fixations and total duration of fixations as dependent variables. 
Does the number of fixations differ between stimuli types? 
Results showed significant main effects of stimuli (F (1, 31) = 5.88, p<0.05, ηp² .16), region (F 
(1.65, 51.22) = 151.27, p<0.001ηp² .83) and a significant stimuli x region interaction (F (1.57, 48.72) = 
17.58, p<0.001 ηp².36).  The assumption of sphericity was violated for the region and interaction main 
effects, as such Greenhouse-Geisser (.55, .52 respectively) adjusted values are reported. 
The main effect of stimuli type was in the direction of more fixations to posed (44, 95% CI 
[39.65, 48.79]) expressions than spontaneous (40.60, 95% CI [36.37, 44.83]). In regards to region the 
main effect identified the differences in fixations to the face (83.33, 95% CI [75.28, 91.38], from the 
mouth (46.08, 95% CI [41, 51.12], eyes (25.52, 95% CI [18.76, 32.27]) and body (14.72, 95% CI [12, 
17.44]). The significant stimuli by region interaction showed changes in opposite directions for two 
regions according to the stimuli type shown. There were significantly more fixations to the faces of posed 
expressions (91.25, 95% CI [81.72, 100.97]) than spontaneous (75.41, 95% CI [67.10, 83.71], p<0.001), 
however there were significantly less fixations to the bodies of posed expressions (11.09, 95% CI [8.68, 
13.51]) than spontaneous (18.34, 95% C [14.70, 21.99], p<0.001). 
Does the duration of fixations differ between stimuli types? 
As was the case with fixations there were significant main effects of stimuli (F (1, 31) = 33.37, 
p<0.001, ηp² .52), region (F (1.65, 51.20) = 141.36, p<0.001 ηp² .82) and a significant stimuli x region 
interaction (F (1.87, 57.87) = 46.75, p<0.001 ηp² .60) albeit with larger effect sizes.  The assumption of 
sphericity was violated for the region and interaction main effects, as such Greenhouse -Geisser (.55, .62 
respectively) adjusted values are reported. 
As with fixations the durations followed a similar pattern with more time (in seconds) fixated to 
posed expressions (24.62, 95% CI [21.93, 27.31]) than spontaneous (20.68, 95% CI [18.65, 22.71]). The 
amount of time fixated to specific regions also mirrored the frequency of fixations (face=45.69, 95% CI 





95% CI [3.68, 5.19]). The interaction again followed the same direction as number of fixations but was 
more pronounced in durations with significant differences for all regions between stimuli types. The eyes 
(12.74, 95% CI [9.08, 16.42]), mouth (31.32, 95% CI [26.07, 36.56]) and face (51.98, 95% CI [46.36, 
57.60]) attracted significantly longer fixations in posed expressions than spontaneous (eyes=9.90, 95% CI 
[7.28, 12.52], mouth=27.01, 95% CI [22.84, 31.17], face=39.39, 95% CI [35.65, 43.14], p≤ 0.001). There 
were significantly longer fixations to the body in spontaneous (6.43, 95% CI [5.32, 7.55]) expressions 
than posed (2.43, 95% CI [1.85, 3.01], p<0.001). 
5.3.5.2 Do the patterns of fixations differ between stimuli and expression types?  
In order to simplify the interactions the regions of the face were collapsed into ratio of time spent 
viewing the eyes relative to the mouth (eye-to-mouth ratio = eyes/ (eyes + mouth)) and face relative to the 
body (face-to-body ratio = face/ (face + body)), the same calculations were carried out on the number of 
fixations that occurred to regions. This resulted in measures per participant of how often they viewed the 
eyes relative to the mouth and face relative to the body with higher values denoting more time spent 
viewing the eyes or face respectively. To investigate if there are any effects of the stimuli type on viewing 
patterns and if viewing patterns differed across reactions a 3-way ANOVA was conducted comparing 
stimuli with two levels (posed/spontaneous), expression with four levels (maths/ monopoly/ negative/ 
positive) and region of interest (eye-to-mouth ratio/ face-to-body ratio) for the number of fixations and 
percentage duration. 
Mauchly’s test of sphericity was met for all eligible variables and interactions. For number of 
fixations there was a significant main effect of stimuli with more fixations to the combined ey es and face 
of posed (60.3%) stimuli than spontaneous (55.5%) stimuli (F (1, 31) = 36.63, p<0.001, ηp² 0.54) 
However this was largely driven by the tendency for children to spend the majority of time viewing the 
face. There was a significant main effect of expression (F (3, 93) = 20.53, p<0.001, ηp² 0.40) with 
significantly more fixations to the maths (64.9%) expression than monopoly (51.7%), negative (57.4%) 
and positive (57.8%) (all p<0.001), the positive feedback expression also attracted significantly more 
fixations than monopoly (p<0.05). There was a significant main effect of region of interest (F (1, 31) = 
278.35, p<0.001  ηp² 0.90) with more fixations made to the face relative to the body (84%) than there 
were to the eyes relative to the mouth (31.8%). There was also a significant three way interaction between 





What is the effect of stimuli type on fixations patterns? 
Analysis of simple main effects with Bonferroni adjusted t-tests showed that stimuli type 
influenced the number of fixations to the eyes in the maths question, negative feedback and positive 
feedback expressions. More specifically, the increased number of fixations to the eyes was more 
pronounced in the spontaneous condition (43.4%, 95% CI [38.2, 48.5]) of maths question than the posed 
condition (35.3%, 95% CI [27.4, 43.2], p<0.05). While in the posed condition increased numbers of 
fixations to the eyes were evident in positive (33.7%, 95% CI [25.4, 42.0], p<0.01) and negative (36.7%, 
95% CI [28.2, 45.2], p<0.05) feedback expressions compared to spontaneous (26.7%, 95% CI [18.7, 
34.6], 28.8%, 95% CI [19.2, 38.5] respectively). The only expression that presented differences in face to 
body fixations between stimuli conditions was negative feedback where there were significantly more 
fixations to the face when the stimuli was presented in a posed format (92.6%, 95% CI [89.7, 95.6]) than 
a spontaneous format (71.3%, 95% CI [67.8, 74.8], p<0.001).  
What is the effect of expression type on the number of fixations? 
Simple main effects of expression type with Bonferroni adjusted t -tests showed the only 
significant difference in number of fixations to the eyes within posed stimuli, was between monopoly 
money (27%, 95% CI [19,35]) and negative feedback (36.7%, 95% CI [28.2, 45.2]), consisting of more 
fixations made to the eyes when viewing negative feedback (p<0.05).  The number of fixations to the face 
region within posed stimuli showed significantly more fixations to maths expressions (91.5%, 95% CI 
[87.9, 95.1]) than monopoly (79.9%, 95% CI [75.1, 84.7], p<0.001) and significantly more in negative 
feedback (92.6%, 95% CI [89.7, 95.6], compared to monopoly money (79.9%, 95% CI [75.1, 84.7], 
p<0.001), and positive feedback (86%, 95% CI [81.8, 90.1], p<0.05).   
Differences in fixations between the expressions were more pronounced when delivered in a 
spontaneous format. The maths expression (43.3%, 95% CI [38.2, 48.5] attracted significantly more 
fixations to the eyes than all other expressions (monopoly=22.9%, 95% CI [14.9, 30.9], negative=28.8%, 
95% CI [19.2, 38.5], positive=26.7%, 95% CI [18.7, 34.6], p<0.01) whilst the previous difference 
between monopoly and negative feedback reduced to non-significance (p=.549). Concerning fixations to 
the face, there were significantly more fixations to the maths expressions  (89.3%, 95% CI [86.2, 92.5]) 
than monopoly (76.8%, 95% CI [71.8, 81.7]) and negative feedback (71.3%, 95% CI [67.8, 74.8], both 
p<0.001). The monopoly expression attracted significantly fewer fixations to the face than negative 





What effect does region of interest have on the number of fixations?  
Simple main effects analyses with Bonferroni corrected t-tests of differences in region of interest 
show a unanimous significant difference in the number of fixations to the face relative to the body, 
compared to the eyes relative to the mouth; with consis tently more fixations to the face. This difference 
was found at every level of stimuli and expression type (p<0.001). Plots of the ratio of fixations to the 
eyes relative to the mouth (figure 5.3) and face relative to the body (figure 5.4) can be seen belo w when 





































































Figure 5.3: Ratio of fixations made to the eyes relative to the mouth, higher count 














































Figure 5.4: Ratio of fixations made to the face relative to the body, higher count represents more 






The type of stimuli the expressions are delivered in did not appear to present a clear pattern. 
Number of fixations to the eyes was significantly increased for different expressions in both the posed 
(maths) and spontaneous (positive and negative) conditions, whilst number of fixations to the face was 
only significantly affected in the negative expression when posed. Overall between the expressions the 
most prevalent effect was an increase in the number of fixations to the eyes when the maths expression 
was posed, there was also a reversal in the significance of fixations to the face between monopoly and 
negative feedback when spontaneous. 
5.3.5.3 Does the duration of fixations differ between stimuli and expression types?  
A second ANOVA was conducted on duration of fixations, with the same IV’s and levels as 
outlined above. Mauchly’s test of sphericity was violated  (stimuli x expression x region = .59) so 
greenhouse-geisser adjusted epsilon β values are reported. There was a significant main effect of stimuli 
type on the duration of fixations with significantly longer fixation durations to the eyes and face of posed 
stimuli (60.1%, 95% CI [56.6, 63.5]) than spontaneous stimuli (56.3%, 95% CI [52.6, 59.9]) (F (1, 31) = 
14.95, p=0.001, ηp² .33). There was a significant main effect of the expression shown on the duration of 
fixations made (F (3, 93) = 33.33, p<0.001, ηp² .52). The negative feedback reaction (51.6% 95% CI 
[48.1, 55.1]) attracted significantly shorter fixations to the eyes and face than maths question and positive 
feedback (p<0.001), whilst the maths question expression (66.4%, 95% CI [63.2, 69.7]) attracted 
significantly longer fixations than all other expressions (p<0.001). There was a significant main effect of 
the duration of fixations made to the regions of interest with significantly more time spent looking at the 
face relative to the body (88.4%, 95% CI [86.8, 90.0]) than the eyes relative to the mouth (28%, 95% CI 
[21.6, 34.3]) (F (1, 31) = 379.20, p<0.001, ηp² .92). There was also a significant three way interaction 
between the stimuli type, expression type and region of interest (F (1.76, 54.71) = 35.53, p<0.001, ηp² 
.24). 
What is the effect of stimuli type on fixation durations? 
Analysis of simple main effects with post-hoc Bonferroni corrected t-tests showed posed stimuli 
was characterised by greater viewing time of the face but spontaneous stimuli with greater viewing time 
of the eyes. Posed expressions attracted significantly longer viewing times to the face for negative 





p<0.05) compared to spontaneous  (negative=67.8%, 95% CI [63.4, 72.1], positive=92%, 95% CI [89.5, 
94.6]). When the stimuli presented was spontaneous this increased the duration of fixations to the eyes, 
there were significantly longer fixations in the maths (42.5%, 95% CI [35.4, 49.6]) compared to posed 
(maths=35%, 95% CI [28.6, 41.4]. (p<0.001) 
What are the effects of different expression types on fixation durations?  
Simple main effects with post-hoc Bonferroni corrected t-tests showed that when presented in a 
posed format, the only expression to influence duration of fixations to the eyes was maths question (35%, 
95% CI [28.6, 41.4]), which attracted significantly longer fixations than monopoly (22%, 95% CI [14.1, 
29.9], p<0.001). In regards to viewing time of the face there were significantly longer fixations to the 
maths expressions (96%, 95% CI [94.7, 97.2] than all other expressions (monopoly = 90.9%, 95% CI 
[88.8, 92.9] p<0.001, negative feedback = 83.5%, 95% CI [81, 86.1] p<0.001, positive feedback = 93.8% 
95% CI [92.4, 95.3] p=.032. There was significantly less time spent fixated on the negative feedback 
expression (56.5%, 95% CI [51.5, 61.4]) than all other expressions (Maths= 96%, 95% CI [94.7, 97.2] 
p=0.002, monopoly money= 90.9%, 95% CI [88.8, 92.9], positive=93.8% 95% CI [92.4, 95.3], all 
p<0.001) 
When viewing spontaneous expressions there was much more variation between the expressions 
in the amount of time fixating the eyes, most notably characterised by an increase in the maths expression 
(40.7%, 95% CI [34.7, 46.7]) which had significantly longer fixations than all other expressions 
(monopoly money= 20.5% 95% CI [12.6, 28.4], negative feedback = 25.8% 95% CI [16.7, 34.8], positive 
feedback= 20.3%, 95% CI [12.4, 28.1], p<0.001).  
What effect does region of interest have on fixation durations? 
As with the effects outlined in number of fixations, there was a unanimous significant increase in 
the duration of fixations to the face compared to the eyes, this effect was significant at all levels of stimuli 
and expression type (p<0.001). Plots of the ratio of time spent viewing the eyes relative to the mouth 


































Each IV affects the duration of fixations differently, presenting expressions in a posed format 
increased viewing time to the face (relative to the body) for the negative feedback expression. Presenting 
expressions in a spontaneous format increased viewing time to the eyes (relative to the mouth) in the 
maths question expressions, but showed increased viewing time to the eyes for the other three expressions 
when presented in a posed format. Variation between the expressions in viewing time to the eyes was 
Figure 5.5: Ratio of duration spent viewing the eyes relative to the mouth, higher count 



















































Figure 5.6: Ratio of duration spent viewing the face relative to the body, higher count 























































more pronounced when the expressions were spontaneous; specifically the maths expression presented 
significantly longer durations to the eyes than other expressions . Differences in viewing times to the 
region of interest did not differ according to expression or stimuli type, presenting only a unanimous 
significant increase in percentage of time viewing the face relative to the body compared to the  eyes 
relative to the mouth. 
5.3.6 Do retrodictive mindreading ability and viewing patterns predict autism traits?  
Where previously the focus was on the relationship between ASC traits and the ability to 
recognise expressions or have those expressions recognised (section 4.3.6), this analysis will investigate 
the capabilities of the RM paradigm and newly developed stimuli as a measure that might identify ASC 
traits. This is particularly important given previous work has shown specific viewing styles in autism 
when viewing complex social scenes (Klin et al., 2002; Klin & Jones 2006; Sasson, Turner-Brown, 
Holtzclaw, Lam & Bodfish 2008).  
A multiple regression was carried out to predict autism quotient scores from RM ability and the 
proportion of time spent viewing the eyes relative to the mouth and face relative to the body whilst 
controlling for age, sex and IQ. Correlations showed a significant relationship between AQ scores and 
RM score, there were no significant relationships between AQ and other individual predictors, Individual 
r shown below in table 5.6. The frequency of AQ scores within the sample population  can be seen below 
in figure 5.7 which shows a similar distribution as would be expected in a typically developing sample 
(Auyeung et al., 2008) 
Table 5.6 Correlations between output AQ score and predictors significance in brackets  
 RM score IQ Score Eye to mouth ratio Face to body ratio Age 

















Linearity was established via inspection of partial regression plots and studentized residuals 
against predicted values. Slight negative autocorrelation was present as assessed by Durbin -Watson 
statistic of 2.69 suggesting there may be an underestimate of statistical significance. Homoscedasticity 
was satisfied via visual inspection of studentized residuals plotted against unstandardized predicted 
values, and tolerance values >0.8 suggested no evidence of multicollinearity. Studentized deleted 
residuals showed one value as an outlier (4.17) driven by a high score on the AQ (120) however leverage 
(0.15) and Cook’s distance (0.63) values were satisfactory and the participant retained given that variation 
in AQ scores was an outcome variable. One participant presented a leverage value approaching risk (.29), 
however this participant did not present as an outlier or show high Cook’s d (0.27) and so was retained. 
Assumptions of normality were satisfied via inspection of P-P plot and histogram.  
The model was a significant predictor of AQ scores (F (6, 25) = 2.62, p=0.041, adj. R
2
 = .24), 
with face to body ratio and RM scores predicting autism traits. Correct RM score (p=0.006, R
2
 = .088) 
was a significant predictor, with a standard deviation increase in RM ability there was a predicted 9.22  
decrease in AQ scores, Similarly the face-body ratio  predicted decrease in autism scores (p=0.034, R
2 
=.063). Every one standard deviation increase of time spent looking at the face relative to the body 
predicts a 6.38 decrease in AQ scores. A one standard deviation increase of ratio looking to the eyes of 
the face relative to the mouth was associated with an increase of 4.96 in AQ scores but this relationship 
did not reach significance (p= 0.109), a full regression table can be seen below (table 5.7) 
 





Table 5.7 Regression table for coefficients predicting AQ scores  
Model Predictor B SE B β P 
1 Constant 68.10 28.95  p=.632 
 Sex 1.65 6.54 .05  
 Age 1.17 2.09 .10  
 IQ -.26 .21 -.23  
2  (ΔR
2
=.33, p<0.05) Constant 267.97 83.38  p=.041 
 Sex 2.18 5.63 .06  
 Age 2.89 1.95 .26  
 IQ -.29 .18 -.26  
 Eye to mouth ratio 24.69 14.85 .28  
 Face to body ratio -190.55 85.11 -.36*  
 RM score -3.44 1.15 -.52*  
Note: *= p<0.05  
 
5.4 Discussion 
Through the use of eye tracking software this research aimed to investigate the viewing patterns 
children exhibit, if these are governed by the stimuli type, and crucially if viewing style and the ability to 
retrodict events can predict autistic traits. It was predicted that recognition of spontaneous expressions 
would be significantly better than posed. It was also predicted there would be significantly more fixations 
to posed expressions where participants would be less likely to have their attention drawn to specific 
regions due to less coherent display patterns in posed expressions. On the contrary to the directions 
predicted for fixations, it was predicted significantly longer would be spent viewing the highlighted 
regions of interest (the eyes, mouth, face and body) in spontaneous expressions; This was due to 
consistent display patterns in spontaneous expressions which should attract attention for longer periods of 
time.  
Results did not support the hypothesis that spontaneous expressions would be recog nised 
significantly more than posed. This was a prediction based upon the result in chapter 4, however the lack 
of differences in this research may be due to two reasons; first the expressions chosen represent the two 
best recognised expressions when posed and when spontaneous. By default the prior result would cancel 
itself out in this instance where two expressions were expected to be better recognised when posed and 
two expected to be better recognised when spontaneous. Second, the process of stimuli selection which 





select a stimuli shortlist that reflected the overall expression averages was compromised and resulted in a 
stimuli shortlist which had previously demonstrated better overall recognition in posed display than 
spontaneous. It is possible that given a larger stimuli set that better reflects the previous task presented to 
typically developing adults, significant differences in recognition would emerge in the directions as seen 
in chapter 4. Of note in this research was the particularly poor recognition rates overall which converged 
around chance recognition rates. It is possible the RM task proved too difficult for the young sample who 
were unable to perform at the rates previously shown in adults despite being shown a shortlist of 
expressions which typically developing adults recognised on average four times better than chance would 
expect.  
Results supported the hypothesis regarding number of fixations to posed and spontaneous 
stimuli, where there were significantly more fixations to posed expressions; however there was also 
significantly longer duration of fixations to spontaneous expressions. This is in line with previous 
research using the stimuli set where posed expressions did not form in statistically distinct patterns across 
individuals to the same degree spontaneous expressions did. That participants looked to posed 
expressions more frequently supports the prediction, however looking for lo nger durations to posed 
expressions suggests the amount of time viewing the expressions does not necessarily translate to better 
recognition and may actually be an indicator of higher cognitive load in deciphering ambiguous 
expressions. The nature of analysing the ratio of eye-to-mouth viewing and face-to-body viewing did not 
allow direct comparison of eyes to mouth for example, but this was investigated in outright fixations and 
durations and could be seen in the means and percentage duration reported. These showed consistently 
more fixations, and duration, was spent viewing the mouth region than the eyes. The preferential viewing 
to the mouth was consistent in both posed and spontaneous expressions of every type. Such a pattern is 
not consistent with previous research which has shown consistently more time spent viewing the eyes in 
typically developing populations (Haith et al., 1997; Speer et al., 2007; Wagner et al., 2013), but is 
consistent with previous research using the RM paradigm (Pillai et al., 2012; 2014; Cassidy et al., 2014) 
which suggests looking to the eyes is not related to task performance. 
It was predicted that RM ability and viewing patterns would significantly predict autistic traits, it 
was expected worse performance on the RM task and more time viewing the mouth and body would 





model was a significant predictor of AQ scores, but more time viewing the eyes did not significantly  
predict a decrease in AQ scores. Regarding viewing the eyes, the direction observed was opposite to the 
predicted direction with more time viewing the eyes associated with more severe autistic traits but this 
was non-significant. Given that viewing patterns showed more fixations and duration to the mouth region 
which has been associated with ASC in previous research (Klin et al., 2002; Pelphrey 2002; Baron-Cohen 
et al., 1997; 2001), it again suggests the viewing styles used appear to be reliant upon the st imuli shown. 
For spontaneous dynamic stimuli, a more flexible approach to attention allocation may be required, which 
includes more fixations to the mouth which is possibly more informative than the eyes. The current 
typical viewing patterns that are reported have been based on observation of atypical stimuli that 
potentially do not apply to more valid tasks and so provide inaccurate assessments of  abilities and 
subsequently draw inaccurate conclusions. 
Worth note in regards to the increased viewing time to the eyes and the direction of association 
to autism scores may be attributable to the defined regions or interest. The regions of interest in this 
research termed eyes and mouth, also included the nose and chin respectively , previous research has 
demonstrated that viewing time to the eyes in ASC samples is more accurately located below the eyes 
(potentially due to avoiding the eyes directly) (Yi et al., 2013). The broader defined regions of eyes in this 
research may capture looking to the eye region, but not the pupils. However, it is important to make clear 
the present results are taken from a typically developing sample and have limited inferential validity to 
ASC samples.  
One potential explanation for the results could be that the combination of dynamic stimuli with 
improved ecological validity, being used in a sample with a mean age of 9.12, is that although holistic 
processing should be complete by this age (Tanaka et al., 1998) the configural processing is still 
immature (Bruce et al., 2000). Previous research is unlikely to have presented expressions of such validity 
and complexity, for such short of periods of time to children at this developmental stage. The resulting 
findings, instead of being contradictory to previous work, may be distinct in the task presented and results 
obtained. This then might suggest that viewing patterns thought to be implicative of ASC traits are in fact 
only valid in unnatural conditions. When those viewing patterns manifest under more realistic conditions 





The patterns of emotion inference to situation retrodicted showed significantly more consistent 
emotion inferences than inconsistent, when the event was both correctly and incorrectly retrodicted. One 
would expect a decrease in consistent inferences when the event was incorrectly retrodicted, this would 
aid in explaining the incorrect retrodiction if an inconsistent emotion was attributed to the individual. In 
reality it may be that this does play a small role, as the overall margin of observed consistent to expected 
emotion inferences was larger after correct retrodictions than incorrect. However the processing and 
decision making appears to be mostly based on other factors around the retrodiction which then governs 
the decision making process for emotion to be inferred. For example if an individual decides that the 
person in the video was given some good news regardless of if they have got that retrodiction correct, the 
cognitive bias they have just made towards that decision will influence their following emotion inference. 
An individual is far more likely to say a person will feel happy after they have already outwardly stated 
the person looks as though they received some good news. In this way the design employed primed 
participants to select consistent emotion inferences based on their prior retrodictions, it is almost 
impossible to ask those two questions in direct succession and not have one influence the other. This is 
easily overcome in future research design, the entire videos to be used should be shown once asking for a 
retrodiction, then repeated asking for an emotional inference; Whilst this is a valid design solution it 
doubles the experiment length introducing new issues around participant fatigue, particularly with 
children. The order the inferences and retrodictions are asked should be counterbalanced to further control 
for any order effects. 
A further issue that arose during data collection was a self-selecting sample of children who 
were willing to sit still and face the eye-tracker. The children who were unable to sit still, disabling 
calibration of the eye tracker means any children that showed more active personas or shorter attention 
spans were unable to complete the research and likely removed a much broader set of visual search 
strategies. Overcoming this issue is not realistically possible, the nature of the equipment requires the user 
to be seated in front of the apparatus with minimal movement, it is instead important that any 
interpretations made from the research are done with this self-selected sample in mind. There is the 
opportunity to use alternative eye tracking equipment, such as head mounted glasses which do not rely on 






The results of the present study question previous research which appears to show a specific 
visual search strategy that would be considered consistent with ASC or control populations. Instead the 
stimuli used draws into question the results obtained under previous conditions with various samples, 
suggesting those viewing patterns may be specific to less natural stimuli which are invalid when 
extrapolated to the real world. The methods used combined with the novel results, have shown the RM 
paradigm can produce naturalistic expressions with recognition rates above ch ance for many of the 
expression types. The patterns of recognition suggest that any previously reported differe nces in 
recognition rates between posed and spontaneous expressions have been overstated and may have the 
direction wrong entirely. Such a finding combined with the viewing patterns in this research, and those in 
previous chapters, make a strong case for future research to consider the inclusion of high quality 
naturalistic expressions. The results also have implications for future research, particularly in replication 
with a developing sample and in atypically developing samples such as those with ASC where the claims 





Chapter 6 The Effects of ASC and Alexithymia on Retrodictive 
Mindreading Ability 
 
The literature discussed and experiments conducted thus far in this thesis  have been done in an 
attempt to highlight the methodological and theoretical flaws in presenting non -natural, contextually 
neutral and emotionally rigid expressions to individuals with ASC. Subsequently, considering a finding of 
any direction to be implicative of a difficulty associated with ASC should not be considered valid. Thus 
far, the evidence has shown that spontaneous expressions form more readily identifiable patterns, are 
more easily recognised by typically developing adults, and are viewed differently, characterised by less  
fixations and durations to the face but more to the body, however the viewing styles did not appear to be 
linked to recognition.  This chapter will investigate group differences between those with an ASC 
diagnosis and typically developing controls; attempting to produce accurate findings of any differences 





The literature covered in section 2.8 demonstrated that emotion recognition abilities in ASC 
have shown inconsistent results. For example a sample of participants with AS or HFA showed 
significantly reduced abilities  to correctly recognise facial expressions  as well as attribute emotion to 
body movement and vocal affect (Philip et al., 2010). As Harms and colleagues (2010) note in their 
review of autism research, HFA samples comprise the majority of ASC individuals in adult studies. 
Among HFA samples where difficulties are present in FER they are more regularly confined to negative 
emotions (Ashwin et al., 2006; Bal et al., 2010; Corden et al., 2008; Wallace et al., 2008; Boraston, 
Blakemoor, Chilvers & Skuse, 2007; Howard et al., 2000) and possibly less pronounced than previously 
thought.  There is also a body of research showing no such difference between ASC individuals and 
control (Loveland et al., 2008; Neumann et al., 2006; Rutherford & Towns 2008; Ogai et al., 2003; 
Teunisse & de Gelder 2001).  
In some cases where research has shown intact FER, experiments that have investigated the 
subsequent understanding of that information through judgements of trustworthiness have shown 
difficulties in linking the visual information to subsequent behaviour (Adolphs  et al., 2001). In another 





reaction, the ASC sample struggled only with reactions to being given chocolate or a home -made gift; 
This suggests the complex nature of genuine and feigned gratitude is misunderstood in ASC samples 
(Cassidy et al., 2014). In the cases where no difference is present between ASC and control groups the 
suggestion would be that any observable traits in social communication or interaction are not due to 
emotion recognition difficulties. 
One such cause of an apparently intact FER system but continued social interaction and 
communication difficulties could be alexithymic traits (see section 1.3.5). Emerging research suggests the 
difficulties in emotion processing in ASC are actually due to Alexithymia, Bird and Cook (2013) present 
a compelling case for Alexithymia as a major contributor to FER difficulties, and possibly responsible for 
the inconsistent findings of FER in ASC with some research showing difficulties (Ashwin  et al., 2006; 
Humphreys et al., 2007; Wallace et al.; 2008), whilst others found no differences between ASC and 
controls (Ozonoff et al., 1991; Castelli 2005; Adolphs et al., 2001). The proposition is that differential 
performance on FER tasks between ASC and control groups could actually be due to differential degrees 
of Alexithymia between the groups. This is in part supported by the evidence reporting reduced empathic 
responses in Alexithymia (Johnson et al., 2009; Moriguchi et al., 2007). 
With empathic difficulties linked to Alexithymia which has high co-morbidity with ASC and is 
thought to contribute to FER difficulties (section 1.3.4.4), this can have a knock on effect on social 
communication skills. On one front individuals with ASC and alexithymic traits can struggle to recognise, 
mimic and subsequently understand expressions displayed to them. On another front these individuals 
may also struggle to fashion recognisable expressions of their own. This can lead to unclear signals being 
sent and a misunderstanding in social interactions, which in turn can lead back to contextually odd 
expressions being returned and misinterpreted as in the first point raised above.  This could have 
implications for the types of tasks used and methods of assessment which can tend to focus on emotion 
labelling rather than affective content or root causes. 
The inconsistent literature surrounding FER in ASC requires more robust methods that better 
reflect the demands of everyday social interaction. The emerging literature linking Alexithymia with ASC 
and Alexithymia’s known influence on empathy and FER performance requires a re-think of how ASC 
and its symptoms are approached. The current research will address the inconsistent results of FER 





typical social interaction, combined with more robust and valid tests of emo tion recognition and 
understanding, it is hoped there will be a better understanding of FER abilities in ASC. By employing a 
measure of Alexithymia, the research will investigate the reported co-morbidity of ASC and Alexithymia 
and any relationships between Alexithymia itself and FER performance. The research has three 
hypotheses: based on the nature of the task with its more complex design it is predicted the control group 
will correctly retrodict significantly more events than the ASC group. In line with previous research it is 
predicted the ASC group will present significantly higher Alexithymia scores than the typically 
developing group. Having predicted higher Alexithymia scores in the ASC groups it is also predicted the 
ASC group will make significantly less correct emotional inferences than the typically developing group 
due to Alexithymia’s influence on empathic abilities. 
6.2 Method 
6.2.1 Design 
A mixed factorial design was employed investigating the differences between an ASC sample 
and control sample on a RM task, with RM performance as the dependent variable. There were two 
within groups factors; stimuli type with two levels (posed, spontaneous) and expression type with four 
levels (maths, monopoly, negative, positive). Ethical clearance was granted by Coventry University ethics 
board (see Appendix J) 
6.2.2 Participants 
This research recruited an adult sample, it was expected the ability to retrodict social events 
would be fully developed in adulthood. This was partially governed by the results in p revious chapters 
which demonstrated good recognition with adults in chapter 4 and poor recognition with children in 
chapter 5. It was therefore decided the intact recognition in chapter 4 utilizing the subset emotions from 
chapter 5 that demonstrated good recognition previously with adults would be used in this experiment 
with an adult sample. One hundred and thirty-seven participants were recruited via opportunistic 
sampling from various sources. This consisted of 53 ASC individuals (Mean age=43.34, SD =16.01, 25 
males 28 females), falling into the subtypes Autism = 3, HFA = 1, other = 2 and AS = 46.  84 control 
(Mean age=35.29, SD = 17.28, 23 males 61 females). Participants were recruited through SONA the 
research participation scheme at Coventry University. The research was advertised on social media as 





participants in exchange for participating in others’ research. Autistic participants were recruited through  
multiple means; the research was advertised and distributed through the Cambridge Autism Research 
Database of volunteers and the autism west midlands charity.  The disability service at Coventry 
University also advertised the research to its service users . 
6.2.3 Materials 
6.2.3.1 Scales/questionnaires 
The Autism Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) is a 50 item likert questionnaire designed 
to assess autistic traits. It was included to measure traits in the autistic sample and screen the typically 
developing sample. It shows high specificity and reliability as evidenced previously in chapter 3. The 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale (TAS-20) is a 20 item likert questionnaire that measures emotional openness 
and understanding as a self-report measure of Alexithymia. The TAS-20 is considered the gold standard 
measure of Alexithymia presenting good internal reliability as evidenced previously in chapter 3. The 
reading the mind in eyes task refined version (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001) was used as a comparative 
measure against the RM task. This task was included as a measure of concurrent validity to check the 
performance on the RM task against the eyes task which has a similar component in requiring participants 
to infer emotional states to faces with complexity beyond that in typical emot ion processing tasks. 
Because the RM task not only assesses recognition of responses in a socially appropriate manner but also 
asks individuals how they think people feel the eyes task is a good comparison measure.  The eyes task 
consists of 36 images of eyes conveying emotional states and four choice forced response options. 
6.2.3.2 Stimuli 
The same 32 video expressions (ranging in duration from 2 to 8.3 seconds) were taken from the 
stimuli set as were used in chapter 5; these expressions covered four reactions captured in response to a 
specific cue/prompt (Maths, Monopoly, Negative, Positive). These expressions were uploaded to an 
online experiment on qualtrics and administered in randomised order. 
6.2.4 Procedure 
The research was completed online on Qualtrics, a survey data collection provider. Upon 
accessing the research participants were informed of the aims and purpose of the research, after providing 





autism diagnosis and subtype, employment status, IQ and general index of ability if known. For the 
purposes of better understanding of the groups participants were also asked their highest qualification 
achieved and any mental health diagnoses they were comfortable disclosing.  Following the demographic 
questions participants completed the RM task; this consisted of viewing 32 video reactions randomised in 
order which spanned four categories (maths, monopoly, negative and positive). Four different examples 
of each expression type were shown two posed and two spontaneous. Following each video participants 
were asked which event they believe caused the reaction in the video (four choice forced response 
categories as above) and how did they think the person in the video felt, with a four choice forced 
response (thinking, surprised, sad, happy).  Upon completing the RM task participants completed the AQ 
followed by the TAS-20 and finally the eyes task at which point participants were debriefed and thanked 
for their participation. 
6.3 Results 
6.3.1 Group characteristics 
The self-report demographic information provided by participants in regards to employment 
status, level of education completed and any medical diagnoses was quantified. To ensure fair 
comparisons between the uneven sample sizes in each group the frequency of reported characteristics 
were converted to percentages of the sample. 
 Results of employment status showed the ASC sample were more likely to be unemployed 
(28.3%) compared to the control sample (5.95%), there was also a larger student population in the control 
sample (44%) compared to the ASC sample (15%). When considering educational attainment for the 
control sample the most frequent level of qualification attained was A -levels (32%), whilst the most 
frequent qualification of the ASC sample was an undergraduate degree (36%). Notable group differences 
in self-report mental health issues were a notable increase in anxiety and depression, in the ASC sample 
anxiety was reported as three times more prevalent (58%) than the control sample (19%). Similarly, 
depression was reported twice as frequently in the ASC sample (43%) than the control sample (21%). 
Further information on group demographics for employment, education level and health can be found 















































































































































Upon screening of the data 5 participants were removed from the ASC group and 9 from the 
control group for abnormally low scores, these were found to be caused by participants not progressing 
with the task through to completion. 
Analysis of the group characteristics according to demographics and the various measures 
administered showed there were significantly more females in the control sample (56) than the ASC 
sample (25) (t (89.901) = -2.546, p=0.013). To ensure any differences between the ASC sample and 
control sample were not confounded by sex differences independent samples t-tests were conducted on 
scores on the eyes task, RM task, AQ scores and Alexithymia scores. Results showed t significant 
differences in AQ scores in the expected direction with higher AQ scores in males 30.21 than females 
24.43 (t (121) = 2.45, p=.016. However this result is to be expected as ASC traits are more readily 
identified in males than females. There were no significant differences between the sexes in any of the 
other measures (all p>0.05 two tailed). Further information on group characteristics and differences are 
displayed in Table 6.1 below. 
 
Table 6.1: Descriptive statistics of sample groups 
 Control  ASC   
 N Mean SD  N Mean SD Significance result  
Age 75 34.85 17.37  48 44.67 15.84 U(121)=2463.50, p< 0.001 
Full scale IQ 9 141.78 12.17  16 136.94 15.05 t(23)=-0.82, p= 0.42 
eyes task‡ 74 25.78 4.82  48 24.52 5.80 U(120)= 1577, p= 0.148 
RM score‡ 75 18.59 3.99  48 18.46 3.04 U(121)=1723, p= 0.345 
AQ scores† 75 18.05 7.32  48 39.46 6.85 U(121)=3498.5, p<0.001 
TAS-20 score† 75 48.77 11.43  48 65.42 11.74 U(121)=3101, p<0.001 
Note: RM= Retrodictive Mindreading AQ= Autism Quotient, TAS= Toronto Alexithymia Scale 
‡= directional analysis control> ASC 
†= directional analysis ASC>control  
 
As the ASC sample was significantly older than the control sample Pearson’s correlations were 
used to investigate any potential relationships between age and other variables.  Correlations between age, 
eyes task, RM, AQ and TAS-20 scores showed age only correlated significantly with AQ scores 
(r(123)=.281,p=0.002). This was to be expected given the significant group differences in AQ scores, but 
also suggests the differences in age between the groups did not present any meaningful relationship  with 






6.3.2 Did participants with ASC recognise expressions differently? 
To investigate recognition a 2 (group) x 2 (stimuli type) x4 (expression) mixed factorial 
ANOVA was carried out with presence of autism diagnosis as  the between groups variable and stimuli 
type and expression type as the within groups variables. Mauchly’s test was violated and sphericity could 
not be assumed between levels of expression types (Greenhouse-Geisser =.92), as such Greenhouse-
Geisser adjustments are reported.  Levene’s test showed equality of error variances between the groups 
(p>.05) 
There was no main effect of group (ASC, Control) on recognition rates (F (1, 121) = 0.03, 
p=0.849). There was a significant main effect of stimuli type with spontaneous expressions (Mean = 
60.57%, 95% CI [58.12, 63.03]) recognised more than posed expressions (Mean=55.19%, 95% CI [52.77, 
57.61]) (F (1, 121) = 17.88, p<0.001, η² = .129). There was also a significant main effect of expression 
type (F (2.66, 322.32) = 82.09, p<0.001, η² = .404). There were significant interactions between 
expression type and group (F (2.66, 322.32) = 3.87, p=0.013, η² = .031) and a significant interaction 
between the type of stimuli shown and the expression type on recognition (F (2.86, 345.71) = 13.87, 
p<0.001, η² = .103). There were no significant interactions between the recognition rates of stimuli type 
viewed and group (F (1, 121) = .561, p=.455 or type of stimuli shown, expression type and group 
diagnosis (F (2.86. 345.71) = 1.24, p=.297. 
6.3.2.1 How was each expression type recognised? 
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses showed the main effect of expression type followed a 
structured pattern with the expressions maths question (75.59%, 95% CI [72.32, 78.87]), monopoly 
money (61.98%, 95% CI [58.84, 65.12]), negative feedback (52.04%, 95% CI [48.90, 55.89]) and 
positive feedback (41.56%, 95% CI [37.57, 45.38]) recognised best to worst respectively. All p values 
were significant at the p≤0.001 level. 
6.3.2.2 How did groups differ in recognising different expression types?  
Bonferroni corrected post-hoc analyses showed the significant interaction between expression 
type and group was in the case of the maths expression being significantly better recognised by the ASC 
group (79.69% 95% CI [74.57, 84.81]) than the control group (71.50% 95% CI [67.41, 75.59]) p=.015. 





two expressions, within the ASC sample there was no significant difference between the negative 
expression (48.96%, 95% CI [43.50, 54.42] and positive expression recognition (40.63%, 95% CI [34.66, 
46.59] p=.299), a difference that was significant in the control sample (negative 55.83%, 95% CI [51.47, 
6.], positive (42.50%, 95% CI [37.73, 47.27] p=0.001).  
6.3.2.3 What difference did stimuli delivery type have on expression recognition?  
Investigating the interaction between expression and st imuli type, post-hoc analyses showed the 
maths question (79.50%, 95% CI [75.63, 83.37]  p=.001), monopoly money (68.26%, 95% CI [63.75, 
72.77] p<.001) and negative feedback (57.28%, 95% CI [52.93, 61.63] p<.001) expressions were 
recognised significantly better in a spontaneous delivery format than posed (71.69%, 95% CI [67.57, 
75.80]; 55.69%, 95% CI [52.13, 59.27]; 47.51%, 95% CI [43.27, 51.75] respectively). The opposite effect 
was true for positive feedback (p=.002) which was significantly better recognised in a posed format 
(45.88%, 95% CI [40.88, 50.87]) than spontaneous (37.25%, 95% CI [32.87, 41.63]. Analysis of 
recognition rates between expressions within stimuli type suggest the pattern previously outlined in the 
main effect was driven by results from spontaneous expressions which follow the same recognition 
pattern (means provided above). However within posed stimuli the differences are less pronounced 
between expressions causing differences between negative to positive (p=1) to fall below the significance 
threshold (means provided above). A bar graph of recognition rates of expression types when posed or 





















Figure 6.4: Group recognition rates of expressions when in posed and spontaneous formats error 
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Table 6.2: Confusion matrix of control and ASC participants responses when expression were (A) posed and (B) spontaneous  
   Typically developing    ASC  
A) Posed   Correct answer        Correct answer   
   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive 
 Maths 213 29 78 29  Maths 152 12 58 21 
Participant 
response 
Monopoly 12 172 16 61 Participant 
response 
Monopoly 3 110 10 43 
Negative 72 18 152 73 Negative 40 6 95 49 
 Positive 17 90 63 150  Positive 9 75 39 89 
B) Spontaneous Correct answer        Correct answer   
   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive 
 Maths 237 24 23 44  Maths 165 15 26 34 
Participant 
response 
Monopoly 21 214 30 76 Participant 
response 
Monopoly 8 132 19 41 
Negative 40 13 195 79 Negative 23 7 106 50 
 Positive 19 62 62 114  Positive 6 44 49 75 





6.3.3 What are the patterns of expression recognition? 
Participants’ responses to the videos were collated and a confusion matrix compiled (seen above 
in table 6.2) which shows the responses given relative to the correct answer. 
6.3.3.1 Could participant’s retrodict the correct event more than other options?  
To investigate if participants could correctly retrodict the matching event that caused the reaction 
in the video a 2 x 2 x 4 x 4 mixed factorial ANOVA was conducted. Stimuli type (posed, spontaneous), 
Correct answer (video shown) and Actual answer (guess made) were within subjects factors and group 
(ASC, Control) was a between subjects factor the dependent variable was the event retrodicted.  The 
assumption of sphericity was violated, as such Greenhouse-Geisser adjusted epsilon values are reported. 
Main effects add little to the interpretation of any results in this analysis, for example the 
significant main effect present in correct (actual emotion shown) (F (2.62, 353.71) = 9.35, p<0.001) 
meaning more responses irrespective of if they were correct were made to one type of expression than 
another, does not add to interpretation other than participants felt more able to answer some expressions 
than others. As a result the significant interactions between Stimuli and correct (F (2.72, 367.40) = 12.90, 
p<0.001) and Correct and actual (F (4.66, 629.91) = 316.83, p<0.001) will be further investigated. 
6.3.3.2 Did stimuli delivery type influence the number of guess attempts?  
Post-Hoc Bonferroni corrected analyses showed that the significant interaction between the 
stimuli type shown and correct answer (what the expression type actually was) was driven by differences 
in the amount of selections made to monopoly money and positive feedback expressions when posed and 
spontaneous. The monopoly money expressions attracted significantly more guesses (more participants 
felt able to answer it) when shown in a spontaneous format (2.52, 95% CI [2.31, 2.72]) than a posed 
format (2.06, 95% CI [1.90, 2.22], p<0.001), whilst the opposite was true of positive feedback 
expressions where significantly more guesses were made when the expressions was delivered in a posed 
format (1.73, 95% CI [1.54, 1.93]) than a spontaneous format (1.39, 95% CI [1.21, 1.56], p<0.001). 
6.3.3.3 Were participants more likely to retrodict the correct event? 
Post-Hoc Bonferroni corrected analyses showed the significant interaction between correct 
response and actual response was due to participants’ ability to retrodict the correct answer more 


















































the correct expression than alternative options (all p<0.001). A bar graph of the frequency of answers 
given to each expression type can be seen below in figure 6.5. 
Figure 6.5: The frequency of answers provided to each expression display error bars indicate ±1SE 
 
Figure 6.5 shows the recognition rates of each individual expression, which is the rate they 
selected the correct answer of the expression viewed over other options, is above chance for all 
expressions (maths = 70.86%, monopoly = 57.26%, negative = 49.52%, positive = 38.98). Of note is that 
alternate incorrect options in all cases fall below the expected chance rate (25%) for guessing, or on the 
chance rate in the case of monopoly money incorrectly guessed as the eliciting prompt when it was in fact 
positive feedback (25.34%). What Figure 6.5 demonstrates is that participants could correctly attribute the 
eliciting event of the expressions above the chance rate, and as correct recognition decreases incorrect 
guesses increase but in an expected pattern with even increase amongst appropriately valenced 
alternatives. For example, as positive feedback showed the poorest recognition there was an increase in 
incorrect guesses of monopoly money and negative feedback but not maths question. This is because an 
outwardly thankful response or even shy and reserved in some cases (explaining the rise in negative 
feedback guesses) is not considered an appropriate or typical response to being asked a maths question.  
Only the positive feedback expression showed a cumulative incorrect guess rate 49.45% greater than the 
correct rate (38.98) however as mentioned above and demonstrated in figure 6.5 none of the incorrect 





6.3.4 Did participants make systematic emotional inferences to the expressions? 
To investigate if participants gave systematic emotion inferences to the expressions viewed, the 
frequency of inferences made was tabulated. This was done for both the control and ASC samples, the 
frequencies of inferences were tabulated according to the stimuli type (posed or spontaneous) and if the 
events were retrodicted correctly (pairing the reaction in the video to the correct causal event). Likelihood 
Ratios were calculated from the total observed frequency of consistent emotions inferences (thinking to 
maths, for example) and inconsistent emotion inferences (Happy to negative feedback, for example) and 
comparing these observed frequencies to a null hypothesis of expected frequencies.  The observed and 
expected frequencies of emotion inferences in any given condition can be seen in table 6.3 below. Below 
sub tables represent the inferences made to both spontaneous and posed expressions when the 





Table 6.3: Frequency of emotion inferences made by each group to posed and spontaneous expressions when correctly and incorrectly retrodicted   
 Correct response (expected frequencies in brackets) 
A) Control group Posed stimuli   Spontaneous stimuli 
  Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total 
 Thinking 194 (83.1)
A 43 (67.1) 24 (59.3) 7 (58.5) 268  Thinking 217 (83.9)
 A 24 (75.7) 25 (69) 3 (40.4) 269 
 Surprised 14 (46.5) 102 (37.6)
 A 13 (33.2) 21 (32.8) 150  Surprised 7 (48) 103 (43.4)
 A 33 (39.5) 11 (23.1) 154 
 Sad 1 (36.6) 2 (29.5) 115 (26.1)
 A 0 (25.8) 118  Sad 0 (41.8) 0 (37.7) 134 (34.4)
 A 0 (20.1) 134 
 Happy 4 (46.8) 25 (37.8) 0 (33.4) 122 (33)
 A 151  Happy 13 (63.6) 87 (57.2)† 3 (52.1) 100 (30.5)
 A 203 
B) ASC group            
  Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total 
 Thinking 137 (63.4)
 A 33 (45.9) 11 (39.6) 5 (37.1) 186  Thinking 130 (58.3)
 A 20 (46.7) 14 (37.5) 5 (26.5) 169 
 Surprised 11 (32.4) 57 (23.4)
 A 11 (20.2) 16 (19) 95  Surprised 10 (33.5) 65 (26.8)
 A 10 (21.5) 12 (15.2) 97 
 Sad 1 (26.9) 3 (19.5) 73 (16.8)
 A 2 (15.8) 79  Sad 2 (28.3) 0 (22.6) 80 (18.2)
 A 0 (12.9) 82 
 Happy 3 (29.3) 17 (21.2) 0 (18.3) 66 (17.2)
 A 86  Happy 23 (44.9) 47 (35.9)† 2 (28.8) 58 (20.4)
 A 130 
  Incorrect response (expected frequencies in brackets) 
C) Control group Posed stimuli   Spontaneous stimuli 
  Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total 
 Thinking 105 (36.1)
 A 13 (23.6) 27 (43.3) 3 (44.9) 148  Thinking 57 (21)
 A 12 (19) 16 (22.4) 5 (27.7) 90 
 Surprised 20 (42.5) 38 (27.8)
 A 49 (50.9)  67 (52.8)† 174  Surprised 10 (17.9) 33 (16.3)
 A 12 (19.1) 22 (23.7) 77 
 Sad 4 (22.5) 7 (14.7) 79 (26.9)
 A 2 (27.9)  92  Sad 2 (13.3) 3 (12) 50 (14.2)
 A 2 (17.5) 57 
 Happy 7 (34.9) 31 (22.8)† 8 (41.8) 97 (43.4)
 A 143  Happy 6 (22.8) 20 (20.7) 2 (24.3) 70 (30.1)
 A 98 
D) ASC group            
  Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total   Maths Monopoly Negative Positive Total 
 Thinking 70 (25.2)
 A 8 (15.5) 21 (26.3) 2 (34) 101  Thinking 69 (20.7)
 A 16 (28.9) 23 (30) 4 (32.5) 112 
 Surprised 11 (21.9) 26 (13.5)
 A 19 (22.9) 32 (29.7)† 88  Surprised 15 (24.7) 69 (34.5)
 A 27 (35.9) 23 (38.9) 134 
 Sad 5 (15) 1 (9.2) 52 (15.6)
 A 2 (20.2) 60  Sad 1 (15.3) 3 (21.4) 76 (22.2)
 A 3 (24.1) 83 
 Happy 5 (28.9) 21 (17.8)† 3 (30.2) 87 (39.1)
 A 116  Happy 6 (30.3) 39 (42.2) 6 (43.9) 113 (47.6)
 A  164 





The bolded diagonal cells in Table 6.3 display consistent emotion to expression inferences, it is 
the combined total of the values not in parentheses of these cells that represents total observed consistent 
emotional inferences. The total value within parentheses of those same cells represents a null model 
expected frequency. A larger value outside parentheses than within suggests participants made more 
inferences than would be predicted. The opposite is true for inconsistent emotion inferences (values not 
bold or on the diagonal) where a larger value would be expected within parentheses indicating 
inconsistent emotion inferences were less frequent than a null model would predict. 
The individual breakdown of observed to expected frequencies displayed above can be useful for 
isolating specific instances where an inconsistent emotion attribution was made more than would be 
expected. Some values have been highlighted above where this is the case, it is mostly confined to 
monopoly money but in two specific condit ions: correct retrodictions to spontaneous stimuli, and 
incorrect retrodictions to posed stimuli.  Both the control and ASC sample inferred happiness as an 
emotional state more than would be expected. This does not necessarily mean that participants are 
particularly poor at inferring emotional states to the monopoly money expression; instead it appears more 
appropriate to acknowledge that the monopoly money expression may have two appropriate emotional 
inferences which may even be blended in one expression. Viewing the observed to expected frequencies 
it can be seen that incorrectly retrodicted posed expressions were most likely to attract inconsistent 
emotion inferences. 
Despite the instances highlighted above, significant likelihood ratios were present for all 
categories and groups (posed incorrect retrodiction, spontaneous incorrect retrodiction etc.). This suggests 
participants were significantly more likely to infer a consistent emotion to event and significantly less 
likely to infer an inconsistent emotion. No apparent difference was present between the control and ASC 
sample; although the smallest Lχ2 statistics were present in incorrectly retrodicted expressions from the 
ASC sample. Smaller Lχ2 statistics are less likely to produce significant results providing evidence 
against the current model in favour of the null. Because significance was still present in these instances it 
can be stated the current model (that consistent inferences will be more frequent than inconsistent) is still 
applicable to the ASC sample but slightly less robust. The totalled consistent and inconsistent observed 








Table 6.4: Total observed (with percentages) and expected frequencies of emotion inferences between groups and stimuli type to correct ( A) and incorrect (B) 
retrodictions 
 Control  ASC 
 Posed  Spontaneous  Posed  Spontaneous 
A) Correct Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent 
Observed frequency 533 (77.6%) 154 (22.4%)  554 (72.9%) 206 (27.1%)  333 (74.7%) 113 (25.3%)  333 (70.4%) 145 (30.6%) 
Expected frequency 179.8 507.3  192.2 567.9  120.8 325.2  123.7 354.3 
Likelihood Ratio Lχ2 (9)=946.72 p<0.001  Lχ2 (9)=1031.19 p<0.001  Lχ2 (9)=544.73 p<0.001  Lχ2 (9)=531.81 p<0.001 
 
 Posed  Spontaneous  Posed  Spontaneous 
B) Incorrect Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent Consistent Inconsistent 
Observed frequency 319 (57.3%) 238 (42.7%)  327 (66.3%) 166 (33.7%)  235 (64.4%) 130 (35.6%)  210 (65.2%) 112 (34.8%) 
Expected frequency 134.2 422.6  125 368.1  93.4 271.6  81.6 240.4 






6.3.5 Does Alexithymia severity predict retrodictive mindreading ability within autism? 
To directly test the Alexithymia hypothesis a linear regression was conducted using Alexithymia 
to predict the performance on a retrodictive mindreading task within the ASC sample recruited. Durbin 
Watson statistic (2.28) was satisfactory and Homoscedasticity was satisfied via visual inspection of 
studentized residuals plotted against unstandardized predicted values. Studentized deleted residuals 
showed one value as an outlier (-3.09) driven by a low score on the RM task (9) however leverage (0.03) 
and Cook’s distance (0.29) were satisfactory. One participant presented high Cook’s D (.78) due to their 
uncharacteristically low Alexithymia score (25) within the ASC sample. Using a more conservative cut-
off of Cook’s D (4/N) the threshold for Cook’s D was set at 0.084 application of which removed the two 
cases identified above. Assumptions of normality were satisfied via inspection of a P-P plot and 
histogram. 
The regression model was non-significant suggesting Alexithymia scores (standardised beta -
.06) in ASC do not predict performance on an emotion processing task, in this case the RM task (F (1, 44) 
= .157, p= .694 R
2
 = .004)  
6.3.6 What were the associations between measures? 
 
Given that no significant group differences were present in retrodiction ability, but groups were 
distinct in scores of self-report autistic traits and Alexithymia traits, Pearson’s correlations were used to 
investigate any associations between scores on these measures across the spectrum. A correlation matrix 
of measures used can be seen below in table 6.5 and plots can be seen in appendix K. 
 
Table 6.5: Correlation matrix of assessment tasks 
    Eyes task  RM score  AQ score  TAS score  
Pearson’s r 
Eyes task  
  
— 0.369** -0.296** -0.257* 
RM score  
    
— -0.143 -0.088 
AQ scores  
      
— 0.712** 
Note: * p < .01, ** p < .001 
 
  
There were no significant relationships between RM score and AQ or TAS scores. There were 
positive relationships between eyes task scores and RM scores as would be expected and AQ scores and 
TAS scores which would also be expected. Interestingly given the previous non-significance in group 
differences of eyes task performance correlations showed significant weak negative relationships between 





6.3.7 What are the effects of Alexithymia on task performance? 
Splitting participants into high Alexithymia traits (≥62), possible Alexithymia traits (52-61) and 
low Alexithymia traits (≤51) appeared to show little trend on performance of RM ability particularly in a 

















Investigations of RM ability according to TAS severity via independent one way ANOVA 
showed no main effect of severity F(2,120)=.889, p=.414,  
Alexithymia severity had a significant effect on performance on the eyes task with variation 
between severity groups (F (2, 119) = 3.21, p=0.044, η²= .051). Difference contrasts show the difference 
resides between the mild Alexithymia group (Mean=26.80, SD=4.17) and severe Alexithymia group 
(Mean=24.42, SD=5.50) and medium Alexithymia group (Mean=24.30, SD=5.87) p=.013. The difference 
in Eyes task scores between mild, medium and high severity Alexithymia can be seen in figure 6.7 below. 
Figure 6.6: Boxplots of retrodictive mindreading scores within Alexithymia severity 








However there is a clear trend of autism severity increasing with Alexithymia severity (see 
figure 6.8). An independent samples one way ANOVA showed significant differences in AQ scores 
between Alexithymia severity F (2,120) = 56.93, p<0.001.A planned contrast was carried out comparing 
AQ scores in high Alexithymia severity to those in medium and mild severity showing significant 
differences (t (120) = 9.80, p<0.001). AQ scores were significantly higher in high severity Alexithymia 












Figure 6.7: Boxplots of Eyes task scores within Alexithymia severity bands (1= severe 
Alexithymia, 2= possible Alexithymia, 3= low Alexithymia 
Figure 6.8: Boxplots of AQ scores within Alexithymia severity bands (1= severe 





The results show Alexithymia severity presents in a linear trend with autism severity, this would 
be expected given previous literature and the relationship reported previously. However, the linear 
relationship between Alexithymia and autism traits does not present in as pronounced a fashion for either 
RM ability or eyes task scores  where differences between severities are less notable. 
6.4 Discussion 
This research aimed to investigate emotion recognition and understanding in an ASC sample and 
comparison control sample. The research included new stimuli of spontaneous reactions captured in 
naturalistic reciprocal social interchange which were designed to better reflect typical social interactions; 
this should provide better assessments of abilities or difficulties. The research also investigated the links 
between autistic traits and Alexithymia, where growing research is highlighting Alexithymia’s role in 
emotion recognition difficulties. 
The research made three predictions: based on the more complex task requiring retroactive use 
of information and social attributions, it was predicted the control group would correctly retrodict (‘what 
has happened to this person?’) significantly more even ts than the ASC group. The results did not support 
this hypothesis as there were non-significant differences in RM ability between the ASC and control 
group. There were however, instances of differences between recognition of specific expressions, namely 
better recognition of the maths question in the ASC sample than control sample. There were also 
differences in inter-expression recognition rates between the groups; for example the control group 
showed significantly better recognition for negative expressions than positive, a difference that was not 
significant in the ASC group. This pattern of recognition rates between the expressions is to be expected 
given the previous literature that shows specific difficulties on negatively valenced expressions in ASC 
(Ashwin et al., 2006; Bal et al., 2010; Corden et al., 2008). The control group’s superior recognition of 
negative feedback relative to positive feedback is not found in the ASC group where research has 
typically shown difficulty in recognising negatively valenced expressions, as a result this minimised the 
difference between negative and positive feedback reactions.   
It was also predicted the ASC group would present significantly higher Alexithymia scores than 
the typically developing group. The results s upported this hypothesis showing significantly higher 





autism traits across the entire sample, where participants with high alexithymic traits had significantly 
higher AQ scores than those with medium or low alexithymic traits. This is consistent with previous 
literature showing strong comorbidity between ASC and Alexithymia (Berthoz & Hill 2005; Hill & 
Berthoz 2004; Bird & Cook 2013). However, the effects of Alexithymia on performance in the RM task 
were not consistent with previous literature on emotion processing abilities (Parker, Taylor & Bagby 
1994; McDonald & Prkachin 1990; Prkachin et al., 2009; Pollatos & Gramann 2011; Pollatos et al., 2008; 
Cook et al., 2013). Results showed no effect of Alexithymia severity on RM performance. Such a finding 
is contrary to previous research and has implications for the Alexithymia hypothesis; if Alexithymia is 
expected to contribute to emotion processing abilities worse scores on the RM task would be expected in 
the severe Alexithymia group than the medium or mild group. To directly test the Alexithymia hypothesis 
within autism a regression was conducted using Alexithymia scores to predict RM scores within only the 
ASC sample. Results suggested Alexithymia scores do not significantly predict RM performance. This is 
problematic for the Alexithymia hypothesis as the ASC group self-identified as significantly higher in 
Alexithymia traits than controls, it would be expected a group self-identifying as higher in Alexithymia 
traits would show a negative association on an emotion processing task. Particularly as the Alexithymia 
hypothesis suggests the differences in emotion proces sing abilities reside in the specific overlap of ASC 
traits and Alexithymia traits which appeared to be the case in this sample. There was an effect of 
Alexithymia severity on eyes task performance with those reporting mild Alexithymia performing better 
than those reporting medium or severe alexithymia. This difference observed in the eyes task but not the 
RM task presents problems for the RM task as it was expected an arguably more social task in nature 
would find differences between alexithymia severities . 
 Finally it was predicted the ASC group would make significantly less correct emotional 
inferences (‘how did this person feel?’) than the typically developing group due to Alexithymia’s 
influence on empathic abilities. This hypothesis was not supported as ASC participants made situationally 
appropriate emotional attributions significantly more than would be expected in all conditions, this 
included when they had correctly retrodicted the event and when they incorrectly retrodicted the event. 
This was also consistent across both posed and spontaneous expressions. Although there were still 
significantly more consistent observed attributions than would be expected after an incorrect retrodiction, 
there was an overall decrease in the number of consistent attributions. Controls gave less consistent 





pattern was present in the ASC group with less consistent attributions after incorrectly retrodicting the 
event than after correctly retrodicting the event.  
The decline in consistent emotion attributions, although not to below significance, would still 
suggest a correct understanding of socially appropriate emotional responses is part of the formula in 
attributing emotional states to others. For example observing an individual crying is usually associated 
with sadness and pain, however if you were to see that individual cradling a new born baby the tears take 
on a new context and the emotional attribution changes to joy. The example is crude because tears of joy 
are typically easily differentiated from tears of sadness, however the example serves to highlight how 
context can aid in assigning appropriate emotional states and that this context has been lacking from 
much of the previous research in the literature (Calder et al., 2000; Elfenbein & Ambady 2002; Hall & 
Matsumoto 2004; Kessler et al., 2008; Matsumoto et al., 2002; Shioiri et al., 1999). This may be one 
potential explanation as to why no group differences have been found in overall performance between the 
ASC and control groups. It is possible the stimuli and method of assessment used provide a greater 
opportunity for autistic individuals to find the extra context that is available in typical social interch ange, 
they can then use this to minimise any difficulties that may have been present under more artificial 
circumstances. 
The above explanation while potentially standing for the RM results, does not adequately 
address why no group differences were present in the eyes task, which has a robust effect (Baron-Cohen 
et al., 2001; 2015; Vellante et al., 2013). There is confidence that the sample gathered are autistic, with 
diagnoses and self-report traits significantly differentiating the two groups. Similarly , the comorbid 
Alexithymia with ASC and group differences also serves to corroborate legitimate group differences 
based on autism diagnosis. Recent research using the full (36 images) eyes task has shown significant 
differences between control groups (mean s core 26.48) and ASC groups (mean score 23.49) (Baron-
Cohen et al., 2015); however these scores are not dissimilar to those presented above (control mean 
25.78, ASC mean 24.52). As Baron-Cohen and colleagues (2015) demonstrated a sex difference in eyes 
task performance within controls but not an ASC sample, this was considered as a potential contributing 
factor due to the uneven sex ratio in the sample collected (52.08% female in ASC, 74.67% females in 
control). This proved not to be a contributing factor, as no differences were present between the sexes in 





females outperforming males (McClure et al., 2000; Thayer & Johnson 2000; Montagne, Kessels, 
Frigerio, de Haan & Perrett et al., 2005; Hoffmann et al., 2010) and in Baron-Cohen and colleagues  
(2015) research specifically. This  would have helped towards significance in the current research with the 
distributions of the sexes as they were within the groups (more control females bringing the control 
average up inflating group differences).  
Previous correlations have demonstrated associations between eyes task performance and AQ 
across collapsed ASC and control groups (Baron-Cohen et al., 2001), or only in females with autism 
(Baron-Cohen et al., 2015). This was demonstrated on a particularly large sample of females (N=217), 
although the current research did demonstrate similar male to female ratio within the ASC sample it may 
be that the larger female sample reported previously contributed to significance . In the cases of both of 
the research highlighted the direction of the relationship was the same and strength was similar to that 
reported above (-.53 and -.32 respectively). Prior research has demonstrated a lack of difference between 
ASC and control groups on the eyes task when controlling for Alexithymia while also demonstrating 
significant differences between those with and without Alexithymia (Oakley, Brewer, Bird & Catmur 
2016). The lack of difference between ASC and control groups on the RM task and between Alexithymia 
severities suggests  that in the current methods the RM task might lack specificity. There is the potential in 
a specific aim that expanding the number of expression types and removing  the stimuli spontaneity as a 
variable to allow more expressions in a manageable experimental procedure could identify differences  
between both ASC and control groups and Alexithymia severities. 
With ASC diagnosis not influencing performance on tasks , the sampling method might be a 
contributing factor. Considering an overwhelming majority of the ASC sample were recruited from the 
Cambridge autism research volunteer database (CARD) (83%) this may select a sample that is much more 
experienced with experimental procedures and tasks. Volunteers of the CARD receive monthly E-mails 
of all approved research, volunteers self-select which research project they want to take part in, this could 
result in an over-representation of participants who frequently take part in research of a specific nature 
(such as emotion processing). This could inadvertently train participants on these tasks improving  
performance relative to controls. There is also the possibility that a self-selecting sample which opts in to 
research databases is naturally higher functioning; for comparison only 34.1% of the control sample was 





worth mentioning IQ was self-report if known, this method of collection might self-select for individuals 
who have a particularly high IQ and have subsequently been tested and therefore know t his information. 
Thus it is possible the actual IQ of the entire sample would fall much closer to the normative range but 
this is speculation. Nevertheless the reported IQ that was observed may have influenced the research , 
allowing certain coping mechanisms in the ASC sample, where previous research has shown the 
importance of IQ in emotion processing (Loveland et al., 1997, Buitelaar, van der Wees, Swaab-
Barneveld & van der Gaag, 1999) 
The findings provide mixed support for the Alexithymia hypothesis of autism, on one hand the 
results show strong support for Alexithymia comorbidity in ASC through the presence of more 
Alexithymia traits in the ASC sample and increasing Alexithymia severity with AQ scores across the 
entire sample corroborating previous research (Berthoz & Hill 2005; Hill & Berthoz 2004; Bird & Cook 
2013). However the presence of more Alexithymia traits in the ASC group did not bring about group 
differences in performance. In fact only when Alexithymia severity itself was investigated did differences 
emerge between severity bands . Thus the research does add to previous literature in highlighting the links 
between Alexithymia and ASC but fails to find results that implicate Alexithymia, particularly in autism, 
as a major contributor to emotion recognition difficulties.  
Similarly the research does not find supporting evidence that emotion recognition difficulties are 
as pervasive as reported in the literature (e.g. Harms et al., 2010). The factors discussed above such as the  
sample recruited, new stimuli set, and method of assessment, may have played a part in better reflecting 
the demands of typical social interaction allowing greater context to aid recognition. It was anticipated the 
task would be more difficult than previous us ed in the literature, as such the stimuli used was limited to 
the four best recognised expressions from the prior experiments. This was done because it was believed 
making the task easier was more likely to unearth any differences than a task that is too h ard and will 
produce floor effects. It was also believed after RM performance predicted AQ scores in chapter 5, that 
the design used in that experiment provided enough difficulty and specificity to differentiate between 
those with an ASC diagnosis and those without. All expressions showed acceptable recognition rates 
above chance, as such for future research it might be worth considering expanding the expression 
categories used. This is proposed for two reasons: firstly, simply adding more expressions incre ases the 





response patterns showed when giving attributions participants tended to recognise monopoly money as 
positive and surprised. This effectively narrows the feasible range of answer from four to two and chance 
rate to 50%. By including more expressions across the valence spectrum it might be that the process of 
elimination opportunity is reduced and the task becomes more difficult. This in turn cou ld detect any 
difficulties in an ASC sample which appear to be more subtle; at least in the current sample under the 
current methods.   
Expanding upon the current research, future directions could investigate group differences with 
the broader expression library as discussed; there would also be room to investigate emotional mimicry 
between those with an ASC diagnosis and a typically developing sample. This could be expanded 
between the degree of emotional mimicry assessed by facial change in response to po sed and spontaneous 
expressions, this is particularly pertinent given the differential display patterns of posed and spontaneous 
expressions highlighted in chapter 3. This could have implications for the correct understanding of 
expressions (in the case of artificial stimuli) and subsequent expression understanding in others (in real 
world settings) this particular point was briefly addressed in the introduction and would warrant further 
investigation given the comorbid Alexithymia reported in this study. 
To summarise, in this chapter the focus was investigating group differences between an ASC and 
control sample on recognition rates of a new dynamic spontaneous stimuli set. The results showed no 
significant group differences in the RM task or emotional inferences to situations. There was also no 
difference between the groups on performances on the eyes task, however investigating differences 
between Alexithymia severities on eyes task performance showed significant group differences with mild 
Alexithymia performing significantly better than medium or severe. In line with previous research there 
was a strong link between Alexithymia and ASC. Alexithymia scores did not predict RM ability within 
the autistic sample, questioning the accuracy of the Alexithymia hy pothesis. Similarly Alexithymia 
severity across the whole sample showed no effects on RM performance.  The improved recognition of 
spontaneous expressions over posed is consistent  with findings in chapter 4; this is bolstered by the 
differential display patterns between posed and spontaneous expressions shown in chapter 3, which 
extended further to differential viewing patterns in chapter 5, but these viewing styles did not translate to 
recognition rates between posed and spontaneous expressions in chapter 5. Recognition generally fell 





These findings suggests future research with adults should endeavour to use high quality spontaneous 
expressions as these improve recognition rates; presumably by better reflecting typical social interaction. 
The lack of group differences suggest those previously reported may be over-exaggerated, potentially 
through methodological assessment or the current results may be under estimated through sampling; 







Chapter 7: General Discussion 
 
7.1 Summary of the Findings 
The studies presented in this thesis investigated the production of posed and spontaneous 
expressions, their recognition in a typically developing adult population, the recognition and viewing 
style in typically developing children and the performance of ASC adults and controls on a RM task. In 
chapter 3, it is believed the first research is presented that investigates whole face display patterns of 
matching posed and spontaneous expressions with FACS data captured in social interchange. Similar 
work was carried out by Namba et al., (2016) but this was based on spontaneous expressions that were 
captured in response to specifically selected films; the drawbacks of such a method were discus sed in 
chapter 2 section 2.6. Similarly, FACS analysis was used in Vals tar et al. (2006) but this was based 
primarily on brow movements not entire faces.  
In chapter 4 the newly created expressions were validated in an online survey with typically 
developing adults. The free response emotion inferences given by participants were coded and cross-
tabulated which showed emotion inferences deemed consistent to specific reaction types (e.g. happiness 
to positive feedback/ sadness to negative feedback) after both correct and incorrect event retrodiction.  
Chapter 4 showed good recognition above chance for all expressions except no repeat, and a global 
improvement in spontaneous expression recognition over posed. Controlling for expression positivity 
through valence did not influence the recognition rates between expressions. There was also a borderline 
significant negative correlation between Alexithymia traits in the displayer and recognition of their 
expressions. 
In chapter 5, once again it is believed the first results are reported investigating viewing styles of 
posed and matching spontaneous expressions with eye-tracking data, with the exception of Calvo and 
colleagues (2013) although the definition of non-genuine expressions in their research resulted in artificial 
blended images. The results in chapter 5 showed differential viewing patterns based on the stimuli type 
with significantly more fixations and longer durations to posed expressions. There were no significant 
differences in the recognition of posed and spontaneous expressions which suggest s the viewing styles do 





Finally in chapter 6 the RM paradigm and new stimuli created were employed with an ASC 
sample and controls. Results showed no significant difference on the RM task which is in line with some 
previous literature showing less marked difficulties on emotion tasks (Tracy et al., 2011; Jones et al., 
2011; Da Fonseca et al., 2009; Lacroix et al., 2009; Spezio et al., 2007; Neumann et al., 2006; Piggot et 
al., 2004). There was also a strong overlap of Alexithymia traits and ASC traits in line with previous 
literature (Berthoz & Hill 2005; Hill & Berthoz 2004; Bird & Cook 2013) however, there was no 
significant effect of Alexithymia severity on performance on the RM task, and specifically within the 
ASC sample Alexithymia score did not predict RM ability. This is contrary to the previous literature 
linking alexithymia with emotion processing difficulties in ASC (Parker, Taylor & Bagby 1994; 
McDonald & Prkachin 1990; Prkachin et al., 2009; Pollatos & Gramann 2011; Pollatos et al., 2008; Cook 
et al., 2013). However, investigating RM severity in the collapsed entire sample did demonstrate 
significant differences between mild and both medium and severe Alexithymia on the eyes task. In 
chapters 4 and 6 there was a consistent result of better recognition of spontaneous expressions than posed 
expressions, contrary to previous research (Hess & Blairy, 2001; Wagner 1990; Wagner et al., 1992; 
Naab & Russell, 2007). This finding was replicated in two different demographic samples: typically 
developing adults and adults with a diagnosis of ASC. The difference in recognition of spontaneous and 
posed expressions was reduced in typically developing children, suggesting the intricacies of expression 
spontaneity become more important throughout development; potentially in line  with increased social 
demands. 
7.1.1 The impact of stimuli type on expression production and recognition  
The differences between posed and spontaneous expressions were apparent in chapter 3. 
Through factor analysis of FACS codes, it was found that posed expressions did not present a coherent 
factor structure stronger than random data for four of the expressions (maths, monopoly, no repeat and 
not recording). This was substantially more than spontaneous expressions of which only positive 
feedback presented a weaker factor structure than random data. The suggestion is that posed expressions 
are not created in the same way that spontaneous expressions are, this is shown in the lack of patterns 
across participants in display style which occur in spontaneous expressions. 
The effect may be due to two reasons: it is possible the individual differences in trying to 





that posed expressions appear in different intensities that are more subtle and not recognised by 
FaceReader. However during validation in chapter 4 participants gave intensity ratings of the expressions 
and no difference was found in the ratings of intensity given to posed and spontaneous expressions. 
Therefore it seems more plausible that the inconsistent display patterns in posed expressions are caused 
by the lack of ability to directly recreate the expression as it would be spontaneously. Although there is no 
research to date that has specifically compared posed expressions to spontaneous through FACS analysis, 
the results are in line with previous that demonstrate differential displays of posed and spontaneous 
expressions (Dibeklioğlu et al., 2012; Dibeklioğlu et al., 2010; Valstar et al., 2006; Williams et al., 2001). 
The consistent display patterns in spontaneous expressions appeared to influence recognition 
rates in subsequent research, as there was shown to be better recognition overall of spontaneous 
expressions than posed in chapters 4 and 6. This result would be expected given the implications of 
consistent display patterns in spontaneous expressions, the spontaneous expressions formed into clearer 
more consistent structures than  posed did. If those patterns were more readily identifiable by FaceReader 
it is expected they would be better recognised by humans. However, the improved recognition of 
spontaneous expressions was not unanimous across all expression types; there was consistently worse 
recognition of spontaneous positive feedback than posed positive feedback.  Positive feedback was also 
poorly recognised generally, this was unexpected given happiness (the expected response to positive 
feedback) has such a well-documented ceiling effect in the literature (Ashwin et al., 2007; Bormann-
Kischkel et al., 1995; Gross 2008; Riby & Hancock., 2008; Rosset et al., 2008; Wallace et al., 2008; 
Hoffmann et al., 2010). It was hypothesized that poor recognition of positive feedback and the 
improvement when posed were due to familiarity to posed happiness; becaus e happiness functions as a 
social lubricant it is displayed far more often, even non-genuinely. It is believed this familiarity to posed 
happiness has resulted in better recognition of posed positive feedback.  
Much like the altered display patterns influenced recognition rates, they also attracted altered 
viewing styles. In chapter 5 the results of viewing behaviour to posed and spontaneous expressions in 
typically developing children ranging from 6 years of age to 12 were reported. There was evidence of 
differing viewing patterns depending on the type of expression shown, the children made significantly 
more fixations and spent significantly longer fixated on posed expressions. This matched predictions of 





of posed expressions) lead to the hypothesis that these images are not presenting with high signal clarity. 
As a result it was predicted viewing patterns would appear erratic. This appeared to be the case with 
participants not finding clear regions to fixate on for posed expressions, instead making significantly 
more fixations as they scan for pertinent information. Although not predicted, the significantly increased 
time spent viewing posed expressions could also support this assertion suggesting that increased viewing 
time is more in response to complexity of the expression than clarity, as was presumed.  Most notable 
differences between posed and spontaneous expressions was a large increase in the amount of time spent 
viewing the eyes, mouth and face when the stimuli was posed, and more time viewing the body when the 
stimuli was spontaneous. 
The overall improved recognition of spontaneous reactions shown in chapter 4 and 6 is contrary 
to previous literature (Hess & Blairy, 2001; Wagner 1990; Wagner et al., 1992; Naab & Russell, 2007), 
leading to questions as to why the result was found in this research and at each stage of this research that 
included adults. It is believed the method of evocation used in this research is more valid, the RM 
paradigm requires expressions to be in response to something; thus expressions captured are as natural as 
can be under controlled conditions. Very little research that has investigated the differences of posed and 
spontaneous expressions has opted for methods such as those used in this thesis, instead capturing 
expressions in isolated conditions or asking people to relive memories, such methods have been discussed 
and critiqued previously. The results showing clearer expressions with better recognition and altered 
viewing styles of those expressions seem to corroborate the case made in chapter 2 for a more valid 
stimuli set. However it is worth noting that no such trend was shown in research with children, in fact 
children showed no significant difference in recognition of any direction, which is also  contrary to 
previous research. 
The literature discussed in chapter 2 section 2.3 and chapter 5 introduced the development of 
emotion processing and viewing styles. Between the age ranges of 6 to 12 children should have developed 
to holistic processing where facial features are incorporated in a coherent whole but second order-
relations such as the space between facial features is not yet mature (Bruce et al., 2000; Gilchrist & 
McKone 2010). The task of viewing dynamic videos presents much more information of a second -order 
relation with angle of target to screen not always full frontal and  movement of jaw, lips, eyelids and 





information caused the viewing style changes, but it is not yet possible for children to piece this 
information together with their developing second-order relation processing abilities. 
The results in this thesis would suggest that posed expressions are created in a physiologically 
distinct manner than spontaneous expressions. When shown to adults with developed processing abilities 
this appears to influence recognition rates, with spontaneous expressions  overall showing better 
recognition but individually between the expressions created and used in this research there were 
instances of both posed and spontaneous recognition improvements. It is hypothesized the posed -
spontaneous recognition difference reflects the increased likelihood that certain expressions such as 
positive and negative expressions can be frequently posed for social needs. It is this frequency of posing 
that differentiates expressions better recognised in a posed or spontaneous format; with those more 
frequently posed being better recognised when posed for two reasons; first, those expressions have been 
fine tuned in the displayer in a posed manner for necessity. Second, it would be expected the social utility 
of posing those expressions means they are frequently displayed, and consequently seen, ensuring 
familiarity and improved recognition. Altered viewing styles were evident in children, however it is 
expected viewing styles would differ further in adults given the mature second -order relations and results 
which suggest differential recognition in adults seemingly matching differential display patterns when 
posed and spontaneous. Practically, these findings provide some weight to the claims made at the 
beginning of this thesis that assuming posed expressions are satisfactory in emotion recognition tasks is 
problematic. Although the differences are subtle and lack consistency in direction, the results are clear 
that posed and spontaneous expressions differ in production and recognition in adults, and viewing styles 
in children. To ignore these results, particularly when assessing emotion recognition abilities, could lead 
to artificial inflation or reduction when reporting competencies in samples.   
7.1.2 The impact of Alexithymia on expression production and recognition 
The results suggest Alexithymia has a complicated relationship with expression production. 
Neither autism traits nor Alexithymia traits presented significant relationships with posed expression 
activity (displays), however the relationship between Alexithymia and expression activity (displays) was 
negative and more pronounced. This is contrary to previous work, which has shown altered expression 
production in ASC (Brewer et al., 2016). There was a strong overlap between ASC and Alexithymia, 





when analysing the activity of spontaneous expressions the effects of autism traits and Alexithymia 
reversed, with a non-significant relationship between Alexithymia and spontaneous expression activity, 
but a medium negative significant relationship between ASC and spontaneous expression activity. The 
directions of these results seem to suggest that Alexithymia (although not significant) appears to trend 
towards creating less evocative posed expressions, on the contrary there was a significant relationship 
showing increased autism traits appear with increased spontaneous expression evocation. 
The interpretation of the above results is speculative given the small sample size (n=19) but 
introduces an interesting aspect to the Alexithymia and ASC overlap. These are interesting preliminary 
findings that suggest those with higher alexithymic traits produce less evocative posed expressions; of 
course the opposite is just as plausible, that individuals who produce less evocative expressions may, 
through altered biofeedback mechanisms, present with higher Alexithymic traits. This appears to manifest 
alongside the separate effect within ASC that causes spontaneous expressions to be more evocative. As 
already stated these results are from a limited sample size and only hint at significance, this is also data 
from a typically developing sample, it might be that these independent results for separate expression 
types are not present in an ASC sample or appear in entirely different directions.  
Hypothetically, the interpretation would suggest that those with co -morbid ASC and 
Alexithymia struggle to effectively create posed expressions but also produce overly expressive 
spontaneous expressions. More research is required to better investigate if this is the case in an ASC 
sample but could also allow a better understanding of the social difficulties frequently reported within 
ASC. The less evocative posed expressions  due to Alexithymia traits, may limit the degree of social skills 
which could be particularly associated with displaying posed emotions which aid in social cohesion. 
Additionally, the production of more evocative spontaneous expressions within ASC might fu rther 
exacerbate any perceptions of social difficulties as overly expressive emotions can be seen as awkward 
(Faso et al., 2014; Grossman et al., 2013). The combination of expressions perceived as awkward when 
natural and a reduced ability to produce recognisable posed expressions may act as a double pronged 
social limiter in co-morbid ASC and Alexithymia. 
When considering Alexithymia and recognisability of expressions, an interesting reverse effect 
was found than would be expected from the expression production results discussed above. When 





negative relationship between Alexithymia in the displayer and recognisability, however this was mainly 
demonstrated in spontaneous expressions not posed. This is contradictory to the results above which 
suggested Alexithymia influenced posed expression production but not spontaneous. It is possible that 
those with Alexithymia traits produce expressions just as intense (according to AU activity) but the 
display pattern could be entirely different which would not be found under the current correlational 
analysis which was more exploratory in purpose. These results open up new research avenues to consider 
the expression pattern in those with Alexithymia and those without. There appears to be a relationship 
between Alexithymia and posing expressions, but also between Alexithymia and spontaneous expression 
patterns. 
Having discussed the relationship between Alexithymia in the disp layer and expressivity and 
recognisability; this section will now discuss the relationship of Alexithymia in the recogniser and 
Alexithymia in ASC. Within the typically developing sample there were medium positive correlations 
between AQ scores and Alexithymia scores, suggesting a reasonably strong overlap. Both of AQ and 
Alexithymia scores (borderline significant), presented weak negative relationships with expression 
recognition. The relationship was more robust with AQ scores than Alexithymia, suggesting  that at least 
in a typically developing sample Alexithymia does contribute to emotion recognition difficulties but not 
to a greater degree than autism traits. Once again, as above the relationships were driven by significance 
with spontaneous expressions but not posed. 
Within an ASC sample, the co-morbidity of Alexithymia was more pronounced with a 
significant strong positive correlation; this was also confirmed via one-way ANOVA of Alexithymia 
severity across three categories, mild, medium and severe Alexithymia. There were significant differences 
in AQ scores between mild and medium Alexithymia and medium and severe Alexithymia showing 
strong support for the co-morbidity proposed in the Alexithymia hypothesis  (Bird & Cook 2013). 
However, the effect of Alexithymia on performance in the RM task was non-significant As a measure of 
concurrent validity against the RM task, the eyes task was also administered which showed significantly 
better performance in mild alexithymia than medium and severe. 
Throughout the research carried out in this thesis alexithymia was consistently associated with 
Autism, however when analysed within an ASC sample Alexithymia showed no overall relationship in a 





significantly higher Alexithymia scores in the ASC sample it would be expected that Alexithymia as the 
key contributor to emotion recognition difficulties in autism would be present in the results but showed 
no meaningful influence on the ASC sample. Separately, in the entire sample Alexithymia severity did 
influence eyes task performance but not RM performance. This  would suggest that the RM task either 
requires less emotional understanding that is influenced by Alexithymia  (which is unlikely given it 
specifically requires the ability to identify socially appropriate emotional responses). Alternatively, the 
task lacks specificity, which may require an increase in difficulty given that when shown to adults 
recognition rates were comfortably above chance recognition rates for most expression types. 
7.1.3 Facial emotion recognition in ASC 
As was discussed above in the typically developing adult sample there was a significant weak 
negative correlation between AQ scores and emotion recognition performance on the RM task, this was 
driven by spontaneous expression recognition. This was an expected result which confirmed that autism 
traits and performance on an emotion processing task are related. It also helped to validate the new 
stimuli used in the RM task showing it to be subtle enough in display allowing the emergence of any 
difficulties should they be present. In chapter 5 the viewing styles of typically developing children to the 
differing stimuli types were recorded, autism traits  were also recorded via the AQ. A multiple regression 
was carried out investigating if viewing styles and performance on the RM task predicted AQ scores. As 
would be expected RM score was a significant negative predictor of AQ scores, however viewing style s 
also predicted AQ scores with more time spent viewing the face predicting lower AQ scores. Contrary to 
what would be expected, the ratio of viewing the eyes vs the mouth while non -significant was positive in 
direction with more time viewing the eyes associated with higher AQ scores. Although this result was 
non-significant it is directionally entirely contradictory to what previous research would suggest where 
there appears to be more focus on the mouth than the eyes associated with ASC (klin et al., 2002; 
Pelphrey 2002; Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 2001).  
It is difficult to draw conclusions from the results predicting AQ scores for multiple reasons; 
first, this sample was typically developing and so at best is suggestive of a potential trend in an ASC 
sample. Second, the most surprising result (viewing eyes associated AQ scores) was not statistically 
significant and so similarly at best is worthy of further investigation but conclusions cannot be drawn 





only be accurate in the context of the current research. This last point in particular, subject to further 
investigation, could mean that viewing the eyes has been overrated in importance. In reality, it may be 
that natural expressions such as the ones used in this thesis require an entirely different viewing style, a 
point that has been raised in previous work with similar methods (Pillai et al., 2012; 2014; Cassidy et al., 
2014).  
In chapter 6 group differences in RM task performance were investigated. Contrary to the results 
in chapter 4 and 5 which showed a negative relationship between ASC and task performance, there were 
no group differences in RM ability or the eyes task. This was surprising given the previous results and 
that the ASC and control group showed significant differences in AQ scores corroborating diagnosis. 
Correlational analyses showed a significant negative relationship between AQ scores and eyes task 
performance, this suggests there is  a relationship between autism severity and eyes task performance but 
this does not present strongly enough between those with a diagnosis and those without to show group 
differences.  Unlike the eyes task, RM ability was not significantly associated with AQ scores, despite a 
significant medium positive correlation between RM ability and eyes task performance. 
These results suggest that the RM task, although similar in nature to previous measures such as 
the eyes task, measures a different ability. This ability appears to be isolating the semantic and contextual 
content of an expression, which relies on a greater understanding of emotional affect than recognition 
does. This can be further evidenced by the rates at which control and ASC participants provided 
consistent and inconsistent emotional inferences. Whilst results showed ASC participants still gave more 
consistent inferences than would be predicted, they still gave approximately 3% less consistent inferences 
to posed and spontaneous expressions after correctly guessing the event that caused the reaction. 
Although this difference is marginal it is unclear if this is because of a particularly high functioning ASC 
sample or a previous overestimation of the difficulties reported within ASC. Superficially it  would 
suggest there is a less robust understanding of what emotions are appropriate to what context within ASC, 
specifically this is potentially the influence of co-morbid Alexithymia with ASC which might play a 
larger role on the ability to assign an appropriate emotion to prior events than to retrodict the event itself. 
Ultimately no differences in RM ability or eyes task performance were present between ASC 
and control participants, this is contrary to some research which shows difficulties in ASC (Harms et al., 





Borasten et al., 2007; Howard et al., 2000). What is consistent with previous research are the inter-
expression recognition rates in ASC, where no difference was observed between negative expressions and 
positive, a difference that was significant in the control sample and reflects the tendency to show poor 
recognition of negative expressions in ASC  (Ashwin et al., 2006; Bal et al., 2010; Corden et al., 2008).  
However there is also much research that has shown no differences between ASC and control participants 
(Loveland et al., 2008; Neumann et al., 2006; Rutherford & Towns 2008; Ogai et al., 2003; Teunisse & 
de Gelder 2001), In their review Harms and colleagues (2010) noted that intact FER is present in HFA 
samples and attributed this to compensatory mechanisms. As noted in section 6.4 the ASC sample 
recruited were high functioning with a majority having completed an undergraduate degree and a mean 
IQ of 136.94. Such a sample is likely to have the developed compensatory mechanisms that harms and 
colleagues proposed, similarly as previous research with the RM paradigm has shown (Cassidy et al., 
2014), dynamic delivery can aid in the recognition of more complex expressions. It was proposed in 
section 6.1 that allowing participants to view the expression development could reduce the apparent 
difficulties associated with FER in ASC, this is because more information is available which may be more 
valuable to high functioning ASC participants who rely on compensat ory mechanisms which likely 
includes more contextual information. 
There are two main points raised from this research, first the difficulties in emotion recognition 
associated with ASC are not replicated. This may be because of the sample recruited which was high 
functioning and educated; it could also be contributed to the paradigm, which may be better suited to 
HFA individuals who through compensatory mechanisms, can source emotional information from 
multiple modalities to aid recognition. Second, the res earch showed no significant predictive ability of 
Alexithymia on emotion recognition as measured by the RM task within the ASC sample, if the lack of 
differences found between groups is a result of the sample recruited it would suggest the severity of 
Alexithymia within ASC can be overcome in particularly high functioning individuals. Alternatively, if 
the lack of group differences is a result of the stimuli and task type this would similarly downplay the 
importance of co-morbid Alexithymia with autism in relation to emotion recognition abilities; however 
this position is not supported by the lack of differences reported on the eyes task. Onlythe correlation 
between eyes task performance and AQ scores (and lack of correlation between RM scores and AQ 





that can allow the implementation of coping mechanisms, which reduces any expected correlations 
between RM ability and AQ scores to non-significance.  
The key finding within this thesis would suggest the emotion recognition deficits in ASC have 
previously been overestimated, it is believed the lack of differences presented between the ASC sample 
and control sample is brought about by 1) the improved methodology using more ecologically valid 
stimuli and 2) the potential of a particularly high functioning ASC sample. Although negative correlations 
were present between AQ scores and eyes task scores, which does suggest there is a relationship between 
autism traits and emotion recognition ability, the current results and method point to this difference being 
less pronounced than previously thought. To further investigate this claim it is recommended that more 
research is conducted to replicate the (lack of) effect with further ASC samples.  
7.2 Limitations of the Research 
There are limitations associated with the research, some of which have been identified in 
individual chapters; however, the major limitations will be discussed here. In Chapter 3 when the 
expressions were created and analysed using FaceReader, the analytic process used required static 
images, this was discussed in chapter 2 and subsequently again in chapter 3 as an issue b ecause static 
images do not accurately reflect the expression development. However, the analysis applied is not 
suitable to dynamic stimuli, and ultimately difference based significance testing would not be possible as 
these rely on a mean which would be no better than a singular expressive point identified. There are 
options to identify multiple time points and compare these, but this ultimately results in more levels of the 
IV, this would result in underpowered analyses with barely interpretable results. One option as discussed 
is the use of growth curves in multi-level modelling or SEM and developmental trajectories (Thomas et 
al., 2009; Kashy & Donnellan 2008) however these would only be practical with approximations of 
expression type clarity over time, for example, “how much does this expression look like happiness 
throughout the episode?” This still does not address the issues of including AU activity, which can consist 
of many variables.  
Ultimately it may be that trying to quantify the makeup of expressions in this manner relies on a 
more qualitative approach that isn’t grounded in statistical testing or is more suited to triangulation. Such 





expression type, with similar graphs for the approximate prevalence of each of the six basic emotions 
throughout the expressions development. Including this kind of evidence alongside that presented in the 
factor structures would allow a more valid claim of express ion differences based in observations of 
dynamic development and empirical evidence of patterns. 
Another major limitation of the research is the lack of inclusion of a gold standard confirmatory 
diagnostic measure such as the ADOS or ADI. Although the groups showed significant differences on 
both the AQ and TAS-20 measures, it is common practice for research to include a more robust measure 
of ASC to confirm diagnosis. These were not included for specific reasons, these were mostly due to 
feasibility. The ADOS is particularly time consuming taking approximately an hour to administer and 
roughly another hour to ensure accurate coding, it also requires administration face to face. For this 
reason, it was decided the ADOS would not be included, this is because with the sample recruited it 
would require another 100+ hours in administration and coding. Similarly requiring face to face ADOS 
administration it is unlikely the sample size recruited would be available, further limiting the research 
which required a reasonable sample to investigate the 2x2x4 ANOVA. 
Finally, the order of task administration may have had some impact on the performance, 
particularly when the eyes task is included as in chapter 6. Participants were asked demographic 
questions, completed the AQ and TAS-20, and then 32 trials of the RM task and finally the eyes task. 
This means by completion participants had the potential to answer upwards of 150 questions; because the 
research was specifically interested in how performance would be on the RM task this was completed 
before the eyes task. It is possible that by the end of the experiment participants were just unable to focus 
on the eyes task. However results showed there was an increase in the mean scores on the eyes task of the 
ASC sample relative to those reported previously (Baron-Cohen et al., 2015). The control sample did 
display a decrease in eyes task performance relative to prior results, potentially suggesting they could not 
maintain attention throughout the task like the ASC participants . Whether the increase in the ASC 
participants’ scores is due to practice effects from participating in research previously (recruited through 
CARD) or a sampling bias of particularly high IQ individuals is unclear. For control participants it is 
difficult to confirm without counterbalancing that fatigue effects are responsible for the mild decrease in 





first was to collect higher quality data and with new stimuli sets in favour of replicating an already robust 
effect in the eyes task. 
7.3 Theoretical Implications 
Although this thesis investigated Alexithymia, subscribing to the Alexithymia hypothesis of 
emotion recognition difficulties in ASC, there is also scope to discuss theory of mind (ToM). Of the other 
theories introduced in section 1.3 such as the extreme male brain theory, the methods used have limited 
input to appraise the theory beyond performance between the sexes , which incidentally showed no 
differences. Similarly, to consider weak central coherence there would preferably need to be a measure of 
eye tracking between ASC and non-ASC individuals to observe if attention is focussed to the details 
rather than scanning multiple areas of the face. Finally, without brain imaging technology or some 
measure of arousal it is not possible to identify amygdala activity or subsequent associated physiological 
arousal that would indicate amygdala activity. As such, the theoretical implications will be considered in 
the case of the recognition rates of expressions and reported valence etc. which provide the opportunity to 
evaluate the theoretical basis of emotions as distinct kinds or constructed categories based on variance of 
arousal and valence. Subsequently this allows further consideration of the ToM and the evidence for and 
against theory-theory and simulation-theory. Finally the inclusion of Alexithymia measures in three of the 
four experiments allows appraisal of the merits  of the Alexithymia hypothesis. 
7.3.1 Theories of emotion 
 The research conducted in this thesis presents some interesting results that have implications for 
both the naturalist Darwin-Ekman approach and the constructivist Barrett-Russell approach. The display 
patterns that emerged across individuals in chapter 3 would provide support for the idea that expressions 
of emotion fall into distinct categories. The inconsistent research of expression categorisation was used as 
evidence for a circumplex like emotion structure (Russell & Barrett, 1999) however the results in chapter 
3 point to differential displays between expression types that is statistically quantifiable. This would 
provide some support for the idea of distinct emotion categories as hypothesized by Darwin -Ekman 
theorists. 
 The reported valence for the expressions by viewers in chapter 4 could be seen as evidence for a 





positive connotations such as monopoly money, positive feedback and no repeat all received positive 
valence ratings whereas expressions with negative connotations such as being asked a maths question, 
negative feedback, repeat experiment and not recording all received negative valence ratings. These 
ratings differed slightly, such as positive feedback being rated as more positively valenced than monopoly 
money however they presented no difference in intensity. Barret -Russell theorists would suggest very 
little variation on one axis of the circumplex (within positive expressions and negative expressions not 
between) and no variation on the second axis should result in a similar emotion attribution and display. 
This didn’t appear to be the case, the causal situations of the expressions were identifiable at an above 
chance rate and the consistent emotional state was inferred more than inconsistent options.  
Some results do provide evidence for a constructed approach, For example, of the emotion 
inferences made, errors were more likely to fall along valence lines, corroborating previous research of 
high inter-correlation between similarly valenced emotions (Feldman, 1993; Watson & Tellegen, 1985; 
Watson & Clark, 1984). In this research it could be asserted that errors falling along similarly valenced 
items are supportive of a general recognition of positive and negative valence rather than specific 
emotions categories. But this can’t explain why the monopoly money expression which was rated as one 
of the most positively valenced items presented much better recognition than p ositive feedback which 
was similarly positively valenced. The same difference in recognition applies to maths question which 
was well recognised and not recording which was markedly worse, these two expressions where rated 
with similar valence and intensity.  
The lack of equivalent recognition scores of causal events but errors of emotion inference that fall along 
valence lines provides contradictory evidence to the theory of constructed emotions. If emotions are 
constructed and specific kinds are not inherently natural or innate it would be expected the production of 
expressions would produce fewer differences in structural patterns. That would also be expected to 
translate to similar recognition rates among positively valenced expressions and negativ ely valenced 
expressions. The results demonstrated this was not the case, as both positive and negative valenced items 
were located at the top and bottom end of the recognition scale. Perhaps most important in this thesis, is 
the lack of a difference between the ASC group and control group. Previous work has demonstrated that 
additional context when viewing emotions can aid recognition (Gendron et al., 2013), The RM task 





reactions which can further feed into emotion inferences. Similarly the newly developed stimuli provides 
extra context by allowing expressions to unfold in real time as they are experienced, potentially 
explaining the lack of group differences. 
7.3.2 Theory of mind 
There are better implications to be drawn for ToM, as the RM task does require ToM. Firstly it is 
required to consider what would make an individual react in a certain way, and then subsequently 
mentally assume that situation to try to approximate an emotional state. Within the sample recruited, there 
was a significant negative correlation between eyes task score and AQ score, however this did not 
translate to group differences. There was however no correlation between RM ability and AQ scores. The 
presence of a relationship between eyes task scores and AQ scores but no group differences between ASC 
and control would suggest the difficulties in ToM associated with ASC are not as prevalent as previously 
suggested, specifically in the case of high functioning individuals. The RM score is comprised of the 
correct recognition of the antecedent event that caused the viewed reaction, what that score does not 
encapsulate is the inference of emotion to that expression, as this was asked after the recognition of the 
event, there is a ToM aspect to this secondary question which requires the mental assumptions of another 
state. 
When inferences are considered, the ASC group still chose the correct matching emotional state 
significantly more than would be expected but this  was 3% less in frequency than controls to posed 
expressions and 3% less to spontaneous expressions after correctly retrodicting the event. Interestingly 
after incorrectly retrodicting the event the ASC group gave a consistent emotion inference to the inco rrect 
retrodiction (for example wrongly guessing maths question but still saying the person looked like they 
were thinking) 7% more frequently than controls to posed expressions. Such rigidness to contextually 
consistent inferences suggests the ASC group was more reliant on their retrodiction to subsequently 
deduce an emotional state. Still, this finding is in line with the expression pattern and recognition results, 
suggesting ASC participants do show milder difficulties when they are presented with stimuli of subtle 
expressions forcing them to commit to any prior assumptions they have made about context.  
It would appear from the results the errors that fall along valence lines are specific to inference 





lines in emotion production and recognition; however inferring someone else’s emotional state after an 
eliciting event requires knowledge of appropriate contextual emotions. The most likely and salient source  
of this knowledge is from the self, much like simulation theory postulates, an internal simulation of how 
the self would feel is applied to the target. But there is no certainty that everyone responds the same way. 
To assess the results in respect of theory-theory and simulation-theory it might be most appropriate to 
consider the events as targets for retrodiction and their potential familiarity to participants. Events more 
likely to occur in social context such as receiving positive and negative feedback would expect consistent 
inferences because they are more likely to have been incorporated into a theory. In the same manner if 
more obscure eliciting events such as repeat experiment and not recording present more inconsistent 
emotion inferences this could be construed as supporting evidence for theory-theory which would not be 
as developed in understanding and predicting behaviour in obscure situations that have never been 
encountered. The results did reflect this with more consistent emotion inferences to  events that are less 
obscure.  
Although the above interpretation provides some support for a theory -theory basis of 
mentalising, the result could also be explained to support simulation -theory. The higher frequency of 
consistent emotion inferences to less  obscure events would be expected in either theory, it is suggested 
that certain basic rules underpin mentalizing in simulation theory to save the costly resources of 
simulation. In the context of this research the increased consistent inferences to less o bscure events may 
be attributable to given rules that are accepted as truths, not requiring simulation. Not until more obscure 
events are encountered is simulation employed which relies on the simulated behaviour of the self to 
extrapolate to others. The complexity of the simulation in living obscure events may well cause 
simulation error which could explain the lower consistency, it is also possible that the simulation is 
correct but the event is so obscure that individual inferences differ greatly resulting in a wider range of 
inferences that do not converge. 
There is a strong body of evidence for ToM difficulties in ASC (Baron-Cohen et al., 1997; 1996; 
1985; Frith & Frith 2005), although this research did not find any results of particular strength to sup port 
the theory, which is more than likely attributable to the sample recruited. Future studies of the same 
design with an ASC sample not majority recruited from the CARD (which appeared to be educated to a 





of inference between the groups which could hold more implications for the ToM. The ToM refers 
specifically to the ability to assume the mental states of others and predict behaviour, which is directly  the 
task set in the RM task although rather than prediction it tasks retrodiction. However, other aspects 
involved in recognising and vitally understanding an emotion encompass more than just ToM ability - 
this was introduced in section 1.3.4.4 where the case was made for empathy difficulties globally 
contributing to emotion difficulties in ASC. The ToM does not account for enough of the process of 
recognising and understanding the emotion of others, to do this emotional empathy would need to be 
included which is more closely associated to the Alexithymia hypothesis than the ToM. 
7.3.3 The Alexithymia hypothesis 
The Alexithymia hypothesis  is where this research can have the most grounded implications. 
Alexithymia was measured in the production (chapter 3), validation (chapter 4), and investigation of FER 
difficulties in ASC (chapter 6), in each of the experiments there was reasonable overlap between 
Alexithymia traits and autism traits this was most pronounced in chapter 6 where diagnosed ASC 
individuals were sampled. This reasonable overlap in typically developing individuals and considerable 
overlap in individuals diagnosed with ASC supports the previous literature that suggests Alexithymia is 
indeed present in a considerable proportion of the ASC population (Berthoz & Hill 2005; Hill & Berthoz 
2004; Bird & Cook 2013). If we are to consider emotion processing as a reciprocal action, (that the 
emotions we show shape and govern the emotions shown back to us) then it is important to consider the 
role of Alexithymia in expression production as well as recognition. As discussed in section 7.1.2 there 
were separate associations between ASC and Alexithymia expression production. Alexithymia was 
associated with less evocative posed expressions whilst ASC were associa ted with more evocative 
spontaneous expressions.  
Investigating the recognition of those expressions there was worse recognition of the 
spontaneous expressions as Alexithymia increased in the displayer. This is surprising given that no 
association was found between Alexithymia traits and spontaneous expression displays. There is then the 
potential that spontaneous expressions displayed by individuals with Alexithymia are no different in AU 
clarity but may manifest in different patterns potentially explaining the higher number of factor structures 
within spontaneous expressions. Alternatively expressions produced by those with ASC and co -morbid 





spontaneous. This in turn could influence the expressions that are shown in response and leave social 
interaction in a state of miscommunication. 
The effects of Alexithymia on emotion recognition in the expression recipient were also 
investigated. This is perhaps most pertinent to the Alexithymia hypothesis , typically developing adults 
showed a borderline significant overall negative relationship with emotion recognition, this was increased 
to significance when only spontaneous expressions were considered. Alexithymia traits in the general 
population were negatively associated with the ability to recognise spontaneous expressions. It is unclear 
why this result was found given that there was better recognition of spontaneous expressions overall and 
that spontaneous expressions showed more consistent display patterns suggesting they should be more 
easily recognised. It is not the case that expressions created by individuals with alexithymic traits are 
worse recognised by those with Alexithymia, as discussed above Alexithymia is associated with posed 
expression production but spontaneous expression recognition. It may be that the altered spontaneous 
expression production which is associated with ASC (chapter 3) has a greater impact on the recognition 
abilities of individuals with ASC and Alexithymia traits (chapter 4). 
However this did not translate to individuals with an ASC diagnosis (chapter 6) where no group 
differences were found on the RM task or eyes task according to diagnosis (but the groups presented 
significantly different AQ scores and Alexithymia scores). When the sample was grouped regardless of 
diagnosis, and then subsequently split into severity of Alexithymia, there was evidence of group 
differences between low, possible and high Alexithymia. No effect of alexithymia was present on RM 
scores. Investigating the spread of AQ scores within Alexithymia severity showed a linear relationship as 
would be expected with more severe Alexithymia traits associated with more severe autistic traits. It is 
unclear then why Alexithymia would not follow this trend relative to RM performance, the Alexithymia 
hypothesis is based on the premise that a sub group of ASC individuals will also score highly in 
Alexithymia. This was indeed the case but no differences were present in RM score  or eyes task score 
between the groups. The presence of an ASC group who majority self-reported as either medium or 
severe in alexithymia traits would expect to support the alexithymia hypothesis. .  
In regards to the Alexithymia hypothesis, the results presented on expression development in 
relation to Alexithymia are limited and should be considered preliminary in any interpretations. A larger 





Alexithymia on expression production and subsequent recognition. Future attempts to carry out such 
research should also avoid co-morbid ASC to further understand the effects of Alexithymia independent 
of ASC. In relation to recognition specifically, the ASC group s elf-identified as significantly more 
alexithymic than controls but no group differences were present in RM or eyes task performance. When 
investigating Alexithymia severity, group differences did emerge on the eyes task but not the RM task, 
This is contrary to expectations given that the RM task was expected to require a greater understanding of 
socially appropriate emotional displays. A co-morbidity was found consistently between Alexithymia and 
ASC, therefore the Alexithymia hypothesis  can account for a certain degree of FER difficulties in ASC 
but this pertains to the eyes task specifically. As for why this may be the case, it could be the RM task 
incorporates more contextual information to aid recognition and understanding , this is would appear to be 
the case in comparison to the eyes task with its limited visual information, static greyscale images. 
Alternatively, the RM task may prove too simple a task and require more emotion states and options to 
provide better specificity. 
Despite no group differences being present in this research, it is believed that with an ASC 
sample more representative of the ASC population generally (rather than particularly high -functioning 
and educated individuals with an avid interest in research) that some group differences would emerge. 
However it is not expected under the same design that those differences would be as pronounced as other 
research reports. The Alexithymia hypothesis is supported by strong co-morbidity in both the general 
population and those with an ASC diagnosis, and differences in severities on the eyes task. Based on the 
current results there does appear to be some evidence for alexithymia explaining emotion 
recognition/processing difficulties. This is because alexithymia severities identified differences on the 
eyes task where ASC diagnosis could not. However, the specific hypothesis of alexithymia underpinning 
difficulties within autism was not supported, such an ASC sample with high alexithymia traits would be 
expected to provide supporting evidence for this hypothesis. Future research should attempt to increase 
the demands of a RM task and recruit a more typical ASC sample before discounting the alexithymia 
hypothesis of emotion difficulties in autism entirely.  
7.4 Practical Applications 
Of course the applications of the research are perhaps most importantly within the field of 





future research to consider the sample and if it is representative of the majority as a whole (and also 
potentially re-think the real world impact of certain difficulties associated with autism to those on the 
higher-functioning end of the spectrum.). It also highlights the need  to re-evaluate the methods used 
previously and if these are designed in a way that emphasize difficulties that may not be as pronounced 
under real world conditions. It is hoped the methods employed in this research prompts others to consider 
what is the best way to assess competencies which can guide future interventions thinking about emotion 
processing more holistically as social interaction and understanding.  It is the aim to have the stimuli 
created for use in this thesis freely available for use in research, this would in clude the 266 posed and 
spontaneous video reaction captured and the additional 266 static frames isolated. 
The introduction of this stimuli set comes at a time where there is a growing need for naturalistic 
expressions, and a better understanding of natural expressions. This is particularly prevalent in the 
technology and computer sciences fields. A recently published review of dynamic datasets highlighted the 
growing need for dynamic stimuli sets of spontaneous expressions (Krumhuber, Skora, Küster & Fou 
2017). Key aspects of focus highlighted were for a greater need of experimental control in creating and 
capturing spontaneous expressions, and that expressions should be in a multi-modal format. Also noted 
was the prevalence of research using dynamic stimuli sets in computer science research over the last 15 
years (1543), and that in social sciences over the same period (124). This research addresses some of 
those concerns raised and also provides evidence to further corroborate that spontaneous expressions 
manifest differently, as a result the previously held ideas on how expressions should be viewed and what 
they should look like need to be re-evaluated. 
The findings in regards to spontaneous and posed expressions have practical applications in 
certain interventions. One notable area of application is the growing increase in the use of social robots to 
aid individuals with autism (Kim et al, 2013; Cabibihan, Javed, Ang & Aljunied 2013; Diehl, Schmitt, 
Villano & Crowell 2012; Scassellati, Admoni & Matarić 2012). The benefit of using robots with autistic 
individual is their predictability which allows a lowered state of anxiety for the autistic individual to 
engage in social interaction. The benefit of these results in such a context would allow engagement with  
expressions that can more closely resemble natural expressions to better prepare for interaction with 
humans, this can allow engagement with expressions in either format, posed or spontaneous with the best 





expressions as a concept could hold valuable knowledge for future social skills that not all expressions are 
genuine and some may be for humorous intent.  
Similarly the RM task requires the understanding of socially appropriate responses and 
emotions, typically autistic individuals prefer to plan their days to avoid unexpected change. The use of 
the RM paradigm can be incorporated into this planning to consider the possible interactions that could 
occur and how could people respond? This allows the individual to develop the skill of thinking how 
could people respond to given events, allowing them to be better prepared and reduce anxiety in the hope 
of improving the quality and frequency of social interactions. 
7.5 Future Directions 
There are some potential avenues of research implementing the proposed design and stimuli; one 
such example is to examine the allocation of attention to stimuli via eye tracking measures within an ASC 
sample. There is still debate in the literature regarding the claim that ASC individuals pay less attention to 
the eyes during emotion processing. Some research claims there is less attention to the eyes (Klin et al., 
2002) and face (Rutherford & Towns 2008, Neumann et al., 2006), while other research shows the effect 
to be far less pronounced (Leung, Ordqvist, Falkmer, Parsons & Falkmer, 2013). There is the potential to 
investigate this area with the revised paradigm and stimuli given that results in this thesis suggested there 
are different production of posed and spontaneous expressions, and subsequently viewing styles and 
recognition rates it would seem a natural progression to investigate the viewing styles to natural stimuli in 
ASC investigating if the results from chapter 6 are replicated in a sample more representative of the 
breadth of ASC rather than those particularly high functioning. 
There is also the opportunity to incorporate psychophysiological measures, this allows for 
hypotheses investigating the role of arousal mitigating altered visual pathways in ASC. Current theories, 
such as Porges’ Polyvagal Theory (1995; 2003; 2007; 2009) implicate the inability of individuals with 
ASC to regulate their autonomic arousal via the Ventral Vagus nerve. Typically the more advanced  
Ventral nerve with its myelinated sheath acts as a vagal brake to the excitatory Dorsal nerve which 
activates in situations related to survival (Porges 2007; 2003). 
Activation of the Ventral nerve which allows self-soothing in social situations is measured via 





representative of greater neural control over cardiac rhythm (Porges 2007), this control is the self-
soothing technique to limit physiological excitation, allowing social interactions to take place without 
negative affect arousal influencing judgements and behaviour. There is evidence of lower RSA 
amplitudes in ASC children compared to controls when viewing stimuli of individuals reading a story 
(Van Hecke et al., 2009). Furthermore higher RSA amplitudes were related to higher social skills and 
fewer problem behaviours (Van Hecke et al., 2009). There is also evidence that ASC children who 
exhibited better vagal control of the heart also recognised emotion faster (Bal et al., 2010). The inability 
of ASC individuals to have as much control over the ventral Vagus nerve would appear to be disallowing 
them the calm state of mind that facilitates TD individuals.  
Expanding upon previous work  (Van Hecke et al., 2009; Bal et al., 2010), an interesting avenue 
to pursue would be to analyse the data of visual perusal to regions of interest, and cross reference this 
with measures of psychophysiological arousal. This could provide results potentially detailing the a rousal 
behaviour of ASC individuals in response to certain regions of emotion expressions and facial stimuli. 
The stimuli and task used in the thesis would align with such an experiment in providing realistic 
expression in social context which should allow better understanding of how attention is allocated and 
why. This could have early implications for the literature surrounding the atypical perusal of emotional 
stimuli in individuals with ASC. 
7.6 Conclusions 
This thesis aimed to create a new stimuli set that better represented the demands of everyday 
social interaction, and subsequently use this to investigate the often conflicting results around emotion 
processing abilities in ASC. First when creating the stimuli it was shown that the spontaneous express ions 
conformed to more consistent display patterns across individuals than posed expressions (chapter 3). In 
chapter 4, continuing from the consistent display patterns shown in chapter 3, typically developing adults 
showed significantly better recognition of spontaneous emotions than posed, an effect later replicated in 
subsequent studies with ASC populations (chapter 6). In chapter 5 there was shown to be different 
viewing styles to posed and spontaneous expressions. Children made significantly more fixations and 
longer durations fixated to posed expressions; it was hypothesized this was due to the ambiguous display 
patterns in posed expressions which resulted in more scanning of the face. Lastly in chapter 6 the 





there were no significant differences between the groups on RM task performance or on the eye task. A 
lack of difference on the RM task alone could have implications for the type of tasks used previously. 
Specifically, questioning if the artificiality of previously used expressions and task demands limit the 
amount of social information available for use in compensatory mechanisms in ASC. The lack of 
differences present in the eyes task, which has  a fairly well documented effect within ASC, draw into 
question the typicality of the ASC sample recruited. Replications are required to investigate the 
differential demands of the stimuli created and RM task relative to previous methods. The stimuli creat ed 
in this thesis are available for use in future research and their use is encouraged to more accurately assess 
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Appendix B: Prompt script 
Prompt 1 positive feedback: 
First the block design subtask of the WASI-II was introduced to the participant, explained and completed. 
Upon completion the participant was given positive feedback. 
“Wow that was really fast, faster than average well done” 
On occasions where participants found the task particularly difficult the feedback was tailored to ensure 
the praise was still acceptable and not beyond belief as presenting feedback unbelievable in content can 
be refuted. In such cases the individuals’ performance was acknowledged. 
 “Once you completed the nth trial your performance became much faster and you were faster than 
average well done” 
Prompt 2 Monopoly money: 
Once the participant had responded to the positive feedback on the block design task they were rewarded 
with monopoly money for performing well. 
 “Based on your performance, I have a reward for you *hand over monopoly money*”  
Prompt 3 Maths question: 
After the participants’ response to the monopoly money had ceased, the participant was informed they 
would now be asked a series of five maths questions and that they may find some more difficult than 
others depending on their ability. 
“What is 5 multiplied by 3? 
“What is 15 multiplied by 2?” 
“What is 20 minus 7?” 
“What is 12 plus 8?” 
“What is 616 divided by 7?” 
Prompt 4: Negative feedback: 
“Based on your performance I would expect you to perform a little faster on the maths questions it wasn’t 
so quick” 
The exact feedback given at this point was also subject to minor alterations to ensure participants 
accepted the feedback rather than outright refuting it. 
“Whilst your performance on the first four was fast, compared to others and your previous performance 
on the block design I would expect you to perform faster on the last question” 
Prompt 5: Not recording: 
At this point the participant was informed the experiment was completed and the audio recorder was to be 
turned off. The researcher then stated the audio recorder had failed to record the experiment . 
 
“Okay that’s this section completed I’ll just turn off the audio recorder *researcher checks audio 
recorder* ohh no, it’s stopped recording, only eight seconds have been recorded ” 
Prompt 6: Repeat experiment:  
The researcher then asked the participant if they would be willing to repeat the entire experiment. 
“Umm, would it be okay if we did it again? It would mean you would have to complete the questionnaires 
again too, in case you had a question at any point” 
Prompt 7: No repeat: 
Lastly the participant was informed there was no need to repeat the experiment: 






Appendix C: Emotion report sheet 
Below are some scenarios, could you please explain how you felt during each scenario. You may use the 
list of examples provided at the bottom or choose an alternate response if you so wish. 
 




2. How did you feel when you performance was rewarded with monopoly money?  
__________________________________________________________ 
 
3. How did you feel when you were asked the last maths question? (what is 616/7) 
__________________________________________________________ 
 
4. How did you feel when you were told your performance on the maths questions was below what 
was expected of you? 
_________________________________________________________ 
 
5. How did you feel when the researcher told you the Dictaphone had not been recording? 
__________________________________________________________ 
 




7. How did you feel when the researcher explained the recording had worked and there was no 










































Appendix D: Renewed consent and debrief information 
 
 
Consent for use of stimuli 
 
By signing this form I acknowledge the true purpose of the research has been explained to me, the stimuli 
gathered has been explained to me by the researcher and I understand the intended purpose of the stimuli 
gathered. I agree to have the stimuli used as  described below.  
 
This will involve: 
 Editing (as described by the researcher) 
 
 Use as stimuli displaying spontaneous natural emotional reactions in future research.  
 
 Tick this box to give consent for your stimuli to be used in future research  as explained 
 
 
- Below are some extra consent options concerning the stimuli  in publication and 
research sharing purposes please tick to indicate consent: 
- Have the stimuli appended in image format to published research papers  
- Have the stimuli appended in video format to published research or conference 
talks  
- Adding the stimuli to a database of emotions to be shared with other researchers 














First of all I would like to thank you for your participation in my research. The true aim of the study was 
to develop high quality naturalistic spontaneous expressions of emotion to be used in future research. It 
was necessary to deceive you as to the true nature of the research to obtain high quality naturalistic 
expressions, something that is lacking in the autism literature. Unfortunately if you were aware of being 
recorded throughout the entire interaction and were aware the purpose was to specifically  capture 
naturalistic emotion expressions the intensity and validity of those expressions would be compromised.  
Previous research has shown inconsistencies in the ability within autistic populations to accurately 
recognise expressions of emotion (Kennedy & Adolphs 2012), however this finding is inconsistent in the 
literature (Tracy et al. 2011). The inconsistency is believed to be attributable to differing stimuli and 
autism sub-types in addition to differing methodologies (Harms, Martin & Wallace 2010). As the 
research within autism progresses it is becoming clear that individuals with autism often feel isolated 
and this can lead to thoughts of suicide and in some cases attempts (Cassidy et al. 2014). Therefore 
there is a need for research within the field to progress and improve measures to accurately assess the 
difficulties faced by individuals with autism. One such progression is the need for a stimuli set that has 
naturally expressed emotions more indicative of the nuanced interaction that individuals with autism 
are l ikely to face in real world social interactions. The present research aimed to achieve this by 
gathering spontaneous reactions to certain social cues with the displayer unaware they were being 
recorded for that express purpose. It is hoped the stimuli gathered will  allow comparisons of both 
dynamic stimuli and static in addition to subtle complex emotions and basic emotions across a variety of 
intensities as would be expected in the real world. 
 
Cassidy, S., Bradley, P., Robinson, J., Allison, C., McHugh, M., & Baron-Cohen, S. (2014). “Suicidal 
ideation and suicide plans or attempts in adults with Asperger's syndrome attending a specialist diagnostic 
clinic: a clinical cohort study.”. The Lancet Psychiatry, 1(2), 142-147. 
Harms, M. B., Martin, A., & Wallace, G. L. (2010). “Facial emotion recognition in autism spectrum 
disorders: a review of behavioural and neuroimaging studies”. Neuropsychology review, 20(3), 290-322. 
Kennedy, D., P., & Adolphs, R. (2012) “Perception of Emotions from Fac ial Expressions in High-
Functioning Adults with Autism”. Neuropsychologia 50 (14), 3313–3319 
Tracy, J. L., Robins, R. W., Schriber, R. A., & Solomon, M. (2011) “Is Emotion Recognition Impaired in 
Individuals with Autism Spectrum Disorders?”. Journal of autism and developmental disorders 41 (1), 
102–109 
 








If you have any further questions please do not hesitate to contact the researcher. 
Contact details: 
Researcher: David Walker - Walker29@uni.coventry.ac.uk 







Appendix E:  SPREE request form 
 
The full Spontaneous and Posed Reactive Expressions of Emotion (SPREE) stimuli set 
consisting of 133 posed expressions and 133 spontaneous expressions in full colour 
video format with an additional 133 posed and 133 spontaneous full colour images of 
the isolated most expressive frame are freely available for use in future research. It is 
required you agree with the terms of use outlined below: 
The images must not be altered without the permission of the owner and the exact 
manner of alterations must be agreed. 
E-mailing the below address with request to access the stimuli set will indicate your 
agreement to the terms. 
Davidjwalker24@gmail.com  
At which point the link to the stimuli set will be e-mailed to you. 
 
The author would be grateful to know of any findings generated through the use of the 











Coventry Young Researchers 2016 
Event: 1st – 5th August 2016 
Experiment Abstract Submission  
Deadline: 08/01/2016 5pm 
Email completed form to  
 
Experiments can be for children (under 6 years, or aged 6-12 years) and/or adults. Please bear in mind 
that experimental tasks should be fun and engaging and cannot take more than 20 minutes. A limited 
number of background measures will be administered in a separate experimental session to be shared 
between experimenters. There will also be a separate call for pilot studies and dissemination activities 
(e.g., posters, projections, videos) later in the year.  
 
Experimenters are expected to be present for the whole of the event and to contribute to the wider 
organization and delivery of the event in some way. 
Experimenter(s) 
David Walker - Second year PhD student. 
Scientific Title 
Can Children Deduce Social Scenarios Based on Emotional Responses: A Retrodictive Mindreading Eye 
Tracking study. 
Scientific Abstract (max 250 words) 
The ability to infer which social situation is likely to have resulted in a specific emotional respo nse is a 
key facet of effective social communication. This ability, termed retrodictive mindreading, is an emerging 
avenue of research in social cognition. There is evidence to suggest difficulties in this ability are present 
in individuals on the autism spectrum, where the increased difficulty of the task more accurately 
replicates true social interaction and requires semantic understanding of the stimuli presented. Currently 
there is little research investigating this ability in children and the combination of this method with eye-
tracking is still novel in the literature. The current research aims to employ a new stimulus of broader 
expressions whilst monitoring the visual scan paths and fixations of participants. Assessing participants 
verbal and performance IQ along with autistic traits and Alexithymia, will allow analysis into the 
influence these conditions have on the overall success of retrodictive mindreading ability. Further any 
variations in visual field attention or scan path differences that may be associated with said ability are to 
be analysed. Participants will view videos (length 1s -10s) of 7 prompt categories (examples include being 
asked a maths question, being given positive feedback, being given negative feedback) each posed and 
spontaneous, resulting in 56 expressions in total. Participants will have to infer based on the video what 
prompt they believed caused the reaction in the video. In addition participants will answer various 
questions relating to perceived intensity and what emotion they believe is present.  These will be 
administered on the Tobii (1750) eye tracker. The AQ (child) and TAS-20 scales are due to be completed 
by the parent and WASI-II separately. 
Background measures 
Autism Spectrum Quotient (child) - Auyeung, B., Baron-Cohen, S., Wheelwright, S., & Allison, C. 
(2008). The autism spectrum quotient: Children’s version (AQ-Child). Journal of autism and 
developmental disorders, 38(7), 1230-1240. 
This takes approximately 10-15 minutes to complete and consists of 50 questions to be completed by the 
parent. IT measures autistic traits in children from age 4 onwards but does not indicate a diagnosis. The   





The 20 item Toronto Alexithymia scale - Parker, J. D., Taylor, G. J., & Bagby, R. M. (2003). The 20-Item 
Toronto Alexithymia Scale: III. Reliability and factorial validity in a community population. Journal of 
psychosomatic research, 55(3), 269-275. 
This takes approximately 5 minutes to complete, Alexithymia is a condition whereby inviduals have 
difficulty experiencing and unders tanding emotions. It consists of questions such as “I am often confused 
about which emotion I am feeling” and “I am often puzzled by sensations in my body” This scale is to be 
completed by the parents. 
Wechsler abbreviated scales of intelligence – II  - Wechsler, D. (1999). WASI manual. San Antonio: 
Psychological Corporation 
This takes approximately 30 minutes and provides a reliable estimate of general cognitive ability across 
four tasks: vocabulary, block design, similarity and matrix reasoning. This task is to be completed by the 
child. 
Lay title (max 6 words) 
Mind Reading – Can you guess what happened to someone from their reaction? 
Lay abstract (max 100 words) 
How good are you at mind reading? We need to work out how people feel and make sense of their 
behavior every day. However, we do not know how this fascinating ability develops in childhood. This 
research is exploring children’s ability to guess what caused  another person’s reaction. For example did 
they just hear a nice comment, or did they just get some toy money?! While watching the videos the 
researchers will measure where you look at on the screen using a special computer, called an eye tracker. 
This will allow us to understand how children view and understand different types of realistic social 
situations. 
Lay debrief (max 100 words) 
We are interested in how children learn to infer emotions in everyday social situations, and what affects 
this ability for example, where you look in the video, whether the video was posed deliberately for the 
camera or more natural, and how intense you thought the reaction in the video was. We are also interested 
in how children’s general social, communicative and emotional behavior influences these abilities. 
Through this research we hope to find out how ability to interpret others emotions in realistic social 
situations develops in children. 
I want to work with participants  individually /  
      (delete as appropriate)  
Facilities needed 
Table, power supply, isolated space without distractions, silence  
Number of participants desired and age range:  
 Children < 6 years Children aged 6-12 years Adults 
Minimum number:  30  
Maximum number:  100  
 
Do you have enhanced disclosure from the DBS?  No 
*If yes, please provide  certificate number:   





Idea for a non-experimental activity 
In addition to the experimental tasks we have individual and group activities related to behavioural and 
brain science. Please suggest a fun activity that would link to your experimental task. 
           
Show videos about inattentional blindness, explaining that when attention is focused in one area we lose 
information that would seemingly appear to be much more obvious than o riginally thought. 
Example video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vJG698U2Mvo 
This could be expanded on by splitting the kids into two groups one group watching the  players dressed 
in white and one watching thosedressed in black to see if this affects the blindness. 
 
Finally this could be followed by a second video: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IGQmdoK_ZfY 
Where the children repeat the task, expected to spot the gorilla but will more than likely miss other factors 
























      
 


















Appendix K: Correlation plot of assessment measures and task 
performance 
 
 
 
 
 
 
